JOURNAL
of
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

T. G. MASARYK 1850-1950

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THOMAS G. MASARYK FOR THE FUTURE - - - - - - - - - *Oscar Jászi*

A STATESMAN OF THE MIDDLE ZONE OF EUROPE - *W. W. Kulski*

ENTER MASARYK: A PRELUDE TO HIS POLITICAL CAREER - - - - - - - *Otakar Odložilík*

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RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

VOLUME TEN APRIL, 1950 NUMBER ONE

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

OSCAR JÁSZI, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Oberlin College, sometime Professor at the University of Budapest and Minister for National Minorities in Hungary * * *W. W. KULSKI, Professor of International Relations, University of Alabama, sometime Polish Minister at London* * * *OTAKAR ODLOŽILIK, Professor of History, Charles University, presently Masaryk Professor of Czechoslovak Studies, Columbia University* * * *S. HARRISON THOMSON, Professor of History, University of Colorado.*

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THOMAS G. MASARYK FOR THE FUTURE

by Oscar Jászi

IN a period such as this in which we witness the upheaval of the European State system, the arrival of Asia as a factor in world politics, and the annihilation of many values of Western civilization, one almost loses the yardstick with which leaders of the past were evaluated. Only the belief in ethical values and the victory of ideas over mere expediency can restore our disturbed perspectives towards the rapidly changing reality of powers and compromises.

For the right understanding of Thomas G. Masaryk I felt therefore more appropriate to go back to the hour of his death than to try a new interpretation of his life and accomplishments. Therefore I beg to reproduce here a talk of mine given before the Assembly of Oberlin College, October 6th, 1937 after the passing of the President. Then my impressions were fresh and the traditions of liberalism were still strong. This talk was never published, but I know that I expressed in it the progressive opinion of my old country which not even the masked absolutism of Horthy could completely silence. (This dirty job has now been fully accomplished by the so-called dialectic anatagonists of feudal aristocracy: the Russian trained Hungarian Communists.)

The text of my talk follows:

* * *

In commemorating the great figure of President Masaryk, I painfully feel the impossibility to give in fifteen minutes a picture of a life so long, so rich, so noble; of a work so deep, so many-sided, so gigantic; of a personality so simple, so powerful, so sincere.

Yet to attempt this impossible task is a duty for anyone who had the privilege to come in personal contact with the greatest man of the war period. I say intentionally the greatest man, because the two others who might be

ranked with him do not in my estimation reach his height. President Wilson was as broad in his ideas, as sincere in his idealism as Masaryk was, but he had not his keen feeling of reality, his intimate knowledge of men and things. And Nicholas Lenin in spite of his grandeur as a revolutionary leader had not his deep human feeling, his craving for justice above class interests, his horror of bloodshed and violence.

I met him first at Budapest a few years before the World War when he paid a visit to our club of Hungarian progressive intellectuals who were as convinced as he that the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had come to a deadlock, and its only remedy would consist in the federalization and democratization of its antiquated structure. He impressed me then as a great university teacher with broad ideas and strong convictions. The next time I saw him was a few months after the War, in the Hradčany, the monumental palace of the former Bohemian and Habsburg kings where he had his offices as the first president of the newly created Czechoslovak Republic: the *President Liberator.* What a change in his appearance! These four years of continuous feverish activity—exposed to many dangers, persecuted by the police, surrounded by spies, traveling with falsified passports, saddened by the news of the death of one of his sons, of the imprisonment of his daughter and the internment of his wife, and by false rumors reporting the execution of his second son, and later in Siberia menaced by the bloody wars of the Russian Revolution—these four years of constant insecurity, between high hope and deep despair had made an enormous imprint on his personality. The former professor had disappeared: now he looked like a general. There was something commanding, resolute, inspiring about him. Though he was at this time in his sixty-ninth year, he impressed me as being a man in the fullness of his mental and moral energies. But this change was not the proud result of a successful and victorious career. On the contrary his former simplicity, sincerity, and unpretentiousness became even more accentuated. And further meetings with him confirmed my conviction that no man in modern history came so near to the ideal of Plato's Philosopher King. For him, politics was not a game of romantic adventure or enjoyment of power; it was rather a sacrifice carried on against his deepest inclinations. He said once to Karel Čapek, the distinguished Czech writer—and these words seem to me to give the key to his whole personality—"It is strange, considering what quantities of books and pamphlets I have published, that I published them all unwillingly. I had no desire for teaching either. And believe me, I dislike appearing in public. If I could have followed my own proclivities, I would have been satisfied to

read, study, and perhaps write for my own information; in short, to *learn.*" And if one looks over the list of his publications one is astonished by the wide range of the problems that aroused his interest. The Essence of the Soul according to Plato, Suicide as a Social Phenomenon, Hypnotism, the Skepticism of Hume, Concrete Logic, the Philosophic Foundation of Marxism, Natural and Historical Rights, Democracy in Politics, the Spiritual Currents of Russia, the Problem of the Small Nations—I mention these only at random to show the universality of his mind, his Faustian efforts to understand the world.

I can only enumerate the most salient episodes of his life in order to give an idea of how thought and action were always intimately connected in him. He had every reason to say that he remained always a Platonist.

Masaryk was the son of a Slovak coachman on an imperial estate. "My father was born in serfdom and remained a serf all his life," he used to say. His mother, a deeply religious woman, was a cook in elegant bourgeois homes. Though a passionate student in the grade schools his father sent him as apprentice to a blacksmith and later to a locksmith at Vienna. He learned as a child what exhausting physical work meant. But his intellectual cravings could not stand the monotony of mechanized labor. and by the assistance of a former teacher he was sent into higher education. After finishing his university studies he became soon a lecturer at the University of Vienna and later professor at the University of Prague. In these surroundings he witnessed the gravity of the nationality problem and the cultural political degradation of the Czech people in imperial, feudal, and clerical Austria. These two experiences—the drudgery of physical work and national humiliation—were, I think, a formative influence in his life. Soon came a third experience, not less significant. When he was a student at Leipzig, he fell in love with an American girl, Miss Garrigue of a New England family of Huguenot extraction, whom he married a few years later. Her inspiration and two voyages to America opened for him new horizons. He cherished the country of his wife and learned to understand its atmosphere. Without this perhaps he would never have come into close contact with President Wilson, who became more influential than any other statesman in the formation of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Until the war his activity centered around his university work. But not in the usual sense, because he could not separate his academic life from that of his people. He became, like William James, an "ardent protagonist of unpopular truths.' He shocked almost continuously the convictions of persons in authority. Justice was the supreme rule for him. Though an ardent

patriot, he unmasked the falsification of certain documents which had been venerated as the chief title to the cultural glory of the Czechs. Though deeply religious, he was in continuous fight with the Churches, both Catholic and Protestant. Though a convinced Socialist, he wrote a devastating criticism of the mechanical dogmatism of the Marxian ideology. Though very critical of the Jews, he did not hesitate to defend and liberate the Jew Hilsner when he was accused by demagogues of ritual murder. A wave of indignation swept over the country, and Masaryk was denounced as a paid agent of the Jews. Though a lover of Slav solidarity, he combated romantic Pan-Slavism and its hope of liberation by the Russian Czar. Though a pacifist and an intimate friend of Tolstoy, he attacked his doctrine of non-resistance. In all this and similar issues he called himself a *Realist.* He organized even a political party under this name. His Realism however, did not mean the present-day trite and dull matter-of-factualism. What he fought for was an idealism on a realistic basis. "You see how it is: the method must be absolutely practical, reasonable, realistic—but the aim, the whole, the conception is an eternal poem. Goethe has a nice phrase: *Exakte Phantasie.*"

As a realist he was not a fanatic opponent of the Habsburg monarchy. Like Palacký, the great Czech historian, he hoped for a time that the ramshackle empire might be rejuvenated on a broad, democratic, and federal basis. But he soon perceived that the Habsburgs, like the Bourbons, had learned nothing and forgotten all. He understood that the annexation of Bosnia was the beginning of the catastrophe. He denounced it in parliament, and when the agents of the Austrian foreign office accused the Serb and Croat leaders of treason by forged documents, Masaryk alone exposed the criminal conspiracy of the Viennese camarilla.

When the war came he foresaw that the old Empire would come to an end and that it was his historic mission to gain independence for his people, crushed by the Habsburgs for three hundred years. He escaped the surveillance of the police which surrounded all the prominent Czech leaders and fled abroad. In the company of Beneš, and a few other uninfluential intellectuals, he began in Italy, France, England, Russia, and the United States his daring campaign for the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It is no exaggeration when one of his disciples writes: "A handful of our people, headed by an aged philosopher, a few conspirators with lofty ideals but scarcely a farthing in their pockets, journeyed through Europe and America, proclaiming to the warring powers not only that the Czechoslovak nation had a right to independence, but that still more was necessary. . . .

it was essential to reconstruct Europe . . . " But his stroke of genius was when he succeeded in organizing a legion of the Czechoslovak war prisoners in Russia and Siberia. These fifty-thousand men proved a great support to the Allied Powers in the final struggle, and this army of ill-armed men made their way across the Siberian tundras, returning home by circumnavigating the globe in order to fight on the battlefields in Serbia, in the Debrudja, in Lombardy, and in the Argonne for what was then a non-existent state.

Having returned to his country, he began immediately to lead the work of building the new state. There was chaos, misery, civil war, and racial conflict everywhere. He tried to introduce justice, moderation, and the spirit of reconciliation. He knew that the peace treaties were unnecessarily cruel. When the German theatre in Prague was crudely damaged by the mob, he made it public that he would not appear in the Czech theater until the injured German building was restored. He brought a wreath to the grave of the great Hungarian poet Emery Madách, buried in Slovakia. He laid the foundation for a Hungarian Academy in Czechoslovakia. With these and similar actions he tried to check chauvinism and to build up a state guaranteeing real democracy and the rights of national minorities. And though he came short of the realization of his ideal (the odds were enormously against it), no honest observer can deny that Czechoslovakia is now [1937] the *only* country in Central Europe which in its structure, in its ideals is on the road towards a democratic commonwealth.

And this is the reason why the young republic is the object of the deepest hatred of the German, Italian, Polish, and Hungarian dictators. They all agree that they will never compromise with the republic; it must be destroyed. As a matter of fact, the future of the republic is extremely precarious, surrounded by powerful foes in a time when the help of the great Western democracies and of the League of Nations seems to be extremely doubtful. I often asked how the great old man in his lonely castle at Lany after his retirement from public affairs felt about things to come. Was he not oppressed by the growing insecurity of his great work? Unfortunately I could not see him in the last years, but I am convinced that his answer would have been approximately this: —Well, was not the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic a greater miracle than will be its continuation? And don't forget: what I did was not my personal work but the maturation of the Czech thought of many centuries. My ancestors are John Hus, who anticipated the Reformation on the continent; the Moravian Brothers, who developed the early forms of religious Socialism; the peasant cobbler Peter Chelčický, who in the turmoil of Hussite bloodshed became an influential

forerunner of Tolstoy and Gandhi; and John Comenius, who revolutionized the whole educational system of the world. —Can the dictators destroy such a spirit?

And if his strong belief in immortality was realized, he could have seen at his burial further confirmation of his optimism. I wish to quote a few sentences of the description of the funeral given by an impartial Englishman:

"One saw rich and poor, peasant and factory hand, and employer, who had been begged by the authorities to stay away from the over-crowded capital. They numbered perhaps two millions and had waited since midnight to pay this last tribute to their dead leader. Last night they sat on chilly curbs in the cold wind, patiently preparing to wait ten tours, huddled in blankets and coats, or without protection, for Masaryk's last passing. During the three-hour walk from Hradshin Castle to the railroad station the writer did not hear one syllable uttered in the dense crowd. . . . Most of the women were red-eyed from much weeping. . . . Most of the men stood with stony grief written on their dour Czech faces. . . . Here it was not an ordered and paraded assembly of 'fronts' or totalitarian parties gathered in masses by a precise political machine. Here no one could check presence and absence. . . ."

I ask you: Can the dictators destroy such a people?

* * *

I feel this picture is as I painted it thirteen years ago still true in its essence. The annihilation of the moral and spiritual lifework of the President did not alter it because its moral foundations were true. I would like, however, to add one or two reminiscences which throw additional light on his ideas and character.

In our talks which he conducted always in an atmosphere of leisure and informality the problem of Hungary and the Hungarian minority in the Czechoslovak Republic played, of course, a preponderant role. The Hungarian irredenta fomented by the Horthy regime and the hatred of Hungarian feudalism against Czechoslovakia, as the only succession state which began to follow the methods of democracy, were problems of our discussion. The President did not see a dangerous issue in the Hungarian minority. He was convinced that the only means to solve this problem was Justice. Justice towards the individuals and towards the corporate life of the group. He never believed in violence or compulsory assimilation.

Once I asked the President whether the frontier problem between the Slovaks and the Magyars could be solved and whether a revision of

the frontiers where compact homogeneous Hungarian groups were living could be sometimes discussed under more peaceful conditions. He answered: "If a genuinely democratic Hungarian government would come in whose loyal intentions we could believe, I do not see any reason why the existing controversies could not be discussed and a satisfactory settlement achieved."

Similar ideas he expressed later to a Budapest journalist, but the Horthy system, blinded by the idea of revenge and the restoration of historic Hungary, did not heed them.

At another occasion (it was our last meeting), thinking of the desperate dilemma of some Hungarian progressives between servile submission and secret irredentism, I asked the President: "May I ask you a purely theoretical question? If you were a Hungarian statesman, what would you do now? What would be the leading ideas of your policy in regard of Hungary proper and the Hungarian minority which had been cut off by the peace treaty?" I was somewhat disturbed by my own daring and was afraid that my question could be regarded as indiscreet or immodest. Therefore I immediately added: "I ask this, Sir, as a personal question for my own benefit, from a venerated teacher and not for publicity. Please do not answer if you regard it as inopportune."

After a few minutes of silence the President answered this: "Well in this hypothetical case I would try to do two things: First, I would fight for an honest carrying out of national autonomy for the Hungarians. In the second place, I would advocate the return to Hungary of those territories in the frontier regions where the Magyars constitute a solid, homogeneous majority . . ." And a little later the idealistic realist, afraid of utopias, continued with a smile: "Of course I do not know how far such a Hungarian statesman would be successful under the prevailing conditions. But he at least would advocate a reasonable program which one day might become reality, instead of the orgies of chauvinism which cannot achieve anything, but only create new inner convulsion and new war. . . ."

Here was honesty, reasonableness, vision and wisdom.

But the forces of hatred, fear and vengeance are often stronger—at least transitorily—than honesty, reasonableness, vision and wisdom. And it was the greatest shock in my experience after the Second World War that the successors of Masaryk had abandoned his whole nationality policy and had adopted the philosophy of Hitler and Stalin. Their foreign national minorities were persecuted or expelled in the name of efficiency, power or raison d'état. This policy was equally detrimental for the victors and for the vanquished not only in Czechoslovakia, but in all the countries

in which it was practiced. A new and more fatal cleavage was created between the national units in most of the newly reconstructed states. This cleavage was later terribly widened by the persecution of the churches and the annihilation of the peasants. And now the rupture has become so deep that the rather negative ideas of liberalism alone can never heal it. They must be supplemented by political federalism and economic union. Such a policy would be the logical sequence, the culmination and accentuation of the fundamental ideas of Masaryk.

Oberlin College

A STATESMAN OF THE MIDDLE ZONE OF EUROPE

by W. W. Kulski

SINCE I began writing this article devoted to a great Czechoslovak, my thoughts have been wandering back to the time when I had been closely associated with his countrymen, to the period of the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations of 1940-43. I remember how those negotiations were initiated. It was in September, 1940, during the Battle of Britain, that two Czechoslovaks; Ripka and Slavik, both members of their government, and two Poles, the Polish Ambassador in London, and I, met at a luncheon in the Polish Embassy. The conversation, at first indifferent, led us quickly to the crucial question as to the reasons of our meeting in London instead of Warsaw or Prague. Why our countries were conquered one after the other and why our nations were unable in 1938-39 to present a common front against Nazi Germany—those were natural subjects for a conversation between Czechoslovaks and Poles in the capital of their mutual ally. Then, in 1940 with German planes in the British skies and German troops in Poland and Czechoslovakia, how petty appeared the quarrel over Teschon which had been poisoning the mutual relations during the inter-war period. The mutual suspicions and bitter memories seemed to have disappeared in the face of the common danger menacing our nations. We fully realized that Poland and Czechoslovakia stood and fell together, that in modern conditions the one nation was unable to survive for long the downfall of the other. We could even enlarge the picture and include in it all other nations of this vast and unhappy Middle Zone of Europe stretching between Germany and Russia.

In that hour of danger the idea of a Polish-Czechoslovak federation was born. It had preceded other, similar conceptions, like the Greek-Yugoslav or the Benelux which were making their appearance later on among the respective continental Europeans in London. I believe that the idea of a Polish-Czechoslovak federation was sponsored sincerely by both Governments. I do not pretend to say that old memories of past misunderstandings disappeared as by a sudden miracle, but the new idea was taking root. I feel sure that the two leaders, General Sikorski and President Beneš, took it to heart.

Beginning with 1942 the Soviet Union was casting her long shadow. The Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations continued till May, 1943, but the pace was progressively slower. After the Stalingrad victory and the rupture of the Soviet-Polish diplomatic relations it became obvious that the Soviet

Union did not like the conception of any federation in the Middle Zone which was to become her zone of influence. The Polish-Soviet difficulties made the Czechoslovaks fear that they might be involved indirectly in a quarrel with Russia over the Polish affair. The negotiations were bogged down in the late spring of 1943. By that time I realized, as the secretary-general of the Polish delegation to those negotiations, that the scheme which had appeared to me so hopeful in 1940-41 was doomed to failure. But the defeat was due neither to the Poles nor to the Czechoslovaks, but to the overwhelming veto of Russia.[1] I could conclude that the idea itself was not still born, but only that the first attempt at its realization was fruitless because of unfavorable external circumstances beyond the control of the two nations concerned.

In 1938 Colonel Beck still thought that his country could arrange a *modus vivendi* with Germany while leaving Czechoslovakia to her own fate. Barely a year later Poland was invaded. In 1943-45 there were perhaps some Czechoslovaks who could believe that their country would be able to find some common language with the Soviet Union, to remain independent and to serve as a bridge between the East and the West, while Poland because of her historical conflicts with Russia had to be left alone to arrange her affairs as best she could. The events of 1948 proved again the existence of an inescapable geopolitical solidarity of the two nations. Being located between two great and dynamic powers, Czechoslovakia and Poland cannot afford to go each its own way.

If this is so, the Poles and the Czechosolvaks should make constantly a genuine effort to forget old quarrels, to raise themselves above their respective parochial points of view and to look to each other's historical past in order to reach a better mutual understanding, but not to find new or old pretexts for mutual resentments. Today when both countries have been reduced to the role of satellites of the Soviet Union it does not matter that T. G. Masaryk and Eduard Beneš on one hand, and Ignace Paderewski, on the other, opposed bitterly the claims of their respective countries to Teschen Silesia. But it does matter for the future of the two countries that the Poles and the Czechoslovaks should make an effort to measure fully the greatness of each of those three men and seek in them their inspiration.

Masaryk's mémoires provide two interesting instances of what should be the right perspective in viewing the Polish-Czechoslovak relations. He relates in them his cooperation during the First World War with Polish

[1] See the illuminating article by Eduard Táborský, "A Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation" in the January, 1950, issue of this JOURNAL, pp. 379-395.

leaders: Dmowski and Paderewski. "The Russian Polish leader, Roman Dmowski, who came to London in 1916, understood that the preservation of Austria was and would be a continual danger to the Poles. On many points we agreed. Little was then said of the Silesian question, which was very subordinate in comparison with our common aims."[1]

Elsewhere Masaryk relates a public meeting organized by the representatives of the oppressed nations of the Middle Zone in September, 1918, in New York's Carnegie Hall. It is interesting to see what was at that occasion the attitude of a great Pole, Paderewski, who represented his country at the meeting: "Of the Polish national program he said little, but of me much. He gave a sketch of my life and praised me to the skies. This surprised me the more because Paderewski was a Conservative by conviction and I should therefore have expected him to treat me with some reserve." How did Masaryk react? ". . . I decided that, like him, I would say little of my program but would speak for Paderewski by explaining the relationship of politics to art."[3]

If one would follow Paderewski's lead, Masaryk's life may be a source of inspiration to anyone who maintains his faith in mankind, because it was the life of a great humanist who claimed for good reasons to have been mainly influenced by Plato.[4] While his spiritual master had wanted to confide the government of an ideal republic to intellectuals, Masaryk and his contemporary Wilson proved practically that a professor at the helm of a State might sometimes do better than a professional politician. "People often made merry over the idea that professors like Wilson, Masaryk and Beneš, and men of science like Štefánik, should decide questions of international policy . . . I have never recognized an antagonism between theory and practice, that is to say, between correct theory and right practice; and just as I opposed one-sided intellectualism I stood out against practice divorced from thought."

Wilson and Masaryk became the acknowledged leaders of their nations in the hour of danger. Both led their countries to victory and both left a rich legacy of thought. Both had an unshakeable faith in democracy. While Wilson opened the gates of freedom for small European nations by his conception of self-determination of peoples, the latter being for him the natural consequence of democratic self-government, Masaryk helped greatly his country to benefit by Wilsonian self-determination and to shake off

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2 *The Making of the State* (New York. 1927), p. 120.

3 *Op. cit.*, p. 250.

4 "Plato was my first and chief poliitcal teacher," *op. cit.*, p. 318.

the centuries-old Hapsburg yoke. While Wilson's other title to immortality is his conception of the League of Nations, Masaryk's Czechoslovakia was foremost among the most faithful members of that first international organization. It is not a sheer coincidence that the ideals of the two statesmen had so many points in common—they were the sons of the same liberal period when the progress of mankind seemed to be bound to continue almost without setbacks and when the respect for the indivdual value of a human being was still high. From Masaryk's mémoires one does not gather the impression that he was particularly attracted by Wilson's personality. But he paid him nevertheless a fine tribute fully deserved by Wilson: "Wilson was and remains one of the greatest pioneers of modern democracy." One would be tempted to add: '. . . and of the application of democratic ideas to international relations.' When Masaryk continues: ". . . he proclaimed his faith and belief in the people as the basis of democracy,' this same compliment could be paid to Masaryk himself.[6] He conceived democracy as the expression of the faith in men and of the love of one's neighbor. His definitions are worth remembering now when we are facing he totalitarian conceptions and their opposition to the democratic ways of life: "The strongest argument for democracy—faith in man, in his spirit and immortal soul; that is true, metaphysical quality. Ethically democracy is based on the political realization of love of one's neighbor. . . . Democracy is not only a form of government, it is not only what is written in constitutions; democracy is a view of life, rests on faith in men, in humanity and in human nature, and there is no faith without love, there is no love without faith. I said once that democracy is a discussion. But real discussion is only possible where men trust one another, and honestly seek the truth. Democracy is a conversation among equals . . ."[7]

When on the tenth anniversary of the Czechoslovak independence President Masaryk addressed the youth of his nation from the balcony of the Prague Castle, he warned them that democracy is a living conception and could not be static: ". . . Our democracy must be constant reform and constant revolution of heads and hearts."[8]

The last three years of the Second World War were the period of a short-lived triumph of the so-called "realists" in international politics, of those who loved to talk in terms of the zones of influence of the Great Powers. The results of this kind of "realism" have been very different from

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 318.
[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 304.
[7] *Masaryk on Thought and Life* (London, 1938), pp. 190-191.
[8] Victor Cohen, *The Life and Times of Masaryk* (London, 1941), p. 244.

the sanguine expectations of the clever "realists." Now when we judge Munich, Teheran and Yalta in the light of their results, which were not expected by the "realists", it seems perhaps appropriate to quote Masaryk's mature judgment on "realism" in politics: ". . . politics like everything else that we must do, must be subject to ethical laws. I know that there are politicians, chiefly those who consider themselves to be terribly practical and clever, who do not care for that demand; but experience, not only mine, I think, shows that sensible and honest politics, as Havlíček says, are the most effective and most practical. In the end the ones that we call idealists are always right, and they do for the State, for the nation, and for mankind more than those politicians that are said to be realistic and clever. The smart fellows are stupid in the long run."[9]

Was Masaryk a hopeless idealist who refused to see the surrounding reality? The almost unbelievable success of his policy during the First World War is the best answer to this question. He realized fully that greatness in politics required a well-balanced marriage of a great, inspiring idea with soberly devised means of its realization. One cannot be a great statesman without imagination. It requires a great force of imagination to conceive the idea of the unification of Italy by the small Kingdom of Sardinia: it was necessary to have an even more powerful imagination to oppose in 1914 the conception of a Czechoslovak Republic to the still powerful Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, or to suggest to mankind a startling new ideal: a League of Nations. Without imagination there would have been no Cavours, Masaryks or Wilsons. Masaryk defined clearly and concisely the distinction between the idealism of political aims and the realism of the means: "Politics demand a considerable degree of imagination: to penetrate into the minds of contemporary men, and into history as well, to anticipate the line of social development; and to visualize the ideal towards which the development is pointing—in short, a touch of poetry does the statesman no harm, but that is imagination, not phantasy, or a Utopia."[10] The same thought is expressed even more laconically in another book: "You see how it is: the method must be absolutely practical, reasonable, realistic —but the aim, the whole, the conception is an eternal poem. Goethe has a nice phrase: *Exakte Phantasie.*"[11] Masaryk's own poem was an independent Czechoslovakia.

At a time when the Soviet leaders, followed by the satellite Communists,

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[9] *Masaryk on Thought and Life,* p. 157.

[10] *Op. cit.,* pp. 162-163.

[11] *President Masaryk Tells His Story,* Recounted by Karel Čapek (New York, 1935), p. 225.

persecute the intellectuals for the sin, true or alleged, of cosmopolitanism, when they force upon their countries the darkness of a cultural isolationism, when any contact with Western thought has been proclaimed anathema, the reading of the following lines is particularly impressive: "A bit of cosmopolitanism and polyglotism is part of the trousseau of modern man. To know other nations so as to appreciate better the quality and individuality of one's own. To praise one's own nation merely because the others are foreign and unknown to us, that I should say is blind love."[12] These words would sound like a political heresy in present day Prague, Warsaw or Moscow. Yet those men who impose cultural isolationism and, therefore, intellectual obscurantism upon their unwilling nations, and who, paradoxically enough, are not isolationists in politics and dream about an unlimited expansion, could ponder over those wise observations: "I remember what Napoleon came to on St. Helena: that in Europe there would no longer be any other arrangement possible except a league of nations. According to him, he was compelled to subdue Europe with arms, but now it had to be persuaded, there was no reason for keeping hatred alive among nations. Well I wonder: how many Napoleons and little Napoleons will have still to come to reason?"[13] To Napoleonic dreams of a Hitler or of contemporary Soviet leaders one could oppose the noble thought of the Czechoslovak humanist: "Reciprocity, internationalism, cosmopolitanism — we have a more comprehensive word for it: humanity. The development of the world is working towards universal humanity, to pure humanism. . . "[14]

No wonder that Masaryk could not be impressed by any racial theories, even if presented in a Pan-Slavic form. Yet it is only easy to understand why many of his countrymen were attracted by the conception of a Slavic brotherhood. A small nation almost surrounded by the powerful German nation and practically cut off from the West by this mighty neighbor, the Czechoslovaks could be tempted very naturally by the idea of opposing to the German "Drang nach Osten" a powerful combination of all Slavs led by the big Russian brothers. Moreover, as Masaryk observed many a time, his countrymen knew practically nothing about Russia and remembered only that Russia had been never an enemy of the Czechs and the Slovaks. Masaryk knew better. His warnings proffered during the First World War against a Russian Grand Duke ruling from the Royal Castle in Prague sound now like prophecy. Yet he simply knew Russia and, moreover, realized fully that a community of language though an important factor in

[12] *Masaryk on Thought and Life*, p. 174.
[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 176.
[14] *Ibid.*

itself did not imply necessarily a cultural unity or a solidarity of political interests. One gathers from his writings the general impression that he approached the other Slavic nations very much like any other European nation: with genuine sympathy, but without conferring upon them a particular love only because their languages had common roots with those of the Czechs and the Slovaks. "My relations with the Russians were excellent in all Western countries, and with the Southern Slavs and Poles, as later with the Ukrainians, I worked openly everywhere. We are and mean to be Slavs, albeit European Slavs and citizens of the world."[15] He was too much of a humanist to consent to be imprisoned within the narrow boundaries of a Czechoslovak or a Slavic nationalism. Without denying the existence of the Slavic kinship of blood and language he had no patience with various Slavic Messianic theories. While a Slavic Messianist, even of the present Communist coinage, believes that the Slavs have a historical mission to spread the "truth" in the world and to save the West from its "decadence", Masaryk was looking towards a synthesis of cultures. The Moscow Messianists of our times expressed their belief in this sentence printed on May 24th, 1949, in *Pravda*. "The Capitalist West, its era over, is enveloped in darkness of doom. But for the laboring people of all countries the dawn of liberty and happiness, filling the East, blazes with the bright light of hope. The light will triumph over darkness." To this Masaryk replied in advance: "We have no right to talk, as the Slav and the German Messianists did, of the 'decline of the West.' . . . Deeper knowledge points to a synthesis of culture, to the influence of all nations, Slav and non-Slav, upon each other . . . and my answer to the old saying *ex Oriente lux* is that light comes likewise from the West."[16] Masaryk knew in particular that a close contact of the Czechoslovaks, those most Westernized Slavs, with Russia "would soon demolish our Russophilism."[17] Perhaps this process of disappointment takes place now when Czechoslovakia lives, for the first time in her history, through a period of a Russian overlordship. Anyhow Masaryk could better than anyone else appreciate the difference in mentalities between the two nations, akin linguistically, but so different in other aspects. He knew Russia. He was there a few times, he saw her in the normal, pre-war conditions, and also when she was torn asunder by revolutionary convulsions. He studied her thought, especially that of the nineteenth century. His masterly *Spirit of Russia* may serve even today as a reliable guide for anyone who wants to understand Russian

15 *Op. cit.*, p. 14.
16 *Op. cit.*, p. 424.
17 *Op. cit.* p. 14.

mentality and grasp in an intelligent way the development of thought which culminated in the Revolution."[18]

Perhaps the chief value of this book lies at the present time not only in a conscientious documentation, but also in the author's objective comments. Masaryk did not try to make the problems easy for vulgar minds by simplifying the issues. He did not pretend that Russia belonged to another cultural world as some philosophers of history do. He fully acknowledged the impact of Western thought upon the Russian mind (this is why this book, one may suppose, is on the Soviet index), but he pointed also to the fact that the process of the integration of Russia within western civilization was not yet fully completed. A few quotations will suffice to illustrate his point of view: "A general survey of Russian development since the days of Peter the Great shows the country divided into two halves consisting respectively of an Old Russia with prepetrine civilization, and a New European Russia." ". . . the Europeanization of Russia does not consist solely in the adoption of isolated ideas and isolated practical institutions, but we have to do with a characteristic historical process in virtue of which the Old Russian essence, civilization, and modes of life are being transformed and destroyed by the inroad of the European essence, civilization and modes of life."[19] When one reads this diagnosis of the Russian culture which was founded by Masaryk upon a long labor of research, one realizes more fully how futile are the present endeavors of the Soviet leaders to pull Russia out of the orbit of the Western Civilization. The Westernization of Russia has proceeded for centuries, since the time of Peter the Great. This cannot be undone by the post-war decrees of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. It is too late in Russian history to try to exorcise the Western influence from the Russian soil.

Masaryk did not like the Bolshevik régime although he was never in favor of a foreign intervention. This was due perhaps partly to the revolutionary horrors he had witnessed himself: "By a singular association of ideas the word 'Bolshevism' recalls to my mind one scene among the many horrible and inhuman sights I saw during the Bolshevist Revolution. After the street fighting at Petrograd and elsewhere, the bodies of the fallen were sent to their families, usually in the well-known Russian *izvostchiks*. The stiffened bodies were thrown like logs into the little vehicles, the legs sticking out on one side and the head or sometimes a hand on the other. Ofter the corpse was placed on its feet and bound fast with a piece

[18] *The Spirit of Russia. Studies in history, literature and philosophy* (New York, 1919), 2 vols.

[19] *Op. cit.*, pp. 1 and 2.

of rope or a rag. I even saw one standing head downwards with the legs sticking up in the air. When I think of those gruesome sights, the unnecessary, senseless, barbaric killing of human beings by the Bolshevists always returns to my mind."[20] Perhaps he had also a foreboding of the terror which has been a constant instrument of government of the Bolshevik régime. Being a sincere democrat he could not condone a dictatorial system pretending to be infallible: "Communism is centralistic. Bolshevist centralism, in particular, is very rigid. It is an abstract system deduced from a thesis and applied by force. Bolshevism is the absolute dictatorship of a man and his helpers. It is infallible and inquisitorial. Thus it has nothing in common with science and scientific philosophy; for without freedom, science, like democracy, is impossible."[21] "Uncritical, wholly unscientific infallibility is the basis of the Bolshevist dictatorship; and a régime that quails before criticism and fears thinking men stands self-condemned.[22] When one thinks of the present purges of the Russian intellectuals, of the Central Committee of the Party dictating to composers how they should write their music, prescribing to biologists the methods of research, forbidding scientists to pay attention to Western thought, even to that of an Einstein, one must acknowledge the penetrating insight of Masaryk's severe judgment. But he knew that Russians had the centuries long legacy of a despotic central government and that they could not free themselves in a few years from the chains of that legacy: "The Russians, even the Bolshevists, are children of the Tsarism in which they were brought up and fashioned for centuries. They managed to get rid of the Tsar but not of Tsarism. They still wear the Tsarist uniform, albeit inside out . . ."[23]

To realize Masaryk's poem, to create an independent Czechoslovakia, it was necessary to wipe out the last vestige of feudal Europe, that antiquated Hapsburg monarchy which wanted to oppose to the assault of national aspirations of its subject peoples the meagre device of a personal allegiance to the dynasty. Masaryk, favored by the war events, did his best to hasten the inevitable process of dissolution. When he was making propaganda for the Czechoslovak cause, he fully realized that the Western Powers could hardly be interested in Czechoslovakia or any other small nation as opposed to the great powers of Central and Eastern Europe. Anyone who had to defend the interests of a small nation, especially of one of the middle zone of Europe, knows what Masaryk meant when he wrote: "I, like the

20 *The Making of a State*, p. 176.
21 *Op. cit.*, p. 178.
22 *Op. cit.*, p. 180.
23 *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

leaders of our national revival, had been tormented by the problem of our being so small a nation."[24] Is it not rather natural for the Western Powers to consider the affairs of the small nations of the middle zone in function, so to speak, of their policies towards the two great powers bordering on the zone: Germany and Russia? During the First World War one would have to add a third Great Power: Austria-Hungary. Masaryk had, therefore, to face more than once the problem of how to make the voice of small nations heard by the Western great powers. He realized that there was only one answer to the question, namely to present the problem of small nations as a whole well integrated through their own cooperation: "Even before the War the fate of the small nations appealed to me; for them I could see only one solution—political cooperation and reciprocity in economics and culture."[25] When in 1915 he had to present the inaugural lecture as a professor at the King's College in London and had to do it before a distinguished English audience, did he devote his attention to the problem of the Czechs and Slovaks? He had too keen a sense of realities to do so. The subject of that lecture was: "The problem of small nations in the European crisis." The lecture "brought out—in his own words—for the first time the political significance of the zone of small peoples in Europe that lies between the Germans and the Russians; it enabled me to put both the German 'Drang nach Osten' (The Urge towards the East) and Russian policy in a new light. . . ."[26] Later on in America, the same idea of a zone of small nations served well the interests and aspirations of all nations concerned. Masaryk had conversations with representatives in the United States of practically all of those countries; and the result was the foundation of a unifying organization called "The Mid-European Democratic Union", of which Masaryk became the president. The objective of the Union was as follows: "The Union was an excellent means of propaganda with the practical object of giving the public and the press information upon some or all of the peoples belonging to it. Eleven of them were represented at Philadelphia. Our object was also to put before the Americans a concrete idea of the zone of small nations in Central Europe upon the importance of which in the war and, indeed in European history, I constantly insisted. By getting to know and informing each other reciprocally the representatives of the various peoples were to prepare themselves for the Peace Conference and, if possible, to enter it with a concerted plan."[27]

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[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 29.
[25] *Masaryk on Thought and Life*, p. 201.
[26] *The Making of a State*, p. 87.
[27] *Op. cit.*, p. 255.

Already during the First World War the leaders of the small nations of the middle zone felt that they should address the great powers of the West as a unified force in order to be heard and to be given due consideration beside Germany and Russia. Unfortunately, their immense success at the Paris Peace Conference so largely due to the generous help of Wilson, the dizziness caused by the independence suddenly recovered by some of them and by a unification of national territories in the case of the others, the local quarrels over their mutual frontiers, these and other factors made the nations of the middle zone forget the essential unity of their most vital interests. "The Mid-European Union" died by the end of the war without leaving behind any permanent trace. Even Masaryk was never again active in this respect. He visualized the future of small nations with a much too sanguine optimism. Yet his countryman, F. Palacký, was not absolutely wrong when he said: "If Austria did not exist, she would have to be invented." The Hapsburg unity of the middle zone, or at least of a good part of it, could not survive the pressure of modern conditions. But the real problem for the small nations of that zone was and remains that of reviving "Austria" in a modern form of a political and economic union. The last war and its aftermath proved that those nations cannot survive as independent but isolated units. When some day they will be again faced with the problem which was solved before the war neither by Masaryk nor by any other leader of the middle zone but whose importance was fully appreciated during the last war by the son of T. G. Masaryk and by his faithful collaborator President Beneš, then they should remember that their freedom, survival and economic development depend on their ability to substitute for the dead corpse of the Hapsburg Monarchy not a diverse multitude of "sovereign" nations but a unified bloc of equal partners. Masaryk himself had great difficulties during the First World War in convincing people in Britain, America or France that Europe would be better off if Austria were replaced by several independent nations. People feared a Balkanization of Europe. Federation is the answer of free nations to that argument which has some validity.

To revive the memories of the Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations of the last war and to mention the conception of a federation of the middle zone at the present time when this zone is a Soviet zone of influence, might seem to be dreaming. Independent Czechoslovakia was also a dream in 1914. The wise old Masaryk advised: "Above all, patience is necessary, everywhere, in everything and especially in politics."[28]

[28] *Op. cit.*, p. 324.

In 1950, a hundred years after the birth of the illustrious descendant of humble Slovak serfs, one reads with emotion the simple and unpretentious words written by his son in a foreword to President Masaryk's biography published in 1941 when Czechoslovakia was, as she is today, living in the shadow of a foreign oppression: "A book about my father's life can do no harm to whosoever reads it. It can only do good, because his life in this surprisingly short period of time has become a symbol of decent Europeanism to a great many people who have not lost their sense of values. It is an unusual thing to recommend a book about one's father, but I am doing it gladly, in the unshakeable knowledge that only when some of the fundamental principles, which you will find well, honestly and intelligently described in this little book, again prevail, will Europe call her soul her own. That that day will come, there is, there can be, no doubt."[29] Jan Masaryk did not see the dawn of the day for whose coming he was hoping. But Europe will not recover her soul until the day when the principles dear to both Masaryks will again prevail.

University of Alabama

[29] Cohen, *The Life and Times of Masaryk*, p. vii.

ENTER MASARYK: A PRELUDE TO HIS POLITICAL CAREER

by Otakar Odložilík

IN August 1882 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was appointed Professor Extraordinary of Philosophy and moved soon afterwards from Vienna to Prague.

The fall of 1882 was a momorable period in the history of Czech education. The ancient university which had existed in Prague since 1348, was divided by an Imperial decree of April 11, 1881, into two institutions, one with German and the other with Czech as the language of instruction. The law stipulated that they should be treated as equal, but the practical application of the law was more favorable to the German university than to the Czech. Members of the staff were allowed to choose which institution they wished to serve, and on their decision depended also the fate of seminars, laboratories, special libraries and equipment. As the majority of the senior members opted for the German university, new appointments needed to be made on the Czech side and the Czech university had to be built up gradually from government subsidies or special grants.[1] Thus opened a bright prospect for Masaryk who, since 1879, had been lecturing as Privatdozent at the University of Vienna and had been experiencing material difficulties.

I.

Prague of the eighteen eighties compared unfavorably with the imperial residence on the Danube. The royal castle at the Hradčany remained uninhabited since the death of the sickly ex-Emperor, Ferdinand V. in 1875. The population of Prague had been increasing since the early forties by approximately one thousand a year and totalled in 1880 about 180,000. A relatively rapid development was noticeable in the industrial suburbs as well as in residential districts adjacent to the "New Town." The growth of the population in the metropolitan area and its material progress were evident. But any amalgamation of the new inhabitants flowing into the capital from all parts of the country with the old settlers proceeded at a slow pace. Until 1919 the suburbs existed as independent units surrounding the city of Prague, which, in turn, was divided into eight "towns" or districts.

[1] See Otakar *Odložilík, The Caroline University 1348-1948* (Prague, 1948), pp. 73-76, and H. Gordon Skilling, "The Partition of the University in Prague" the *Slavonic and East European Review* (London), xxvii (1949), 430-449.

Parochial interests occupied the minds of the well-to-do citizens of the Old and New Towns. The Smaller Town (Malá Strana or Kleinseite) on the left bank of the Vltava continued to exist in the shadow of the deserted Castle as the domain of the Bohemian aristocracy without evidencing any conspicuous change in its external appearance or social structure.

Wedged between the closed ranks of the nobility and the German-speaking bourgeoisie, the Czech patriciate suffered from cultural and social isolation. Its members worked out their own code of social behavior, barring the newcomers who might stir the stagnant waters or violate the unwritten rules of social conduct. Letters of some contemporaries agree with memoirs of that age in one point: the eighteen eighties were lean years in comparison with the earlier period or with the eighteen nineties. "That was an extraordinary period, those late 'eighties and early 'nineties. Twilight-like, barren, desperate, provoking, indeed, thoughts of suicide. The old forms were long ago outmoded and dying, to be more precise, dead but not falling from the tree of life and thus keeping the new concepts from sprouting"—this is the testimony by Francis X. Šalda who lived in Prague as a university student just at that time.[2]

Czech political life could not boast of a long or ramified tradition. It burst into full blossom in the spring of 1848 and bore its first fruit before the premature end of the revolutionary era. Czech political programs from 1848 to 1918 were in greater or lesser degree derived from principles and ideas formulated by František Palacký and propagated by his able lieutenant, Karel Havlíček. The Czech delegation to the Austrian Constitutent Assembly in the summer of 1848 acknowledged Palacký as its leader and chief spokesman.[3] The existence of one national party, distinct from other ethnical groups seemed to be, at that early stage of political development, the best guarantee of success in dealing with other nationalities under the Habsburg sceptre.

The victory of the Imperial Court over the revolutionary movements in various parts of the Habsburg Monarchy ushered in a period of absolutism during which political life was brought to a stand-still. After the promulgation of the October Diploma by Emperor Francis Joseph I in 1860 constitutional liberties were restored to the Habsburg subjects and political parties were revived by the prominent forty-eighters. Palacký reappeared on the stage assisted by František Ladislav Rieger (1818-1903)

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[2] Quoted from the preface to *Juvenilie* in *Dílo F. X. Šaldy*, I (Prague, 1925), 10.

[3] See for more information concerning Palacký and his role in 1848 Otakar Odložilík, "A Czech Plan for a Danubian Federation—1848" *Journal of Central European Affairs*, I (1941), 258 ff.

who figured prominently in the Constituent Assembly in 1848-9 and had, in 1853, married Palacký's daughter Maria. Havlíček did not live to see the downfall of absolutism: he sank to the grave in January 1856, his frail health broken by political persecution.

The Court circles hoped to remove Palacký from the political arena by a skillful maneuver. He was named in the spring of 1861 to the Upper House for life. But he soon realized that any chances of success in the assembly of grandees were infinitesimal and he ceased, in September 1863, to attend the sessions. For thirteen years, until his death in May 1876, Palacký worked systematically on his History of the Czech people, leaving the conduct of political affairs to Rieger.

Palacký enjoyed an enormous prestige in his country both as a historian and as political leader, and he was called Father of his People (*Otec národa*). But even his program was not free of criticism at the hands of some representatives of the younger generation. Rieger's position was in many respects weaker than that of his father-in-law. It was not supported by such scholastic achievements as Palacký's, yet he was endowed with undeniable political talent, and profited from familiarity with the current problems. His oratorical ability appealed to mass audiences. Rieger was more vulnerable than Palacký and, indeed, under Rieger's leadership differentiation in the National Party among the conservative and progressive elements made rapid strides. The rift which became evident in the early sixties was never healed. The two camps were eventually constituted as separate bodies, called currently the Old Czech and the Young Czech parties, the former with distinct conservative leanings, the latter inspired by liberal principles. Whereas the banners of the Old Czechs were adorned with the portrait of Palacký, the Young Czechs inscribed Havlíček's name upon their shield, turning to their profit the popularity which Havlíček had gained by his intrepid stand against the henchmen of the Imperial Court. Despite the differences of opinion and fierce polemics the delegates to the Imperial Council in Vienna, elected by the Czech speaking inhabitants of the lands of the St. Wenceslas Crown (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) were constituted as the *Český klub* (Czech Club) wth F. L. Rieger as its president from 1879 to 1891.[4]

A quiet and none too spacious house in the New Town which Palacký inhabited for several decades and into which Rieger moved soon after his marriage, was one of the most important centers of Czech society during

[4] See Zdeněk V. Tobolka, *Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1848 až do*

the nineteenth century.[5] In 1862 Rieger purchased an estate in south-eastern Bohemia (Maleč) and lived alternately there and in his city residence. His wife was never in perfect health and during the late 'eighties her condition deteriorated. She died in March 1891 in Rome where she sought refuge from the severe Bohemian winter. Their oldest daughter Maria was married in 1874 to the economic manager of Maleč, Václav Červinka, and she really possessed the key to her father's heart. Her younger sister Libuše was married in 1888 to Albin Bráf. Rieger's only son Bohuš (1857-1907) studied law and began, in 1889, to lecture on history and theory of public law. He later rose to prominence as professor of Austrian constitutional history and author of several books on constitutional and administrative problems.

A group of prominent Old Czechs maintained friendly relations with Rieger's family and visited regularly their home. It was not surprising that Albin Bráf (1851-1912) often called on his father-in-law and discussed current problems with him.[5] He was professor of Political Economy and, from 1883, he held a seat in the Diet of Bohemia. He was conservative to the core and it was his ambition to regenerate the Old Czech Party so that it would have a fair chance of success in the decisive battle with the Young Czechs which loomed on the horizon Rieger listened attentively to his son-in-law who was known and feared among his contemporaries for sharp wit and merciless criticism of his opponents. Bráf seemed to be an ideal link between the aging leader and members of the young generation and Rieger relied more and more upon his judgment. Another frequent visitor was Joseph Kalousek (1838-1915).[7] For many years Kalousek served on Old Czech papers. He got his training in history, cooperated with Palacký and was chosen as tutor to Rieger's oldest daughter Maria. Kalousek's devotion to Rieger's family was limitless. As professor of Czech history since 1882 he knew the academic scene and could supply valuable information on matters relating to conditions in the Czech university. Rieger trusted him and if he had dealings with persons of academic rank, he consulted Kalousek before taking any decision.

At some distance from the inner circle stood John Kvíčala (1854-1908) whose name cannot be omitted in any biography of either Rieger

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[5] A biography of *F. L. Rieger* from the pen of Hugo Traub appeared in Prague 1919, pp. 368. The street called Pasířská was later renamed for Palacký.

[6] A biography of Bráf by Josef Gruber appeared as the fifth volume of Albín Bráf *Život a dílo*, Prague.

[7] A biography of O. Josek, *Život a dílo Josefa Kalouska*, Prague, 1922, is descriptive and unpretentious.

or Masaryk.[8] Born a cobbler's son, he worked his way through school and at the age of twenty-five he was appointed Professor Extraordinary of Classical Philology at the Prague University, then undivided and predominantly German. His promotion to full professorship came in 1867. He held a prominent position among Czech scholars of that period and after the division of the University he had a leading share in organizing the Faculty of Philosophy. He recommended several candidates for appointments to the newly established chairs—T. G. Masaryk whose treatise on suicide appeared in 1881 was one of Kvičala's protégés. Kvíčala's ambition was not satisfied by his meteoric career at the University. He easily persuaded the Old Czech leaders that his interventions on behalf of the Czech University would bring more fruit if he could appear in Vienna not merely as an academic teacher but as a member of the Imperial Council. Arrangements were made in 1881 for his election on the Old Czech ticket, to be followed by election to the Diet of Bohemia in 1883. Soon afterwards he was delegated to the Provincial Board of Bohemia and thus he secured an almost unlimited control over Czech schools and learned institutions. As many people in editorial offices and in the school system, including the University, depended on Kvíčala's good will and support it was easy for him to unleash a press campaign against anybody who crossed his path or dared to challenge his primacy in the learned world.

Kvíčala's adherence to the Old Czech Party was motivated by opportunism and never was sufficiently genuine to satisfy the old members of the party. His appetite seemed to grow with each new success and soon even his intimate collaborators felt endangered by his expansiveness and domineering nature. It was whispered among members of Rieger's circle that, strictly speaking, Kvíčala was not a full-fledged Old Czech and that the Party, while profitting to some extent from his energetic actions, suffered losses on account of his unbridled ambition and autocratic manner. But Rieger, though aware of the growing gap between some of the leading Old Czechs and Kvíčala, hesitated to throw him overboard. He was afraid that such an explosive nature might do more harm if struck from the roll than if curbed, at least to some extent, by party discipline.

As president of the *Český klub* Rieger exerted considerable influence upon its Young Czech members. But his ambition was higher. He wished to be treated as the legitimate heir of Palacký and as the chief

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[8] Zdeněk Nejedlý inserted a sketch of Kvíčala's life into volume III of his biography of *T. G. Masaryk*, pp. 78-87.

[9] Paul Selver, *Masaryk*, (London 1940), p. 102f.

spokesman of the Czech people. As he advanced in years the desire for recognition of his primacy grew and manifested itself not only by spectacular appearances on the stage but also by irritability or open displeasure at criticism from the ranks of the Young Czechs. One of the sources of Rieger's failure and a considerable explanation of his ultimate tragedy was his dependence upon the judgment of members of the inner circle both in personal maters and in public affairs. Rieger, and even more his lieutenants, were often accused of bias or favoritism and exposed to attacks by the dissatisfied or rejected candidates to whom the Young Czech papers readily opened their columns. Rieger's authority inevitably suffered whenever he was drawn into a bitter press campaign and forced to descend from the pedestal of traditional leadership into the mêlée of quite ungentle party politics.

It was to Rieger's evident advantage that none of the Young Czech leaders equalled him in erudition and political experience. To Rieger's home on Pasířská ulice little could be so appropriately compared as the editorial office of the Young Czech daily *Národní Listy* with Dr. Julius Grégr (1831-1896) in charge. It was Grégr's ambition to build up the paper into "an impregnable stronghold of Czech national thought."[10] The paper had a wide circulation and counted among its contributors not only professional journalists but also some of the leading writers and scholars. Jan Neruda (1834-1891), the greatest poet of that period, contributed regularly either a *feuilleton* or a chronicle of literary and theatrical life. Dr. Julius Grégr was feared among the Old Czechs as an implacable enemy and regarded by his party members as the staunchest champion of its program. By resignation in 1881 from his seat in the Imperial Council he freed his hands and conducted an unrelenting campaign against the Old Czech leadership, not sparing Rieger himself.

During the eighteen eighties the Old Czech Party was on the downgrade. Symptoms of its decline were so disquieting that a major battle with the Old Czechs for key positions was anticipated. Young members of Rieger's inner circle, especially Albin Bráf, were afraid of catastrophe and wished to reinvigorate the party program by emphasis upon economic and social problems. It was also considered to be vitally important to reinforce the depleted ranks by new members who should be recruited especially from the moderate middle class or from those circles which Dr. Julius Grégr had antagonized by his aggresiveness or overemphasis on nationalistic slogans.[10] Rieger was not opposed to enlistment of men who claimed high

[10] Quoted from Josef Holeček, *Tragedie Julia Grégra* (Prague 1918), p. 8.

positions in the Party, but would make no decision without Bráf or other members of his inner circle.

II.

As Masaryk studied and for several years taught at the University of Vienna he was less influenced by the party feud than his colleagues.[11] After his coming to Prague he neither pledged allegiance to the Old Czechs, nor was enticed by the Young Czech slogans into the opposite camp. It was, indeed, very difficult for a newcomer to find orientation in the labyrinth or to see the line between the two parties, for far more than ideological differences it was personal sympathies or animosities that determined individual loyalties. Not bound by party discipline Masaryk enjoyed a high degree of independence and freedom of maneuvring. The lack of relatives and of social contacts prolonged the waiting time. Resenting instinctively Grégr's bellicose nationalism, Masaryk endeavored to organize a circle of friends, composed partly of moderate Old Czechs, in part of some colleagues from both the Faculty of Philosophy and from the Law School. Albin Bráf soon joined the group and helped to break down the barriers between Masaryk and Prague society.[12]

It was not an easy task to introduce Masaryk into some *coteries*. His lack of formalism was viewed with displeasure. Masaryk's wife, a native of Brooklyn, soon acquired a sufficient knowledge of Czech but found it difficult to master the elaborate code of social conduct then prevailing in the Bohemian metropolis and to respect the susceptibilities of her Czech friends. Masaryk shared many of her habits and was regarded by Bráf as a Yankee to whom much must be forgiven by his thoughtful and tactful colleagues.[13]

A singe episode throws some light on social life in Prague and exemplifies the whirlpools wnich the Masaryks had to circumnavigate. A house in the Old Town, owned by the Náprstek family served as a centre for one section of the Czech bourgeoisie. Its proprietor, Vojtěch Náprstek, had participated in the political movement of 1848, and fled, after the restoration of absolutism, to America. He spent about ten years in the Middle West, mostly at Racine, Wisconsin, and returned to Prague in 1858. He

11 He talked to Karel Čapek of his impressions of Prague during the eighties. See Čapek's *President Masaryk Tells His Story*, pp. 141-151.

12 Zdeněk Nejedlý has devoted vol. III of his unfinished biography of *T. G. Masaryk* (Prague 1935) to Masaryk's entry upon the Prague scene and to his academic activities. Chapter VI of P. Selver's biography may be consulted with profit by anyone not familiar with Czech.

13 There is a lively sketch of Bráf's contacts with Masaryk in chapter III of Bráf's *Pamĕti, Albín Bráf. Život a dílo*, I (Prague, 1922), pp. 15-27.

propagated among the Czechs the American way of life, having emancipation of women especially in mind. An American Ladies' Club was organized in 1866 with a prominent novelist Karolina Světlá as the moving spirit. A reading room for which Náprstek provided books and magazines attracted people, old and young, who were anxious to get from direct sources information concerning the "new world." It was a high social distinction to to be invited by officers of the Club to give a lecture at Náprstek's—no other passcard was so highly valued by novices of social life as admission among the American Ladies. It was quite natural that Charlotte G. Masaryk applied for membership soon afer her arrival in Prague. She was cordially received by Náprstek and later she introduced to him her husband. It was at Náprstek's New Year's party in 1883 that T. G. Masaryk saw F. L. Rieger. But neither the host or hostess nor anybody else thought of introducing the young professor and his wife to such an eminent personality as the Old Czech leader.[14] Little more than six years were to elapse before Masaryk was authorized to enter Rieger's home and take a seat on a plush sofa in Rieger's salon.

In the meantime Masaryk cultivated friendships with his university colleagues. A critical monthly, *Athenaeum,* founded by him in October 1883, served as a rallying point for young professors and their friends from other branches of Czech intellectual life. Albin Bráf readily joined the editorial board. It is likely that he secured for the *Athenaeum* contributions from another economist, Dr. Josef Kaizl (1854-1901). Thus a new link was established between Masaryk and the group of young intellectuals.[14a]

Though only three years younger than Bráf, Kaizl depended during the early stages of his academic career on Bráf's support and felt indebted to him for assistance and encouragement.[15] Their fields were related and they both combined with erudition in law and economics a keen interest in public affairs. Bráf regarded membership in the Imperial Council as incompatible with his academic duties. Deputies were expected to spend considerable time in Vienna and parliamentary sessions often collided with examination periods. Whereas Bráf remained satisfied with a seat in the Diet of Bohemia, Kaizl decided in 1885 to run for election on the Old Czech ticket and secured a seat in the Vienna parliament in June 1885.

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14 The episode has been treated at length by Zdeněk Nejedlý in his *T. G. Masaryk,* IV, 142-153.

14a Chapter III and IV in vol. IV of Nejedlý's biography are devoted to the founding of the *Athenaeum.* See also P. Selver, *Masaryk,* p. 117.

15 There is a wealth of information concerning Kaizl's life and work in his collected papers, *Z mého života,* published by Zdeněk V. Tobolka in 3 volumes, Prague, 1909-1914.

It is necessary to make a brief interval in this narrative and bring in the word "mandate." It often occurs in documents and it had a special meaning in the language of Masaryk's contemporaries. It did not stand for "political instructions supposed to be given by electors to (a member of) parliament," as the Oxford Dictionary has it, but it was used freely to designate a seat in the elective assembly. In accordance with current phraseology we speak of mandates to the Diet of Bohemia and of mandates to the Imperial Council. The latter gave naturally more social and political prestige to its holder than a seat in the provincial body. Even a close friendship could be poisoned by such distinctions which in the hothouse atmosphere of the Bohemian capital were not only strictly observed but often deliberately underlined. To be concrete: in a social gathering Kaizl ranked higher than his senior colleague Bráf and few people, indeed, pondered over the reasons for Bráf's decision to spurn offers of a mandate to the Imperial Council.

Friendly contacts with both Bráf and Kaizl strengthened Masaryk's desire for direct participation in politics. The lack of alignment with either of the existing parties proved to be both a favorable circumstance and a handicap. During the pre-election period in 1885 Masaryk broke the reserve he had maintained thus far and entered into conversations with Dr. Julius Grégr, exploring the possibilities of a regular cooperation with the *Národní Listy*.[16] The results of preliminary canvassing were rather meagre. The sparks of hope which flickered for a while went out when the electoral campaign reached its peak. Masaryk buried the project, but in the eyes of the Old Czechs his personal record was marked black. By crossing the line and talking with the arch-enemy he gave evidence, they reasoned, of instability and political immaturity and spoilt his chances of advance on the Old Czech chessboard.

On one occasion Masaryk approached Bráf to find out whether Rieger would be amenable to a broad discussion of current political problems and more specifically of conditions under which Masaryk could join the Old Czech party. Bráf did not refuse openly but did very little to prepare the ground for his colleague. Their friendship cooled and thereafter their intercourse was limited to formal occasions. This was some time in the fall of 1885, when memories of the electoral campaign were still alive.[17]

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16 Nejedlý has made a reference to this episode in his *T. G. Masaryk*, vol. IV, p. 138. There is a valuable article by Masaryk concerning his relation to Julius Grégr, reprinted by Jaromír Doležal, *Masarykova cesta životem*, vol. II, p. 26-35.

17 Albin Bráf has left a vague record of this conversation in his *Paměti*, see Albin Bráf, *Zivot a dílo* (Prague 1922), I, p. 20f.

When the question of Masaryk's entry into political life re-opened the scene was entirely changed, partly for the better, partly to Masaryk's disadvantage.

Early in 1886 Masaryk joined a controversy which has passed into history as the Battle of the Manuscripts. It raged throughout 1886 and 1887 and tapered off during the following year. Its course has been outlined by Masaryk's biographers and there is no need to re-tell it.[18] The battle had broad and deep repercussions in Czech public life. It was so fierce that political feuds were suspended and new alignments took place. Early in March 1886 Dr. Julius Grégr took up the cudgels in favor of the Manuscripts which Masaryk and some of his colleagues branded as false. The *Národní Listy* were thus opened to opponents of the critical school. Among the Old Czechs the conservative point of view prevailed. Josef Kalousek entered the arena in defense of the Manuscripts. Kvíčala shared with Jan Gebauer doubts as to the authenticity of the Manuscripts but regarded it as more opportune to second his conservative colleagues and leave Gebauer in the lurch. Rieger, too, was drawn into the controversy and cast his vote in favor of the Manuscripts when asked for a public statement.

The Battle of the Manuscripts was followed by some skirmishes and clashes. On December 20, 1886, Jan Herben (1857-1937) published the first issue of a bi-weekly *Čas* to be devoted to public affairs. Seven years younger than Masaryk, Herben, a native of Southern Moravia, linked his journalistic career closely with Masaryk's activities and stood faithfully by him during the Battle of the Manuscripts.[19] The first issue of *Čas* carried an anonymous article, Our Two Problems, which Herben at the last minute secured from H. G. Schauer, an advanced student of philosophy whose name appeared on the title-page of a German translation of Masaryk's *Foundations of Concrete Logic*. The article examined the chances of Czech survival in the perennial conflict with Germandom but was in some passages rather nebulous and so phrased that it could be misconstrued and the author accused of recommending voluntary submission to the more powerful neighbor.[20]

The article touched off a new storm which in some of its phases was even more violent than the Battle of the Manuscripts. Masaryk became the

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[18] Paul Selver has devoted chapter VII of his *Masaryk* to the Battle of the Manuscripts, pp. 120-139.

[19] There is a valuable biography of Masaryk from the pen of Jan Herben, *T. G. Masaryk* (the fifth edition revised and supplemented by the author's son Ivan Herben, appeared in Prague 1946, pp. 478). Another contribution by Jan Herben, *Deset let proti proudu,* sketching the struggles during the eighties, was reprinted in Herben's *Kniha vzpomínek* (Prague 1935), pp. 177-450.

[20] See Otakar Odložilík, "Na předělu věků," in *Zítřek,* II (New York, 1943), 39-40.

principal target of attack, though he was in no way responsible for Schauer's contribution. On February 19, 1887, Ferdinand Schulz in the *Národní Listy* branded Masaryk and his associates as advocates of national suicide, thus giving a keynote to the chorus of both metropolitan and provincial newspapers. The Old Czech *Hlas národa* did not lag behind the leading Young Czech daily and, on February 23, stigmatized Masaryk's group as national nihilists.[21]

During the Battle of the Manuscripts and its aftermath Albin Bráf sided with the conservative school. On the other hand, Josef Kaizl remained loyal to the chief iconoclasts, Jan Gebauer and T. G. Masaryk. This act of friendship became an unpardonable sin in the eyes of Masaryk's foes. In March 1887 Dr. Julius Grégr took over from Ferdinand Schulz and launched a second attack on the "nihilists." The seventh of Grégr's articles lashed at the protégés of the nihilists. The passage was so transparent that even an average reader knew that this time Josef Kaizl was being pilloried.[22] In July 1887 the attacks were renewed with greater vigor than before and the clerical daily *Čech* brought additional support to the campaign of the *Národní Listy*.

The attacks had a far more palpable objective than extermination of the nihilistic weed from the Czech gardens and fields. Both the Young Czechs and the clerical wing of the Old Czech party resented Kaizl's moderating influence upon the Old Czech press and wanted to throw him out of the saddle. The best and quickest way seemed to be to discredit Kaizl in Rieger's eyes. It soon transpired that the attack in the *Čech* was staged by Kvíčala. In a conversation with Kalousek Kvíčala had given vent to his hatred of Masaryk's group and voiced the hope that Rieger would "appear on the stage like Jupiter and hurl a devastating thunderbolt at that gang." Kalousek did not protest the charges, feeling that Rieger should re-assert his leadership.[23]

Despite his conservative leanings Rieger hesitated to adopt Kvíčala's suggestion and purge the Party. But he also made no effort to stave off Kaizl's resignation by a clear statement in favor of the victims of a concerted press campaign. Several letters passed beween Rieger and Kaizl. It is to be said to Kaizl's credit that in a letter of July 30, 1887, he spoke

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21 Paul Selver has given the essential points of the controversy in his *Masaryk,* pp. 141-5.

22 The relevant passage from Grégr's article has been reprinted in Kaizl's *Z mého života,* vol. II, p. 367, note.

23 See Kalousek's letter to Rieger of July 28, 1887, published by Jan Heidler in *Příspěvky k listáři dra Frant. Lad. Riegra,* II (Prague, 1926), 317-19.

warmly of Masaryk, pointing out his qualities and reputation in learned circles and resolutely invalidating Grégr's charges.[24] But Rieger wavered between the left wing of the Party and the irreconcilable opponents of Masaryk. Eventually he accepted Kaizl's resignation, on October 13, 1887, as the smoothest way to an appeasement.[25] To the public Kaizl's step was represented as a protest against decrees by which the Minister of Education, v. Gautsch, intended to restrict the number of Czech secondary schools. An entry in Kaizl's diary reveals his diffidence in the presence of Albin Bráf whose star was rising both in Rieger's inner circle and in the party committees.[26]

III

Kaizl's friendship with Masaryk was cemented during the press campaign. As Kaizl had no direct part in the Battle of the Manuscripts he was less disgusted with conditions at the University and more acceptable to the prospective contributors to the *Athenaeum*. Early in the summer of 1888 the editorial board was reorganized and Kaizl placed at its head, to relieve Masaryk of many duties and responsibilities.

Resignation of the seat on the Imperial Council was not to terminate Kaizl's political activities. He wished to re-appear on the stage with somewhat better chances of success. While remaining faithful to the Old Czech program, he did not exclude possibility of a transfer to the opposite camp, provided that Dr. Julius Grégr would be removed from his dominant position. In any case Kaizl wanted to strengthen his position and increase his prestige. Both the Old and Young Czechs had many eloquent speakers in their ranks but on both sides there was an evident lack of experts to be placed on parliamentary commissions or to be entrusted with highly specialized tasks. Kaizl knew that, sooner or later, the Old Czech leaders would need his cooperation and decided to bid his time.

For more than a year Kaizl was occupied with a concrete project, that of founding a weekly. He counted on Masaryk's help but wished to secure regular collaboration from other scholars and experts too. He was particularly impressed by one of his pupils, Dr. Karel Kramář, and made overtures to him.[27] Kramář (1860-1937) seemed to be an ideal choice for the editorial board of the prospective weekly. He had a degree in law and had

[24] Josef Kaizl, *Z mého života,* II (Prague 1911), 377f.

[25] Josef Kaizl, *l.c.,* p. 384.

[26] Josef Kaizl, *l. c.* pp. 385 and 391f. "I confess to somewhat bizarre motives' . . . I am jealous of Dr. Bráf and would like to out-trump him."

[27] See Kaizl's letter to Kramář of November 1, 1887 in *Z mého života,* II, 399.

spent some time abroad in pursuit of higher studies: in Berlin, Strassburg and the École libre des sciences politiques in Paris were the successive stages. He had independent means and was not bound to any regular occupation. After his return from Paris he prepared conscientiously for a political career, spending part of his time in Vienna and establishing contacts both with experts and parliamentarians. Though he showed leanings to the Young Czechs, he was free of party prejudices and readily endorsed Kaizl's project.

Kaizl's search for financial backing of the weekly foundered upon unforeseen difficulties. To avoid complete failure he adopted Masaryk's suggestion that the *Čas* be taken over by the progressive group and changed into a weekly. An agreement was easily reached between Dr. Jan Herben and the trio, currently known as the Realists. On January 1, 1889, the first issue of the weekly *Čas* appeared with an editorial "What do we want" from the pen of Karel Kramář.[28]

On January 22, 1889, Kaizl sent a long letter to Kramář, then in Vienna. It opened with a sensational message: The Shepherd was yesterday from 9 to 11 a. m. in Richter's home.[29] Knowing the code, Kramář realized that Masaryk had paid a visit to Rieger. In a calm atmosphere the establishment of personal contact of the aging political leader with T. G. Masaryk would have been treated as an episode. Under the circumstances which prevailed in the Bohemian capital the news acted as a highly explosive bomb. Kaizl ironically expressed fear that "Johannes" health might suffer under its shattering effects, meaning, of course, Kvíčala.

Remembering the New Year party in Náprstek's home we shall not be surprised to learn that none of the notables was responsible for Masaryk's appearance in Rieger's home. The mediator was František Pazdírek, a journalist of Czech origin who, after having spent many years in Russia, was sent as correspondent for the "Russian Courrier" first to Vienna and subsequently to Prague. Pazdírek was a *persona grata* in Rieger's home and as he admired Masaryk, he broke the ice. As he found that Rieger was willing to talk with Masaryk and that on the other hand Masaryk was ready to call on the patriarch without a formal invitation, he fixed the date and accompanied Masaryk to Rieger's home and helped to open a conversation.[30]

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[28] Jan Herben described the transaction in detail; see his *Kniha vzpomínek,* pp. 366-372. Karel Čapek has recorded many details concerning Masaryk's activities about 1890. See his *President Masaryk Tells His Story,* pp. 168-72.

[29] The letter has been published in Kaizl's *Z mého života,* II, 499f.

[30] At the special request of Jan Herben Pazdírek wrote a detailed account of Masaryk's negotiations with the Old Czech leader and his lieutenants which Herben published in his *Kniha vzpomínek,* pp. 382-394. Bráf has left his version in *Paměti, l. c.,* pp. 21-3.

After an introductory *tour d'horizon* the prerequisites of an agreement between the Masaryk group and the Old Czech leadership were scrutinized. Masaryk soon passed from generalities to concrete problems and suggested to Rieger a reorganization in the upper ranks of the party. When asked for specification, Masaryk named Kvíčala and pointed out his disturbing influence upon the Old Czech press. Rieger admited that Kvíčala refused to submit to party discipline and that an operation was highly needed, but gave Masaryk to understand that no spectacular action against a man of so many contacts could be expected by the progressive group. Masaryk was satisfied with Rieger's vague promise and accepted his suggestion that details of the proposed agreement he discussed both with Bráf and Kalousek.

Masaryk's visit dispelled clouds of misunderstanding which hung over the sky since the opening of the Battle of the Manuscripts. Rieger was impressed by Masaryk's vigor and straightforwardness—"he at least does not lie," wrote Rieger to his daughter Maria.[31] Not only Rieger, but also his two lieutenants, Bráf and Kalousek, admitted that Masaryk possessed high qualities and was an attractive personality, but it was still far from such admissions to a concrete engagement.

Following Rieger's suggestion, Masaryk presented himself in Bráf's home and later met Kalousek in Pazdírek's apartment. Bráf was sceptical from the very beginning, pretending to know that nothing but a promise of mandates for the trio would pave the way for their entry into the Old Czech party. Kalousek showed even a graver concern when approached by Pazdírek, and voiced the suspicion that it was Masaryk's ambition to smoke out Rieger's trusted advisers and ultimately to wrest the party leadership from the destitute Old Man. Personal interviews reduced the tension but concrete results were lacking in either case. While Bráf at least observed the social code, Kalousek gave evasive answers and refused to be drawn into any action against Kvíčala.[32]

Kaizl was initiated into the project and agreed with Masaryk that an overture to the Old Czechs should be made. On the other hand Kramár was surprised that the reserve was broken and recommended a slower course in dealing with Rieger's group.[33] He also did not want to burn the bridges leading to the Young Czech headquarters, wishing to preserve until the

[31] The letter dated Vienna, February 7, 1889, has been reprinted in extract by Jan Heidler, *Příspěvky . . .*, II, 386. See also extracts from Rieger's daughter's diary, *ibid.*, p. 387.

[32] This is evident from Pazdírek's narrative, reprinted by Jan Herben, *l. c.*, p. 387.

[33] Kramář's letter dated Vienna, January 22, 1889, has been published in Kaizl's *Z mého života*, II, 500, note.

decisive moment freedom of bargaining. Kaizl kept Kramář informed concerning the progress of negotiations which soon took a turn for the worse.

Kaizl expected little favor from Bráf as far as his own person was concerned and therefore regarded Masaryk as a more suitable negotiator. But Kalousek's animosity against Masaryk was so deeply rooted that only Rieger's strong gesture would have broken Kalousek's resistance. That gesture, however, did not come. Both Bráf and Kalousek warned Rieger in private conversations against the Realists and skillfully exploited Pazdírek's tactical mistake. Flattered by the initial success, Pazdírek overrated his role and, without consulting Masaryk, made a step forward to counteract Kvíčala's clandestine moves. On February 1, 1889, Pazdírek's paper, *Slawische Warte,* reported favorably the progress of negotiations between the Old Czechs and the Realists.

It soon became evident that Pazdírek had fallen into a trap and facilitated not only Rieger's retreat but also Kvíčala's assault. Highly susceptible in matters of personal prestige, Rieger resented Pazdírek's article and hearkened to the conjecture that Masaryk had authorized the release. Negotiations were suspended. It was Rieger's duty to return Masaryk's visit. After careful deliberation he decided upon a middle course. He drove from the Pasířská to Masaryk's home but remained in the landau and sent the coachman into the house with a visiting card. The gesture was eloquent and could be misunderstood only by such an incurable optimist as Pazdírek.[34]

In the meantime Kvíčala recovered from the original shock and organized a press campaign. A provincial paper, *Ratibor,* appearing in Kvíčala's constituency of Hradec Králové in a letter from Prague vividly depicted the nihilist plague creeping treacherously into the Old Czech camp. Soon afterwards, the *Čech* fired a rocket and warned the Old Czechs of defection of the Clerical wing should negotiations with the atheistic nihilists be continued. It was an open secret in both cases that Kvíčala was guiding the editors' hands. The battle was soon joined by many provincial papers and even the Viennese dailies registered the events. But chances of resumption of direct conversations rapidly dwindled despite efforts of the moderate elements to avoid complete rupture.[35]

In the middle of April 1889 the Diet of Bohemia was dissolved and an election called for for the first half of July. The internal weakness of the Old Czech party became manifest when the results were announced.

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[34] The above narrative has been based mostly on Pazdírek's account as published in Herben's *Kniha vzpomínek, op. cit.,* pp. 390-394.

[35] Kaizl reported to Kramář then in Vienna the progress of the battle; his letters may be found in *Z mého života,* II, 511-531.

Rieger escaped defeat by a small margin and Bráf, defeated in his own constituency, was delegated to the Diet by a group of landowners so that at least his personal prestige was saved.

Late in the fall of 1889 contacts between the moderate Old Czechs and the Realists were resumed.[36] Among the Old Czech leaders there was more willingness to meet the Realists half way and bring them into the party. But the trio was well aware of the cause of defeat in the electoral struggle. Kaizl was more sceptical than either Kramář or Masaryk and recommended a cautious procedure. The winter season was spent in a lively exchange of ideas but the gulf was not bridged. On March 27, 1890, Kaizl reported to Kramář that discussions of some controversial points revealed lack of common ground between the Realists and the Old Czech spokesmen and were, therefore, broken off. The Realists now felt free to establish contacts with the opposite camp.

On November 26, 1890, Masaryk met with Dr. Julius Grégr for an informal discussion of terms under which the Realists would be willing to join the Young Czechs. Both parties were anxious to remove all obstacles from the path as quickly as possible. On December 13, a conference of six delegates, three from each party, took place in Prague and resulted in complete agreement. Masaryk, Kaizl and Kramář joined the Young Czech party.[37] At the election in March 1891 the Old Czech party was totally defeated and even Rieger lost his seat in the Imperial Council. On the other hand, Masaryk, Kaizl and Kramář were elected on the Young Czech ticket. On April 9, 1891, Masaryk took his seat in the Austrian Parliament and on June 9, 1891 he delivered his maiden speech.[38] A new era in Czech history had opened.

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[36] See Zdeněk V. Tobolka, *Politické dějiny* ..... *III*, 1 (Prague, 1936), 292-393

[37] A formal statement was released by *Čas* on December 20, 1890, and reprinted in Kaizl's *Z mého života*, II, 625.

[38] More information concerning Masaryk's work after his election to the Parliament can be found in an article by Otakar Odložilík, "Masaryk and the Czech 'nineties," in *The Spirit of Czechoslovakia*. VI (London, 1945), No. 1.

T. G. MASARYK AND CZECH HISTORIOGRAPHY

by S. Harrison Thomson

THE dynamic philosophical and political career of Masaryk has long been a matter of broad knowledge and sympathetic apprecation in the West. That is only as it should be, for in modern times the great reflective minds have too seldom had a real influence on the course of events in the spheres of mundane concern. For seventeen years Masaryk was Plato's philosopher-king. Plato could have asked for no better protagonist.

Yet it would be defensible to point out that in another field of his work and thought Masaryk exercised a greater and more lasting influence than in national and international politics. His critique and analysis of the history of his own people, in its forceful, inspiring and activating aspects will long outlast the republic he founded and its brutal repression, of which we are now the impotent witnesses. It is because this facet of his work has not been properly assessed in the West that it was thought profitable to trace here the course of his struggles against the unimaginative pedants who opposed his interpretation of the dramatic past of his people.

It will be remembered that, after finishing his university studies at Vienna and beginning his career there as a university teacher in 1879, he was called to the newly reëstablished Czech university at Prague in 1882 as professor extraordinary.[1] Before going to Prague, Masaryk had, in his natural thorough fashion, gone deeply into early Czech history. History was not a subject unfamiliar to him, nor indeed in any way uncongenial, as he had already read widely in the history of the Slavs and the western peoples and had even written an essay on T. H. Buckle's philosophy of history[2] which showed a penetrating and independent mastery of broad historical concepts. It was only to be expected, therefore, that his reëxamination of Czech history under the pressure of the battle of the manuscripts would be fruitful. The literary production of the subsequent years bears out this expectation. He found the intellectual atmosphere in the Prague of the 'eighties either unrealistically romantic or passively austrianized. The romanticism stemmed from Herder and might easily be labelled escapist; the passivity, from the fatigue and resignation induced by the disappoint-

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1 For biographical details Paul Selver's *Masaryk* (London, 1940) is the best in English. Zdeněk Nejedlý's *T. G. Masaryk* (Prague, 5 vols., 1930ff.), has not yet reached beyond the first years in Prague.

1 *Theorie dějin dle zásad T. H. Buckle* (Prague, 1884).

ment at the failure of the 1848 revolution and, more recently, the repressive policies of the Auersperg régime, and contemporaneously by the progressive senescence of the Old Czech party led by F. L. Rieger, Palacký's son-in-law and political heir. Both these currents had to be met.

Soon after coming to Prague Masaryk founded a monthly journal, the *Athenaeum* (1883), in which he published open discussions of living issues—in politics, philosophy, social thought and action, and ethics. It was launched without any specific statement of a program, but within a few year (in the issue of June 15, 1885) he was ready to offer a complete program of aims for which he stood. He advocated a Czech academy, a second Czech university, the founding of more journals of learning and discussion, improvement in Czech journalistic standards, the spread to the whole country of the cultural advancement made in Prague and an increased interest by the new generation in the languages and currents of thought of the rest of Europe. As might be supposed, such a revolutionary and ambitious propaganda aroused no little bitterness in the smug circles of those who had come to regard themselves as the arbiters of Czech thought.

Very early in his Prague career the occasion arose for him to participate in a revival of the discussion of "the manuscripts." Since the "discovery" in 1817 and 1819 by Václav Hanka and some one 'unknown' of several fragments, dating ostensibly from the thirteenth century and in one case, giving the text of a piece of Czech epic which was solemnly pronounced to go back to the ninth or tenth century, there had been lively discussion of the contents of these manuscripts, their genuineness and their implications for Czech culture.[3] They came to be known, from their supposed places of discovery, as the Kralův Dvur and the Zelená Hora manuscripts. If they were genuine the Czechs could boast of a high culture antedating that of their masters and neighbors, the Austrians and the Germans. Great and reputed Czech scholars, among them Jungmann and Palacký, had accepted these documents as authentic. Yet in some quarters doubts had arisen and would not die. Questions raised by two Czech Viennese Scholars. Dr. A. Šembera in 1877 and Dr. A. Vašek in 1879, were indignantly repudiated by Czech popular opinion. Late in 1885 Jan Gebauer, the leading Czech philologist, published an article on the manuscripts in a popular encyclopedia in which he expressed grave doubts of their genuineness. Attacked by other Czech scholars who put a higher value on patriotism, Gebauer published in Masaryk's *Athenaeum* of February 15, 1886 an extensive

[3] See for a summary of the whole dispute F. M Bartoš, *Rukopisy* (Prague, 1936) and *Rukopisy Kralovédvorský a Zelenohorský* (Prague, 1946).

answer. In this reply his arguments went beyond his earlier moderate sketch. He attacked, objectively and scientifically, on philological, paleographical and historical grounds, the authenticity of both the manuscripts. Masaryk followed the dispute closely, read all the available literature on the subject, and, sensing the moral issue involved, threw himself wholeheartedly into the battle. To him the issue was clear. Nothing but evil, he contended, could come from falsehood. Any nation which relies upon a falsehood loses its moral rights to its own pride. If the manuscripts were forgeries the Czech people should be the first to reject them and build their life and traditions upon truth. He made every effort to keep the polemics that raged around him on this high moral level. Accused on many sides of treason, dishonesty, subservience to German interests and many less elegant delicts, he refused to adopt the tone of his detractors and maintained his insistence on the deep moral issues at stake. It was a real baptism of fire for the young professor.

In these early years at Prague Masaryk's thought continued to mature. His influence with open minded students grew, and his reflection upon the historical traditions and the present situation of his people and the path that must be followed to bring them to the full realization of their potentialities and their mission crystallized along several lines. There was much talk in these years of Slavophilism and the leadership of Mother Russia which the lesser Slavic peoples should follow. Masaryk therefore made a careful and critical study of Russian history and literature as well as that of the other Slavs. He made two trips to Russia (1887, 1889), he visited Poland in 1887 and Bosnia and Herzogovina in 1892. He drew from his study and travel no confidence that the salvation of the Western Slavs lay in Russian Slavophilism. The immediate fruit of his Russian studies was a short study of the Slavophilism of Ivan V. Kirějevski, delivered first as public lectures in 1885 and published, after much more study and the two trips to Russia, in 1889 with only minor modifications.[4] In the published edition of these lectures of Slavophilism as regarded by a leading Russian slavophil Masaryk comes to the conclusion that to the Russians Slavophilism is only a minor ideal, completely subordinate to Russian nationalism.[5] This point of view, heavily documented, did much to deflate the romanticism of many Czechs who looked for salvation at the hands of their powerful eastern fellow-Slav nation.

But Masaryk was not content to point out to the Czechs the vanity

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[4] *Slavjanofilství Ivana Vasil. Kirějevského* (Prague, 1889).

[5] Jaroslav Bidlo in *Sborník přednášek o T. G. Masarykovi* (Prague, 1931), p. 163.

of their rosy hopes. He offered a positive program, solidly based in their own history and traditions, which they could grasp and develop with their own resources. This alternative to a Russian dominated and unrealistic Slavophilism Masaryk put to his Czech hearers and readers in words prophetic of the trend and ideals of his whole later life. They deserve quotation in full:

> Every educated and self-conscious Czech, who is desirous of understanding the basis and development of his nation, naturally and necessarily must face the question as to his attiude toward the early history of his country, and especially Hussitism and the Brotherhood, and how he can relate the ideas and aims of that period to the ideas and problems of our time. How can we reconcile the differences between our ancient history and our present situation That, to my mind, is the principal puzzle in the whole Czech question to which our greatest minds have brought a solution, particularly Palacký and Havlíček. Every Czech who makes any pretense of striving for unity and national integrity must answer this question for himself. All our leading ideas take us back to our earlier ages, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, our artists, our historians and politicians find there our period of national greatness. But how many of us have in actuality sensed the essence of that period, and make our connection with what we are now living through? For us Hussitism and the Brotherhood are dull; at the very best we remember the translation of the Bible, our language, our present orthography. And right there is the source of our factionalism and our lack of national unity.
>
> The reformation movement among us Czechs was so strong that it took possession of the great majority of the nation, and in reality we look upon it and its effects as our principal cultural achievement; we see in it a clear manifestation of the Czech spirit. Yet this Hussite people turned again to Catholicism, and there remained only slender vestiges of our Hussitism and Brotherhood in foreign Reformed and Lutheran Protestantism. Thus we Czechs, alone of all Christian nations, lost our historical continuity precisely at that juncture which we regard as our most peculiar ideal and achievement. Herein lies our inglorious disunity and inadequacy. History does not repeat itself; there is no going back, only forward, though we can learn much from our past.[6]

The kernel of Masaryk's whole program lies in this alternative to romantic Slavophilism. It was an appeal to the Czechs to find the solution to their national dilemma in their own resources, confident that their own history and traditions were adequate to inspire and guide their return to unity and a fruitful national existence. This is essentially what Masaryk meant by "realism", a term he transferred into the field of politics which

[6] Quoted by Jan Herben, *T. G. Masaryk* (5th ed., Prague, 1946), p. 32f.

he entered in 1891, when he was a successful candidate for the Reichsrat. His political career does not here concern us directly, but it is appropriate to emphasize that in his speeches on the floor of Parliament, pointedly addressed to the Government, he consistently emphasized the need for greater recognition of Czech rights in every field—education, economic and political autonomy. In speeches to his constituency and in his writing in the Czech press, on the other hand, he stressed the need for the Czechs to realize their political and cultural needs and prepare themselves to exercise their just rights.

Masaryk resigned his seat in Parliament in September of 1893 because of a disagreement between him and Dr. Julius Grégr, the head of the Young Czech party, and returned to his university teaching and study of the basic problems of Czech political, social and cultural life. He had already given sufficient indication of his conviction that the roots of these problems were historical and traditional in nature, and that his people would not achieve their power, self-consciousness or sense of unity until they realized the full implications of their own history. Masaryk set himself the considerable task of carrying this conviction to a larger circle of Czechs than had thus far been reached. He saw no other possible way.

In October of this same year the Protestant publisher Jan Laichter founded an intellectual review, *Naše Doba,* which was intended for a wider circle of readers than the *Athenaeum* had been. Masaryk was the leading spirit in the venture. In the first issue he laid out his program:

> The last few years have been marked by a momentous intellectual disturbance: the awareness of our tasks as a people is more deeply and widely felt every day. We are all needed in the work; many workers are joining the forces, and we are also in the ranks. We all see this as the principal question: what precisely is the place of our nation in the corps of European nations? What is our place in the development of mankind? By our answer to this basic question we wish to recognize our individuality, we wish to determine wherein we are peculiar or unique; we wish to assess what we have contributed to others and what we have received from other peoples; we wish to analyze ourselves properly, for we must know, in order to go forward in our own development, what we already have, what we have still to do and where we should end up. [7]

This was a straightforward proposal to hammer out a philosophy of national history. Obviously much thought had already gone into even this introductory formulation, and, as we have seen from his program in the

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7 Quoted by Herben, *op. cit.,* p. 64f.

Athenaeum in 1885, it is quite clear that he already knew the direction his own thought and teaching would take.

Out of his years of philosophical and historical study, refined and sharpened by his political experience, there soon appeared, one after the other, six books of varying length, which, taken together, are the formulation of Masaryk's humanitarian philosophy of Czech history: "The Czech Question" (*Česká otázka*), published early in 1895;[8] "Our Present Crisis" (*Naše nynější krise*) also published in 1895 and usually as a unit with "The Czech Question"; "John Hus, Our Revival and Our Reformation" (*Jan Hus, naše obrození a naše reformace*), also published in 1895; *Karel Havlíček,* published in 1896; "The Social Question" (*Otázka sociální*), published in 1898: and "Palacký's Idea of the Czech People" (*Palackého idea českého národu*) also published in 1898.

Two elements in Masaryk's make-up must be clearly understood before any attempt can fairly be made to analyze or systematize his concept of the purpose and core of Czech history: his religiosity and his deep immersion in the spiritual traditions of his own people. On many occasions and in many connections he insisted that the question was the most important question a people, an individual or a society could face.[9] By "religion" he meant Christianity, not necessarily creedal, Protestant or Catholic, nor even ecclesiastical, but a vital, passionate and reasonable Christianity. He found this religion best exemplified in John Hus and the Brotherhood (*Unitas fratrum bohemorum* or *Jednota českých bratří*) which essentially stemmed from the Hussite movement.

The second element in Masaryk's thought, his deep saturation in Czech spiritual history, is not unrelated to his religious bent. It is precisely because religion was so important to him that he was able to build a pattern of sensitive approval of the eminently spiritual cast of Czech history. It is only stating a truism to point out that the Czech people have a more religious history than any other people in Europe. Their leading heroes are saints—albeit sometimes very uncloistered and seldom canonized—Sts. Cyril and Methodius, St. Václav, Hus, Jerome, Chelčický, Komenský, and those of their rulers and leaders they most honor, Charles IV, George of Poděbrady, Palacký and Havlíček, were deeply and simply religious. Even their one military genius, Jan Žižka of Trocnov, was a profoundly religious man. It was this tradition, both spiritual and historical, that was so congenial to

[8] The foreword is dated November, 1894.

[9] His published lectures *V boji o náboženství* (1904) are an elaboration of this theme. In his talks with Čapek in 1936 he says quite simply: "Religion is the only question I know of."

Masaryk. There is hardly a page in his *The Making of a State* (1927) which does not explicitly or implicitly reflect his reliance upon the guidance of Hus, Chelčický or Palacký.

To read this closely related group of Masaryk's writings of the mid-'nineties without a preliminary awareness of his conscious dependence upon and expansion of these two interrelated assumptions would be misleading. Together they form the first definite and full-rounded philosophy of Czech history to comprehend and explain all the great movements in the past of this people. Palacký had not extended his *Geschichte von Böhmen* beyond the fateful battle of Mohács in 1526. He had drawn the attention of his own people and indeed of the whole learned world to the leading rôle played by the spirit of the Hussite reformation in Czech history up to that time. He had, furthermore, given clear indication in much of his later essays and political pamphleteering in the 'sixties and 'seventies of the direction his thought on Czech history in its later development was taking. But he was too close to the period of the Czech revival of the early nineteenth century and the movement of 1848 to be able to view these movements historically. He had indeed played a large and even leading rôle in both acts in the Czech drama. It is difficult to demand of an active participant that he be at the same time a reflective analyst. But Masaryk was of a much later generation, and he could view the road by which his people had come from a fresh and almost remote coign of vantage. Therein lay his superiority over his great predecessor. Therein also rests his importance for Czech historical thought.

Masaryk's foreword to the first edition (dated November 1894) of his *Česká otázka* gives the key of his whole investigation.

> I do not understand the Czech Queston in a political sense, or in the sense of political practice, but I understand by this term sociological analysis of those problems which strike anyone who wishes to apprehend the real sense of Czech history, who strives to understand how and by what we, as a particular nation, live as a cultural entity, what our aims and hopes essentially are.
>
> What reasons do we have for our national effort? . . . For me the Czech question is a matter related to the aims of all humanity: it is a problem of conscience. I believe with Kollár that the history of nations is not a matter of chance, but that there is in and through it a definite providential plan, and that being assumed it is the task of historians and philosophers, the task of each nation, to apprehend that world-wide plan, to recognize its own place in it, and, in accordance with that realization and in the fullest and clearest awareness of it, to get on with every aspect of its work, even political. . . .
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> These sketches are a concession to the present unsatisfactory situation of

> our literary appetities. I should have preferred to treat the Czech question quite objectively and by itself, without any historical preliminaries. Obviously I know perfectly well that we are accustomed to the historian's crutch; that is why I use it too. One would naturally suppose that every educated Czech would at least know Kollár, Palacký, Havlíček. Why, of course. But in reality not one in a hundred does know them, and that is why it has been necessary to bring forward the dominant ideas of our best thinkers and national leaders and thus prepare the ground for a more detailed study of the Czech question.

"The Czech Question" is divided into four main sections, corresponding to periods in Czech historical and national thought from the end of the eighteenth century to the time of Masaryk's writing. Some overlapping was of course to be expected. The first is entitled "Our Revival: the first period of Dobrovský, up to 1811." Masaryk here sets the scene for the Czech revival at the end of the age of European enlightenment, assessing the influence of the ideas of the French Revolution, its congruence with the thought of Herder in the lands of German speech, and, among the Czechs and Slovaks, the juncture of these disturbing and anti-authoritarian currents of thought with the vital if not politically or numerically powerful vestiges of the nationalistic Hussite movement, the Brotherhood. Out of this confluence of new ideas there arose a judgment of Hapsburg-Jesuit absolutism as well as the ostensibly enlightened but equally dangerous Josephinism which was satisfying as well as inspiriting to all the smaller peoples of the Danubian basin.

The second part of the study he calls the period of Kollár and Jungmann (1810-1848). This period is less concerned with the roots of national feeling and more interested in a scientific approach to the problems of nationalism. It is a period of development of the implications of national feeling by archeological, historical, philological and literary research and creative popularization—of the tools that were to be needed by a later generation. It is the period of Kollár's great poetical and propaganda activity, the period of Šafařík's investigation into Slavic antiquities, the period when thoughts of a broad Pan-Slavism based on these same studies electrified great masses of Western and Southern Slavs. The riches of Russian and Polish literature were becoming accessible to the Czechs and Slovaks. But these were also Palacký's early years and the first volume of his *Geschichte Böhmens* appeared in 1836, and, though almost contemporary with Kollár's study of Slavic mutuality,[10] it indicated the trend away

[10] This work appeared first in Czech, under the title *O literarnéj vzajemnosti mezi kmeny a ńařečimi slavskymi* in 1836. The next year Kollár published an expanded edition in German under the title: *Über die literarische Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Stämmen und Mundarten der slawischen Nation* (Pest, 1837, 2nd. ed. Leipzig, 1844).

from the romanticism still dominant in this second period to a period of critical realism. This third period (1848-1880) was precisely the epoch of Palacký and Havlíček, of the critical historian and the realistic publicist. The leading note of this era was the logical development of the ideas implicit in the earlier periods and their convergence and actualization in the Czech and Slovak revolution of 1848 and its sequent realistic atmosphere. Rousseau and Herder, the shibboleths of liberty, equality and fraternity widened or deepened to apply to an oppressed nation, Kollár's sentient Pan-Slavism, Šafařík's validation of Slavic primitive self-consciousness, Palacký's dynamic historicism, all these came together in the events of 1848 in Prague and persisted and ripened during the following three decades until Palacký's death in 1878, when the nation that called him the father of his people were in a position to readjust themselves to an emerging Reich German central Europe, under the leadership of Bismarck and the forces he symbolized. But the Czechs and Slovaks had a triple disappointment to face. The events of 1866 showed them that Austria was weak; any hopes of Austro-Slavism were thus futile. In 1867 Bohemia's hopes of a tripartite federal empire in which the ancient kingdom would have equal recognition with Austria and Hungary were dashed by the *Ausgleich*. Thereafter Czech leadership looked to Russia and some revival of Kollár's Pan-Slavic dream. The Congress of Berlin buried that hope.

It is significant therefore that Masaryk begins his fourth period about 1880. From then until the time of writing (1894), frustrated in the various directions they had sought salvation, their leadership reduced to playing a game of concession and attrition with the Vienna court, the Czechs had about given up. It is at this point that Masaryk's prophetic mind assessed the situation historically and concluded that in all their recent and present striving they had lost the way. They had failed to see or understand the genius (*smysl* or 'sense' he called it) of their own history. Their history and their traditions were moral, (Christian reformational in the Hussite meaning), and when they had lived by that tradition they had been strong and great. It was to the effectuation of this program that he devoted his energies, to canalize all possible forces for improving the moral and morale status of the Czechs—the press, art, literature, the drama, the educational establishment, the whole political organism and all Czech religious expression.

> For this reason I have often insisted that we must regard our whole historical development in a positive fashion. Palacký was wrong in contending that our history was one long struggle against Germandom. That struggle is certainly

an important part of our life, but in no wise the principal part, either quantitatively or essentially. (*Česká otázka,* p. 151).

Our policy must be based on a deeper and more extensive cultural effort, by a practical use of political and popular education. We do not have it yet. (*op. cit.,* p. 155).

Masaryk goes on to reject categorically the two Catholic interpretations of Czech spiritual tradition: the attempt to show any continuity of Czech religious thought and teaching with Cyril and Methodius (mid-ninth century) and thus with Eastern Orthodoxy, and the later Jesuit Counter-reformation.

After these rejections he develops his own formulation of the sense of Czech history:

The ideal of humanity, voiced by Dobrovský and Kollár, our resurgent ideal, has for us Czechs a deep national and historical meaning. By humanity, completely and truly understood, we put our stress on the best part of our past; by this term humanity we bridge the spiritual and moral gap of several centuries, by humanity we shall march in the van of human progress. Humanity means to us our national task elaborated and indicated to us by our Brotherhood. The ideal of humanity is the whole of our national life. (*op. cit.,* p. 183).

This brief sketch of Masaryk's book can give no adequate idea of its fervor, its wealth of allusion, its warm appeal to deep Czech emotional roots. But it was not to go unchallenged. A former political associate and colleague at the university, Professor Josef Kaizl, answered "The Czech Question" almost immediately with a brochure entitled "Czech Thoughts" (*České myšlenky,* 1895),[11] in which he explained the Czech revival and the then political situation as the result of the struggle of the European forces of enlightenment culminating in the French Revolution against the enslavement of the Czech people to medieval and anti-Reformation prejudice and bigotry.

After answering Kaizl briefly Masaryk, evidently feeling that he had not properly utilized the crucial period of Czech history, that of the Hussite Reformation, went on to elaborate and clarify some of his own thinking and answer some doubts in the minds of his readers in a small study of "John Hus: our Revival and our Reform" (*Jan Hus: naše obrození a naše reformace,* December, 1895). Emphasizing his rejection of the influence of the French Revolution and European "Liberalism" on the Czech revival, he elaborates upon the difference between Hussite spirituality, deeply ingrained in Czech nature and tradition, and the materialistic indifferentism of "Liberalism." He finds this sharp differentiation valid at every critical point in

11 See Jan Jakubec, *Dějiny české literatury* II (Prague, 1934), 3ff.

Czech history. After showing how Palacký understood Czech history as a part of the larger striving of mankind for the divine, he concludes:

> Not even the Brotherhood was the culmination of our national historical development. The Brotherhood has within itself the roots of still further growth, and this potentiality we must actualize. Today the Kingdom of God must be built upon philosophical desire for the unfulfilled. In that sense and to that end the Brotherhood appeared to Palacký as an ideal of a religious and, as it were, spiritual striving, a philosophy of history, and becomes for him quite naturally a philosophy of religion. (*Jan Hus,* 2nd. ed., Prague, 1899, p. 44).

And he then brings his theoretical argument to this summation:

> The Czech problem, the problem of every thinking Czech, comprehends within the religious problem every other task which our nation deployed precisely in its reformation. The job for every man of conscience is to bring every modern cultural problem and manifestation into some relation with the proper spirit of our reform movement. The task is to work out within onself under these our modern conditions a man who is really modern, the modern philosophical protagonist (continuator) along the lines of our ancestors, the Brethren. (*op. cit.,* p. 49).

In these brochures he had consistently connected the spirit and aims of the Hussite reformation with the Czech revival of the early and mid-nineteenth century. He had accepted the essential theme of Palacký's historical synthesis, and had often referred to Karel Havlíček (1821-1856) as the modern embodiment of this Hussite spirit. A biographical study of Havlíček, published in 1896, was Masaryk's most substantial and scholarly venture into the field of history.[12] It is a minute analysis of the Czech movement of 1848 seen in the life, aims and writing of its most sensitive protagonist whom Masaryk regarded as the best recent representative of the ideal of Czech humanitarianism. The work, heavily documented and pregnant with suggestions for an understanding of the Czech revival and through that of the whole current of Czech history, was greeted by the historical profession in Bohemia with virtual silence, and only marginally noticed by the historians of literature.[13] On the other hand it would be incorrect to say that Masaryk was without influence in these his early years. The reader may sense the vigor of Masaryk's influence among the cultured classes from the bitter attention Professor Josef Pekař gave the former's philosophy of history and understanding of the essence of the Czech past

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12 *Karel Havlíček: snahy a tužby politického probuzení.*

13 Jaroslav Goll reviewed the *Otázka sociální* in *Český Casopis historický* in 1900, pp. 142-156, but barely mentions the other works of Masaryk.

in 1912 when as editor of the *Český Casopis Historický,* the leading Czech historical journal, he published a long study, entitled "Masaryk's Czech Philosophy" ("Masarykova česká filosofie"), to be referred to below. This detailed counter-blast only brought to a head a heated controversy which had been going on for some years, though only recently had it broken into print.

In two memorial volumes to Masaryk on his sixtieth birthday, Professor J. Vančura[14] discussed Masaryk's influence on Czech historical science. The first study appeared in a special number of *Česká Mysl* (Czech Thought), published in 1910. Professor Kamil Krofta quickly answered Vančura in some detail, denying most of the points on which Vančura had claimed for Masaryk either originality or positive contributions to Czech historiography. But Vančura repeated his position in another *Festschrift, T. G. Masarykovi k šedesatým narozeninám* in a somewhat longer article "What Masaryk has contributed to Czech historical writing" (Čím se Masaryk zavděčil českému dějepisu")[15] This time Josef Pekař, now firmly established as, after Goll, the leading member of the Czech historical fraternity, answered in a sharp, and, as he doubtless thought, devastating critique of Vančura's article.[16] One gets the impression that Pekař felt called upon to defend the historical school of Goll, of which he had been one, against Masaryk's simple statement that what Czech historiography needed was a continuator of the tradition of Palacký, whose "History of Bohemia" had ended in 1526. Pekař could point to great achievement in monographs and the publication of significant documentary studies by himself and other pupils of Goll which, he contended, invalidated Masaryk's criticism. Yet the fact remained that the only *vue d'ensemble* of Czech history that filled the gap from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries was that of the French historian Ernest Denis, who was in large measure and on quite independent grounds in accord with Masaryk's spiritual interpretation of that history. This fact might indeed help to explain Pekař's bitterness. There followed immediately an answer to Pekař's attack by Dr. Jan Herben in several numbers of the weekly *Čas,* under the title "Masarykova sekta a Gollova škola" (The Sect of Masaryk and the School of Goll), later published as a separate brochure. It was obvious that Masaryk had able and articulate defenders, to whom a more detailed answer was due.[17] This extensive answer was given by Pekař in the next issue of the *Český časopis historický* of which he was joint editor

[14] The translator into Czech of Ernest Denis' two monumental studies of Czech history.
[15] (Prague, 1910), pp. 117-137.
[16] *Český časopis historický* XVIII (1912), 130-136.
[17] In the first volume of what was to be a monumental history of Bohemia (*České*

with Goll. The whole "sect" and not Masaryk alone was the object of this broadside. Under the title of "Masaryk's Czech philosophy" ("Masarykova česká filosofie"[18] he makes a broad and intensive, not to say spirited, indictment of the whole thesis which Vančura and other partisans of Masaryk had been presenting to the interested circles of the Czech reading public. The second paragraph of this study began:

> Seventeen years have passed since the publication of The Czech Question. During all this long period no purely historical analysis of it has appeared. It would appear to me that this simple fact would show that Masaryk has had no direct influence on Czech historical science.

Pekař contends, first, that Masaryk's philosophy of humanity fails in positing any essential continuity between Hussite times and the Czech revival of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; second, that Masaryk's thesis that the Czech question is primarily a religious question is not borne out by a critical examination of the facts; third, that Masaryk's analysis of the chain of development by which the Czech national character has become what it now is, that is, first humanity, then Slavism, then Czechism, is erroneous; fourth, that Masaryk misunderstood the nature of the Czech revival and appropriated to his own sociological purposes the romantic concept of Czech history, i. e. Herder's picture of mild, peace-loving, democratic ancient Slavs current in Palacký's time—a concept which Pekař labels totally false; fifth, that Masaryk's methodology is unsubstantiable, because he subordinates it to sociological preconceptions, whereas the proper procedure would be the reverse; sixth, Masaryk's "realism" is in actuality quite unrealistic, and he is in fact an idealist who chooses what facts and ideas he judges opportune for his prejudgments; seventh, the supporters and followers of Masaryk have been able to present a case only by falsifying all the writing of Pakař and others of the "school" of Goll; eighth, no good can come to Czech historical science from the unscientific and sinister pursuit of "truth" by vague, unfounded, untrained and prejudiced intuition, rather must Czech historiography follow the tried and true methodology of the school of Goll.

It would be possible with little difficulty to point out numberless cases

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dějiny, 1912ff., as of 1950 13 vols.) Václav Novotný, also a pupil of Goll, took a strong position essentially parallel with that of Masaryk, insisting that the Czech renaissance of the nineteenth century was in large part due to national traditions. Though Pekař was not mentioned by name the statement, *České dějiny* I (1912), 4 note, "But it is certainly possible to agree with Masaryk that the memory of Hus was greater and its influence deeper and more lasting than in some quarters is admitted" certainly refers to Pekař's position.

[18] XVIII (1912), 170-208.

of Pekař's misunderstanding or misconstruction of Masaryk's position. In retrospect it shows little more than Pekař's bitter polemic vocabulary and command of the tricks of the scientific sophistry of the historian with a *parti pris*. He was fully as guilty of picking his facts to suit his thesis as he accused Masaryk and his defenders of being.

The short time between this exchange of polemic courtesies and the outbreak of war allowed no time for further answers or rebuttals, and sides were thereafter chosen rather on a basis of the chooser's favorable attitude toward the Hapsburg Empire on the one hand and the reëstablishment of the ancient Czech tradition of independence on the other. The logic of history, which Pekař had accused Masaryk of not knowing because he was not a professionally trained historian, lay with Masaryk and his defenders, and throughout the war years Pekař and his school had little or nothing to say.[19] It was pointedly noticed at the time that among the signatures to the Writers' Manifesto of May, 1917, demanding that the Hapsburgs grant Bohemia her ancient independence, neither that of Goll nor of Pekař, nor any of their "school" was to be found. There were many, on the other hand, of Masaryk's conviction who thus courageously risked their freedom and demonstrated their confidence in the actualization of the Hussite tradition. The names of some of these are worth preserving: Václav Novotný, Jan Vančura, Jan Opočenský, Josef Šimak, Zdeněk Nejedlý, Lubor Niederle. The number of those in academic and political circles who, in these trying years, came to feel that Masaryk had come closer to the sense of Czech historical evolution than Pekař grew steadily.

There were some Czech historians, as well trained in the methods of documentary precision as Pekař, and some indeed of the school of Goll, who parted company with him during the war years. Václav Novotný had never accepted Pekař's thesis. Josef Šusta had shared moderately Pekař's view, but was quite unwilling to join in the bitter polemics of which the latter seemed so fond. Kamil Krofta, earlier convinced by the weight of Pekař's erudition and influenced by the impressive mass of German learning which in turn had influenced Goll, even before the outbreak of war began

[19] Jaroslav Werstadt puts the contrast somewhat crisply when he comments (*Odkazy dějin a dějepiscŭ*, Prague, 1948, p. 107f.); "on one side Goll and his school were basically the personification of a compromise with the static Austrian and Czech order, and its tactic was opportunism and retreat; on the other side Masaryk and his "sect" were the bearers of opposition to this order and their place is in the first line of attack and in the exposed forward positions . . . Masaryk and Goll—this is a struggle between conscience and opportunism."

to see Czech history and tradition in a different light.[20] He was led to modify his concept of the critical middle period of Czech history partly by his association with Ferdinand Hrejsa on the pre-White Mountain period of Czech protestantism[21] and his own study of the catastrophe of 1620.[22] Furthermore Goll's antipathetic position toward the Czech struggle for independence contributed to Krofta's disillusionment with the conservative school led by Pekař. Goll's open opposition to the May, 1917 Manifesto was a source of deep disappointment to Krofta. By the end of the war he had aligned himself irrevocably on the side of the Palacký-Masaryk-Novotný interpretation of Czech history, and in the following years, both in his academic work and scholarly publication and as a responsible diplomat, followed this line faithfully. In a lecture to the Czech Historical Club in 1929, in which he discussed many of Pekař's detailed objections to Masaryk's philosophy of Czech history he concluded:

> All these critical exceptions cannot prevent us from acknowledging that in Masaryk's philosophy of history there is the healthy kernel, or from accepting what to Masaryk was the essential. That is the conviction of the supreme importance of the Hussite movement, as much from the viewpoint of our history as from that of the present development of the cultural flowering of mankind.[23]

But Pekař had not, in the meantime, deserted his position. It was no longer profitable to attack Masaryk personally. Yet it was possible to find other and less vulnerable targets.[24] In 1931 he was elected Rector of Charles University and his rectoral address was on the subject of the Periodization of Czech History.[25] His contention was that the movements of Czech history necessarily coincide with those of the lands surrounding Bohemia. This

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20 J. Werstadt, *Odkazy dějin a dějepisců*, pp. 102-118, "O myšlenkovém vývoji a profilu Kamila Krofty." See also for a survey of Krofta's development as a historian F. M. Bartoš, *Kdo je Kamil Krofta?* (Prague, 1946), especially for these years pp. 9-19.

21 *Ceská Konfese* (Prague, 1912).

22 *Bílá hora* (Prague, 1913).

23 Quoted by Werstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

24 Josef Pfitzner remarked in his "Neue Wege der tschechischen Geschichtswissenschaft," *Historische Zeitschrift* 153 (1936), 514-537: "Man durfte begierig sein wie sich die Gründung der Tschechoslowakischen Republic auf die Geschichtswissenschaft auswirken werde . . . Die Gedanken Masaryks und Benešs hatten gesiegt" (p. 525). He goes on to point out, however, that the westward orientation of Czech historiography which he ascribes to Masaryk and Beneš did not develop much further. To which it is only fair to insist that Masaryk had laid less emphasis on western ideas in Czech history than upon native Czech humanitarianism.

25 *O periodisaci českých dějin* (Prague, 1932), and in German in *Prager Rundschau* I (1932) No. 6 E. g., p. 9, "The Czech Middle Ages end precisely where the Middle Ages of all the nations of our cultural and historical area end.

position naturally results from any rejection of a strong native Czech tradition. The polemics in which Pekař was immediately involved do not concern us here, save to indicate that the Palacký-Masaryk thesis had by now many able and active defenders. There were indeed many who regarded the whole fuss as amusing and Pekař's part in it as a quixotic tilting at windmills.

In 1932 there appeared from the pen of the leading Czech authority on Hus and the whole Hussite period, Professor F. M. Bartoš of the Hus Faculty of Theology, a summary study of Masaryk's philosophy of history.[26] Bartoš' study gained importance from the fact that he was by then, after the death of Novotný, the greatest living authority in the precise period which Masaryk had made the core of his thesis, the Hussite reformation,[27] and that, as a younger contemporary of Pekař, he had been following the latter's work year by year, and often article by article, with objections in principle and numerous corrections in detail. Bartoš fortified at almost every point the main contentions of Masaryk and found Pekař's objections either captious, ill taken, or based on wilful misconstruction of Masaryk's argument. He further asserted that additional historical facts, not available to Masaryk a generation before, only substantiated his position and invalidated that of Pekař.

The pendulum had thus, since at least 1912 and essentially since *ca.* 1900, swung steadily but inexorably away from the conservative point of view put forward by Goll and defended so hardly by Pekař to a point where Czech historiography accepted virtually Palacký's view that Czech history was a spiritual pilgrimage in very essence *sui generis;* that though the surrounding Germandom was not without influence upon its course, yet the Slavic kernel of Czech development was so distinctly humanitarian and religious that any suppositious German influence was minor and superficial, and that, given a free exercise of its own powers, the humanitarianism of Hus, Chelčický, Komenský, Dobrovský, Kollár, Palacký, Havlíček and Masaryk would prove to be the normal and natural expression of the deeper and incontrovertible urges of the Czech soul. The principal credit for this radical change in the Czech concept of their own history is without any doubt to be given to Masaryk himself. It would be difficult to find a clearer proof of any thesis than the actualization of this view in the free Czechoslovak Republic of Masaryk and Beneš.

University of Colorado

[26] "O Masarykovu filosofie našich dějin" in *Sborník Vůdce generace,* reprinted with slight bibliographical emendations in his collected papers, *Knihy a zápasy* (Prague, 1948), pp. 545-583.

[27] And hardly less of the life and work of Dobrovský, another of Masaryk's key figures.

NOTES

THOMAS GARRIGUE MASARYK — MARCH 7, 1850-1950

Throughout the free world, wherever friends of Czechoslovakia or friends of freedom gave thought to mileposts along the road of human progress, the seventh of March 1950 was fraught with special significance. It was the hundredth anniversary of the birthday of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, President Liberator of Czechoslovakia, and in the estimation of many, the greatest European of the past half century.

There were many modest and probably many more pretentious ceremonies to mark this anniversary of which we have not heard, but, to indicate at least the diversity of observance, we will list a few memorial meetings which have come to our attention.

In London there were two significant meetings. In Caxton Hall on March 7 Lord Vansittart spoke to an Anglo-Czechoslovak audience on the tragedy of the lost freedom of Masaryk's country and its significance for the rest of Christian civilization. There was another meeting held under the auspices of London University where Masaryk was a professor from 1915 to 1918. The main speaker was Robert Birley. There was also a commemorative meeting at Oxford University. At the Sorbonne in Paris the anniversary was officially recognized by a memorial meeting.

The Masaryk Institute of New York sent in mid-February to a representative mailing list a well chosen selection of quotations from and about Masaryk, so that those interested might have source material in hand with which to organize commemorative meetings.

In New York the Masaryk Institute, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Committee for Free Europe held a joint meeting in the Woodrow Wilson House on March 6. President Harry D. Gideonse of Brooklyn College and Professor James T. Shotwell spoke and Jarmila Novotná of the Metropolitan Opera sang some of her native Czech songs.

At the University of Pittsburgh Professor Otakar Odložilík of the Charles University and Columbia University addressed a meeting on March 7.

Denver University, after sending a considerable number of attractive and useful kits containing a select bibliography of Masaryk and reprints of articles about him to educators, clergy and publicists throughout the Mountain States region, held a university convocation presided over by Chancellor Albert C. Jacobs on February 27. Dr. Josef Korbel, formerly Czechoslovak Ambassador to Yugoslavia, S. H. Thomson of the University of Colorado and Richard Brown of the Department of State and sometime Executive Secretary to the UNRRA Mission in Czechoslovakia, spoke on various aspects of Masaryk's life and significance.

An exhibition of some Masaryk items including exchanges of letters between

him and President Wilson was arranged at the Library of Congress. Senator Lehman of New York introduced a resolution in the United States Senate calling for the issuance by the United States Post Office Department of a three cent commemorative Masaryk stamp.

Several publications have also appeared to signalize the anniversary. The National Union of Czechoslovak Protestants in America and Canada, with headquarters in Chicago, published a 55 page biographical essay on *T. G. Masaryk Nastín života a díla* in Czech by Professor Odložilík. The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, with headquarters in Washington, D. C., published a brochure *T. G. Masaryk* in English by Professor Otakar Máchotka, now of Cornell University, and the "Committee for the Celebration of the Hundredth Anniversary of T. G. Masaryk" (sponsored by the Central Committee of Czechoslovak Legionaires and a special committee of the Czechoslovak Council in America) published a substantial (142 pages) *Sborník,* under the editorship of Dr. Josef Falta. Among the many contributors are Petr Zenkl, Juraj Slavik, Vojta Beneš, Ivan Herben, J. J. Zmrhal, Jozef Lettrich, František Němec, Jan Papánek, Antonín Hřebik. It is planned, if possible, to compose a collection of scholarly studies on the life and work of Thomas G. Masaryk. It might be suggested that a properly edited English version of the life of Masaryk by Jan Herben would be of great use to the Western World.

It is unfortunately impossible to report any noticeable celebrations of this anniversary in his native land to which he brought independence and statehood. There was no official notice taken of his birthday by the present government of Czechoslovakia, though there were numerous articles and editorials in the controlled press attacking him for his connections with the imperialist West.

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Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts, announces the third session of its Institute on the United Nations, June 25-July 22, 1950. The program has been planned by consultants from 15 New England colleges, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Foreign Policy Association and similar organizations around the general theme "Towards a World Government." Those interested can obtain further information from Miss Marjorie Fisher, Executive Secretary, Mount Holyoke Institute on the United Nations, South Hadley, Massachusetts.

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The Slavic Department of the University of California (Berkeley) announces an especially rich list of offerings in the languages and cultures of the Slavic peoples for the summer of 1950. The Berkeley Summer Session is in two semesters, June 19 to July 29 and July 3 to September 9. Elementary Russian, Polish and Czech; Second year Polish and Russian, third year Russian, Slavic philology and advanced individual work are offered.

An Institute on International Administration will be held at the University of Denver during the coming summer from June 21 to July 21. Visiting specialists from the United Nations and the Department of State will lecture and lead seminars on such subjects as: "Concepts of International Administration"; "Administrative Problems in the Development of the United Nations"! "Administrative Problems in the Operation of the U. N. Specialized Agencies"; "Administrative Problems in the Conduct of the United States Activities Abroad"; and, "International Administration and United States Foreign Policy." Dr. Albert H. Rosenthal, Director of the School of Public Administration at the University of Denver, will be in charge.

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The University of Denver will conduct its second annual Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union during the period June 19 to July 21, 1950. The main feature of the Institute is a five quarter hour course for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, surveying the politics, economics, sociology, history and international relations of the U.S.S.R. Forty of the fifty hours of lectures will be given by four members of Harvard University's Program of Regional Studies: Merle Fainsod, Chairman of the Department of Government; Michael Karpovich, Chairman of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures; Alexander Gerschenkron, Director of the Economic Project of the Russian Research Center; and Alex Inkeles, Lecturer on Social Relations and Research Associate of the Russian Research Center. C. Dale Fuller of the Department of International Relations of the University of Denver will again be the Coordinator for the Institute.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

The International Political Science Association, established in September 1949 under the auspices of Unesco, is actually directed by a Provisional Executive Committee with Mr. Quincy Wright (University of Chicago) as Chairman and Mr. Marcel Bridel (University of Lausanne) and Mr. D. W. Brogan (University of Cambridge) as Vice-Chairman. The first months of the Associations' existence have been devoted to the creation of its administrative organization and the establishment of contacts with National Associations. The Committee, at a Meeting held in Paris from the 6th to the 7th February 1950, has defined the outline of the programme of the Association's activities.

The Association will hold its first Roundtable Conference in Zurich from the 4th through the 9th September 1950, at the same time as the International Sociological Association. Both Associations will hold a certain number of joint sessions for the study of the "Role of Minorities in International Relations". As to the Agenda of the International Political Science Association of the Zurich Roundtable Conference, it will include the following topics:

a. Comparative electoral systems, with particular reference to their influence upon political parties, public opinion, and the nature of the political regime.
b. The role of the citizens' in a planned society, political and sociological aspects.
c. What are the *Minimum* conditions for an effective and permanent Union of States, with special reference to powers, jurisdiction, and finance

The Association's Secretariat will furnish and receive all suggestions concerning the Association, its activities, its programme and the organization of the Zurich Roundtable Conference. Please write to the Executive Secretary Treasurer, M. Jean Meynaud, 27, rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris 7e, who is qualified by the way, to receive requests for individual membership by all persons properly qualified by their professional or general activities in Political Science (an annual dues of 2 dollars is to be contributed by members of regional or national associations belonging to the International Political Science Association as collective members and of 3 dollars for others persons, it being understood that the contribution of these sums entitles the giver to free service of the Unesco's "International Social Science Bulletin".

BOOK REVIEWS

BOKES, FRANTISEK, *Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov od najstaršich čias po oslobodenie.* Bratislava: Slovenská akadémia vied a umení, 1946. Pp. 411.

Slovakia has always been one of the most isolated regions of Europe. Protected and isolated by the Carpathian mountains, none of the great highways of Europe's history traverse it. Only as a province of larger units, Hungary or Czechoslovakia, has Slovakia been important enough to attract the interest of Great Powers and has rarely, if ever, had the dubious honor of being a pawn in their power politics. Its history is, therefore, not comparable to that colorful though harrowing history of Macedonia, for instance. The first foreign army ever to take the trouble of fighting its way through the narrow Slovak valleys to the heart of Slovakia appears to have been the Soviet Army of General Petrov in 1944-1945, and the dispatch of Petrov seems to have been motivated more by political than strategic considerations, namely, it suited the Soviet post-war policies to assure the liberation even of this small and forgotten country.

Budapest, Prague and Vienna have traditionally been 'windows onto Europe' for the Slovaks, and the view of Europe and the world that Slovaks have received through them has never been particularly broad. It is therefore not surprising that Slovak history and historiography, considerable since 1918, should still be very provincial. Bokes' *History of Slovakia and the Slovaks since the earliest times until the Liberation* (specifically, up to the first free Czechoslovak elections of April 1920) is no exception to this rule. On reading this book one has the impression of a region living in an historical vacuum. Bokes sees little interrelation between the history of Slovakia and that of Central Europe, let alone that of Europe as a whole. He is safest when he treats events limited strictly to Slovakia. When he passes to their outside ramifications he becomes vague. The conception of a common Czecho-Slovak history, so dear to Czech historians, is tacitly rejected, and divergent points vis-à-vis the Magyars are emphasized. Otherwise, as Bokes attempts little interpretation, the book is written objectively and with commendable restraint. There is in it none of that angry chauvinism that reduces much of historical writing in Central Europe to mere propaganda designed to justify current-day political objectives. It is essentially a chronicle of events based on little independent research exhausting the research of other scholars and presenting it in a convenient form. There are abundant original illustrations and many good maps.

For his treatment of the earliest history of Slovakia, Bokes fully utilizes the considerable results of archeological excavations and historical research pursued after 1918 by Professors Eisner and Ondrouch of the Slovak University in Bratislava. He places the arrival of the Slavs into the region of Slovakia in the 6th and 7th centuries and rejects the Hungarian thesis that there is no contin-

uity between the Slav settlement of Slovakia before and after the arrival of the Magyars in the Danubian basin, *ca.* 895.

The activities of the Hussites in Slovakia in the fifteenth century, one of the rare points of contact between the Czechs and Slovaks in the Middle Ages and therefore greatly emphasized by Czech historians as well as Slovak Protestant historians, are considered by Bokes, a Catholic writer, as unfortunate. He does not believe that they laid the foundations for the Protestant Reformation in Slovakia in the sixteenth century.

The bulk of the book from p. 13 on is devoted to the awakening of the Slovak national consciousness at the end of the eighteenth century and the struggles of the Slovaks up to 1918 for a modest place in the Hungarian state. The Slovak armed insurrection of 1848-1849, largely ignored by foreign writers on Slovak affairs, even by such well-informed and sympathetic ones as Seton-Watson and Harrison Thomson, is treated by Bokes at length on the basis of the bulky and authoritative work on the subject by Professor Rapant of the University of Bratislava.

The chapter on the struggle for independence during World War I is hopelessly jumbled. Thus the declaration of Czechoslovak independence in Washington on October 18, 1918 precedes the discussion of Masaryk's activities in the United States, of which the culmination was the declaration. There is no apparent reason or explanation for this disregard of chronology and simple logical sequence of facts. However, Bokes is perhaps not altogether responsible for the inadequacy of this chapter. He wrote his book in 1944 and early in 1945, that is still under the regime of Monsignor Tiso when the literature pertaining to the struggle of the Czechs and Slovaks for independence during the years 1914-1918 was blacklisted and not available in the Slovak public libraries. His bibliography omits even such indispensables for the study of this period of Czechoslovak history as the war memoirs of Masaryk and Beneš. With this exception, however, Bokes' bibliography is undoubtedly the most complete one, at least as far as the Czech, Slovak, Magyar and German works on Slovak history are concerned. This may also be said of the book in general. It is undoubtedly the best general work on the subject so far available.

Florida State University VICTOR S. MAMATEY

MENDOL, TIBOR, *A Balkan Foldrajza* (The Geography of the Balkan Peninsula). Balkan Institute, Budapest, 1948. Pp. 107, maps.

The aim of the Balkan Institute is threefold: first to increase the knowledge of the political, cultural, societal and economic conditions of the Balkan Peninsula among the Hungarians; second, to give information concerning Hungary to the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula; third, to widen the cultural and economic ties between Hungary and the Balkans. To achieve these aims the Institute sponsors lecture series, courses in the various Balkan languages, maintains a

reference library and a reading room and publishes pertinent material in the "Books on the Balkans" and similar series.

The book under review was originally presented as a lecture in one of the series sponsored by the Institute. It is written in a semi-popular style for use by the general public. This condition imposes upon the author the obligation to explain his technical terms by broad generalizations which often cause a break in the continuity of the text. The use of footnotes may have been a better practice. It is slightly confusing to give information on the Balkan region and teach geographic terminology simultaneously. At the same time, in several instances where specific conditions require explanations, they are not always clear. More and clearer explanation of specific conditions and less space devoted to the explanation of geologic or climatic phenomena and conditions would have greatly improved the usefulness of the little volume. The five illustrations are rather ambitious but the careography is blurry, especially in the cases of the topographic and physiographic maps. The reproduction on the rough paper is poor.

The book consists of six chapters. The first is an introductory statement about the general historical background of the peninsula. The significance of this is in its point of view. Until quite recently the Hungarians did not pay much attention to the Balkans, which, in their opinion, was a backward area of poor goat and swine herders. Dr. Mendol's main point is that such a point of view and attitude is "in many respects erroneous and in its consequences unquestionably damaging." This certainly indicates great changes in at least some Hungarians' attitude towards their neighbors to the south. All through the treatment of Fiume, and Voyvodina and Transylvania, Dr. Mendol never mentions that these were for centuries Hungarian, neither does he mention Hungarian minorities in Yugoslavia or Rumania.

After the introduction the author discusses the physiography and hygrography of the peninsula (24 pages), followed by the treatment of climate and natural vegetation (14 pages). Each of these sections ends in a brief summary of its human significance. The author calls attention to the difficulties of a western and the ease of an eastern approach to the peninsula and the resultant eastern orientation of its people. The vegetation chapter ends in a brief discussion of the changes wrought by man, and of the cultural landscape. This leads into the discussion of the human element in two chapters. Chapter IV deals with the problems of land use and economic development, the ethnic question ending in a brief discussion of the main regions of the peninsula (25 pages). Dr. Mendol points to the importance of religion in the question of nationality, especially in the case of the Catholic Croats, the Eastern Orthodox Serbs and the Moslem Bosnians who will speak the same language yet write in three different ways and belong to three widely divergent cultural communities.

In the next chapter the author discusses the various types of houses found on the peninsula, their development and the reasons therefor. He discusses the building materials, stone, wood, and adobe, their relationship to the environment

and their effect upon building types. The chapter closes with a discussion of urban and rural communities. The patterns of villages, towns and cities, and their economic functions are analyzed.

The last chapter gives general information about the evaluation of source materials and an excellent, comprehensive bibliography.

University of Florida SIGISMOND DER. DIETTRICH

KUTNAR, FRANTISEK, *Sociálně myšlenkova tvářnost obrozenského lidu.* Prague: Historický klub, 1948. Pp. 216. Kč 90.

For about two centuries, from the Peace of Westphalia to the opening of the constitutional era in 1848, the Czech people merely vegetated and were deprived of any direct influence upon Habsburg policy. The social structure of the formerly independent nation became singularly simple. To the upper classes, weakened by successive waves of persecution as well as by emigration, an unusually high percentage of newcomers from various parts of Catholic Europe was admixed either during the war or immediately after the cessation of hostilities. Under the pressure from the Vienna Court the heterogeneous elements amalgamated and adopted the German language as a means of communication. Anyone looking for representatives of the Czech national spirit in this period of political and intellectual lethargy, must look to the peasantry as well as to the lower strata of the townspeople.

The hard lot of the village population as reflected in official documents or in literary products of that period has never ceased to occupy students of social and economic history. The names of Josef Pekař or Kamil Krofta vouch for the high quality of contributions devoted to the legal status and material conditions of the agricultural class.

František Kutnar, one of Pekař's pupils, has decided to treat other aspects of peasant life and has produced a book which deserves more than a few casual remarks. A literal translation of its title is well-nigh impossible and would only betray the author's indebtedness to cultivators of a *précieux* style from among the contemporary Czech writers. The subtitle is more concrete and reveals the author's intention to treat the common Czech people during the period of the national revival from three different angles in order to grasp the trends of their progress toward emancipation. Consequently, the book has three sections, prefaced by reflections on the common people as a problem of historical study. No dates have been given as the termini of the author's observations. It may be said briefly that the latter part of the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic era have been more thoroughly investigated than either the earlier or the ensuing periods. Kutnar's *début* was a doctoral dissertation on the Life and Work of Ignatius Cornova, a learned ex-Jesuit and historian whose life climaxed around 1800 and an interest in approximately the same period has not left Kutnar since the publication of his thesis in *Český Časopis Historický,* vol. 36, 1930.

In the first section of his book the common people are presented as objects

of sympathy or of expert studies by some authors and thinkers of that age. The protagonists of mercantilistic policy revamped the outmoded concepts and assigned to the agricultural class a highly important position in the state organism. Raising of living standards and the abolition of serfdom figured prominently both in theoretical considerations and in practical projects of the enlightened monarchs and of their learned advisers both in Vienna and in Prague. They were also reflected in contemporary writing from which Kutnar quotes in the opening chapter of the first section. The humanitarian spirit permeated also the more popular writings which bloomed both in German and Czech after the mitigation of the censorship and which found readers on both sides of the dividing line, among the privileged classes and the common folk. In the third chapter the author has recaptured the echoes and reverberations in Bohemia of the Great Revolution. He also studied efforts of the Czech patriots to awaken the masses from torpor and indolence to an active support of the national program.

In the second section of the book the common folk enter the stage as active partners. Divided into four chapters, this section analyzes popular reaction to contemporary events. The theme is attractive for, with the author, the reader witnesses the birth and early deevlopment of Czech political thinking after more than a century of enforced silence. As a warning against exaggerated hopes or illusions, it must be said that only exceptionally a member of the peasant class took to the pen to leave a record of his experience. What Kutnar was able to consult came mostly from that sprinkling of intelligentsia which cast its lot with the underprivileged population, from village priests, schoolmasters, or, occasionally, from an enlightened nobleman. The currents of thought, the principles of the Enlightenment and of the Great Revolution, the trends of literary and intellectual life were largely beyond the grasp of these authors and, even more so, the illiterate folk. The wars, the rise and fall of dynasties, the marching of foreign troops, the stories of defeats or victories which spread from one country into another on the wings of the wind stirred the stagnant atmosphere, stimulated curiosity and imagination, gave rise to thinking and revived among the Czech people the sense of solidarity with other countries of Europe. There is in Kutnar's book no allusion to the American revolution or the rise of the American nation.

The belated and dim reminiscences of the rebellion against the Habsburgs or the meteoric career and ultimate fall of General Valdštejn—(Wallenstein) soon gave way to echoes of political realities, especially of the war of which the lands of the Bohemian Crown on several occasions became either the theater or the coveted prize. Frederick II of Prussia and Napoleon provided topics both for spirited conversations in the *salons* of the Bohemian aristocracy and for the untrained commentators of current events in peasant huts or in village greens. Some of these comments reappear in the writings in prose or verse which Kutnar has subjected to a careful analysis. The epithets "beast" or "knave" given to Frederick II were not coined artificially but sprang from the people's anger at the intruder. In regard to Napoleon, popular resentment harmonized with the

official point of view communicated to the masses through such media as government proclamations, pamphlets, sermons or newspapers. Many authors displayed toward Napoleon's campaign the same negative attitude as they had reserved for the Jacobins. But there was a section of the population among whom the Corsican was almost as popular as Joseph II, the King-Reformer to whom both the peasants and the Protestants were indebted for many progressive measures. Kutnar refers to a belief prevailing in some parts of Bohemia that Bonaparte was Joseph's natural son; in such circles the enemy of the Emperor Francis was regarded as the continuator of Joseph's efforts to alleviate the plight of the common people.

The third section, though somewhat incongruous, supplements the two previous parts and rounds out the picture. The theme is of great importance for the spiritual history of the Czech people. Though the country was, by the untiring labors of Jesuit missionaries, brought back to the fold of the Church secret adherents to the "faith of the Lamb" survived in many regions, especially in the mountains. Outlawed as they were, and deprived of leadership, they gradually lost contact with Protestant orthodoxy and either espoused primitive forms of deism or adopted crude variants of mysticism. Visions and expectations of the coming of an ideal political and social order were but a variation of profound dissatisfaction with the prevailing conditions as it had been voiced by more politically minded contemporaries. The mysterious King of Morocco, whose advent was foretold in several folk songs, was both a revival of Messianic hope and a rather distorted manifestation of belief that such an enlightened and humanitarian ruler as Joseph II must re-appear on the scene.

Since the appearance, in 1895, of Masaryk's *Česká otázka* the progress and the underlying ideas of the Czech naitonal revival have attracted historians no less than the Hussite period. Kutnar's book, though not marked by the author as such, is a welcome companion to Masaryk's analysis of the legacy of the scholars and thinkers from the Enlightened and Romantic eras. It depicts that very social class upon the uplift of which the "Awakeners" based their hopes in regeneration and the final emancipation of the Czechs and Slovaks.

Columbia University OTAKAR ODLOZILIK.

WHITRIDGE, ARNOLD, *Men in Crisis. The Revolution of 1848,* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1949, Pp. 364. $5.00.

This is a very live and readable account of the revolutionary movement of 1848 as these events turned about certain leading personalities of the times. The author's approach is primarily biographical. The story begins in France, then moves to Italy, Germany, and the Austrian Empire, and finally ends with an account of the repercussion in the United States. The author has read widely in the literature of the movements of 1848 as his admirable bibliographical notes indicate, though he has failed to note the excellent survey of this whole 1848 movement by Félix Pontail (Paris, 1937). His account however shows a lack of

depth in his general knowledge of the whole background of the period. To take only one example from many, he classes (p. 12) Louis XVIII of France as a reactionary along with his brother, Charles X. As well class General Grant with Grover Cleveland. The whole account lies too much on the surface, the author's knowledge is thin when he gets out of the narrow range of 1848 and 1849. The most interesting original chapter is the one on the influence of the revolutions of 1848 on the United States. Because of the lack of general books on the whole revolutionary movement of 1848, in English, this book will prove useful.

In conclusion, the author sums up four reasons for the failure of the Revolutions; the confusion between the claims of nationalism and democracy which kept the revolutionaries from working together especially in the Hapsburg Monarchy; the political inexperience of the revolutionary leaders; the apathy of the peasants who everywhere formed the overwhelming majority of the population; and finally, the fears of the bourgeoisie that the revolution would go too far. So 1848, the "annus mirabilis" of the nineteenth century was, as Trevelyan said, "the turning point at which modern history failed to turn.'

Oberlin College FREDERICK B. ARTZ

NOVAK, VIKTOR, *Magnum crimen. Pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj* (A Half Century of Clericalism in Croatia). Zagreb, 1948. Pp. 1124.

This book in paper covers of white and yellow is probably the largest historical work which has appeared in post-war Jugoslavia. Eleven hundred pages of print is undoubtedly an achievement considering the technical difficulties both in collecting material and in rushing such a bulky volume through the press.

The name of the author is not completely unknown to students of Latin paleography. Another question is how many of his articles and books on various aspects of Croat national history may have reached either private or public libraries in America. Viktor Novak, a Croat by birth, has been, since 1924, active among the Serbs. He has held the Chair of Croat History which was founded at the University of Belgrade in order to promote mutual understanding between the two kindred peoples. One of the determining factors in his life was his visit to Rome before 1914 and his research in the Vatican Archives. As a medievalist he came into a close contact with problems of modern religious life and took lively interest in relations between the Vatican and the Catholic Croats.

Magnum crimen is the last part of a trilogy which Novak planned long before the second World War. In a preface to this volume he has outlined the project and acquainted the readers with the progress of his work. The first part of the trilogy, *Magnum tempus*. has been conceived as a survey of life and activities of the Croat Catholic clergy during the national awakening. The atitude of the Church dignitaries toward the schemes of a Jugoslav union, called summarily Illyrism, was to be the point of departure, as the author's eyes were turned more to literary and scholastic activities than to purely ecclesiastical matters. As a sequel to this survey the author hoped to write a biography of Bishop Josip

Strossmayer (1815-1905) who, for several decades, had held a dominant position among the Croat people and was, in his epoch, counted among the leading figures in the Danubian area. This part of the trilogy, *Magnus Sacerdos,* has not been conceived as a biography on the traditional pattern. Novak's ambition was to contrast the life work of the patriotic prelate with the views and activities of his opponents from the ranks of the higher Croat clergy. The present volume, the third in order, as indicated by the sub-title, sketches the growth of clericalism in Croatia since the opening of the present century, developing the theme to which some chapters of Strossmayer's biography were to be devoted. We learn from the preface that *Magnum tempus* was already completed before Jugoslavia had been drawn into the second world conflict, whereas the work on the second part of the trilogy did not advance beyond the preliminary stage of research in archives and libraries and classification of excerpts and notes.

It is easy to see why the final volume has been given priority in the author's program of work. It is evident that he wished to present his contemporaries in the shortest possible time with an analysis of such trends in Croat life as resulted, in 1941, in separation of the Croats from the Serbs and in the establishment of NDH, the Independent State of Croatia. The book is topical and has been, undoubtedly, received with satisfaction by the present masters of Jugoslavia as many of its passages could be used as corroboration of charges made by the political leaders against the Croat Catholic hierarchy. The author does not stand aloof from the current struggles and controversies and makes it sufficiently clear that his book has not been intended as a dry account of past events, but in many cases as an actual impeachment, indeed a militant gesture.

But in all fairness to the author it cannot be said that he has written his story in order to obtain any special consideration from the regime. The origin of the book cannot be traced to the sources of the current anti-Church propaganda as conducted in the Communist dominated countries. Its roots are deep in the soil of Central Europe and for those who are familiar with the Central Euorpean scene it is not difficult to trace the affiliations. Prof. Novak, to-day in his sixties, came in his formative years under the influence of the last wave of the anti-clerical feeling which spread from France and Italy to Central Europe. Its champions could be found both among the German liberals and among the progressive Czechs. What in France and Italy remained within the intellectual sphere, in Central Europe soon became mingled wtih political and national struggles, then entering into the final phase. The alliance of the 'sabre and cowl', as the close contacts between the Imperial Court and the hierarchy were usually called, brought about, especially among the non-German peoples, an estrangement between the people and that section of the high clergy which was its lot with the ruling class. Any support given to the anticlerical movement served automatically as a contribution to the struggle for liberation, and, vice versa, allegiance to the hierarchy was tantamount to a betrayal of the national cause.

If we open Prof. Novak's book with these things in mind, we shall find it

easy to orient ourselves in the vast mass of material and evidence which he has collected both during the pre-war period and during the years of, first, his incarceration in a concentration camp and, later, in confinement to his home in Belgrade. The invasion and disruption of Jugoslavia in the spring of 1941 has served the author as the dividing line of the period to be covered in the third part of his trilogy. The *magnum crimen* is not an individual or isolated action: the author uses the term to designate the activities of that part of the Croat hierarchy which cast their lot with the *poglavnik* of NDH, Ante Pavelić, and endorsed his policy, friendly to the Axis and hostile to the Serbian people, and in general to all those who even after the forceful dismemberment of the country remained faithful to the idea of a Jugoslavia. Two long chapters, covering over 500 pages, have been reserved for the description of conditions prevailing in the NDH. The author bases his gloomy picture not only on written documents which, despite strict police measures found their way to the occupied capital, but also on personal narratives by some of his fellow prisoners in the Banjica *konclogor.*

But the connection between the *Magnum crimen* and the prior volumes of the trilogy has been preserved by a broad outline of the part which one fraction of the Croat high clergy played both during the first World War and in Jugoslavia from 1918 to the spring of 1941. The subtitle is a little misleading, for there is in the book only a brief sketch of ideological struggles among the Croats before 1914 ,and a detailed treatment begins with the shots fired in Sarajevo at the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort on June 28, 1914.

The presentation of the period of thirty years is neither even nor symmetrical. The narrative does not run smoothly, as the author has decided to quote freely and extensively from contemporary documents both to corroborate his charges and to disarm beforehand his opponents. Some passages have been written by a scholar in a dignified academic gown, in other parts of the book the author assumes the role of the public prosecutor.

Stockholm, Sweden OSCAR NEUMANN

KISZLING, RUDOLF, *Die Revolution im Kaisertum Österreich 1848-1849.* Mit Beiträgen von J. Diakow, M. Ehnl, G. Hubka und E. Steinitz. Vienna: Universum Verlagsgesellschaft, 1948. 2 vols. Pp. 356, 368. 146 sch.

This is a collaborative work written by former officers of the Austro-Hungarian army. Steinitz has contributed the sections in the first volume which deal with the Hungarian revolution and with the military campaigns in Hungary during 1848. Hubka has composed the parts on the South Slavs and their conflicts with the Hungarians. Diakow has penned the portions concerned with Italian affairs in 1848 and with the Italian campaign of 1848. Ehnl has written of the sections dealing with the revolutionary movement in Vienna and the German-speaking regions of Austria, as well as those on the political manipulations of the Habsburg court and on the Italian campaign of 1849. The other

parts of the volumes were written by the editor, Rudolph Kiszling. The sixteen excellent maps in the back of each volume illustrating various military campaigns against dissentient groups and the numerous smaller maps included in the text have been prepared by Alfred von Mierka and Rogobert Pohl.

The material in both volumes has been drawn mainly from published monographic studies and memoirs, but some of it has been taken directly from documents in the Viennese archives, particularly the *Kriegsarchiv*. Footnote references are given only for the archival material cited. A lengthy index in the second volume adds much to the usableness of the work.

Since the contributors to the above work were all officers of the old imperial army, it is to be expected that a large portion of both volumes deals with the battles fought in various parts of the empire to put down the revolution. Over 400 of the 724 pages in both volumes are devoted wholly to military matters. In fact, the main contribution of the work lies in the excellent, clearly written echnical discussions of the military campaigns of 1848-49.

As former officers of the Habsburg monarchy, the authors who contributed to Kiszling's book naturally portray the imperial court and such staunch Habsburg supporters as Windischgrätz, Radetzky, Jellačić, and Schwarzenberg in a much more favorable light than do such standard liberal authorities on the 1848 revolution as Reschauer and Bach. A mild pro-Habsburg vein runs through both volumes. Events and actions are depicted so as to impress the reader with the irresponsible radicalism, the demogoguery, the unbridled ambition, and the naiveté which characterized many of the radical leaders.

The very fact that Kiszling's work is weighted on the side of the forces of conservatism perhaps makes it a healthy corrective for the pro-revolutionary panegyrics which have in the main dominated the historiography of the revolutionary movement of 1848-49 in the Habsburg monarchy. The work is definitely one-sided; nevertheless, in many respects it is one of the most useful of the numerous volumes commemorating the 1848 revolution which were published during the year of the centennial celebration.

University of Colorado R. John Rath

Gross, Feliks, *The Polish Worker: A Study in Social Stratum*. New York; Roy Publishers, 1945. Pp. 274.

The continuing importance of this book, published more than three years ago, stands up under the triple test of events, analysis and ideas. While written some months before World War II ended (its preface is dated December 1, 1944), hence before the subjection of Poland to Soviet communist despotism, Dr. Gross' book makes more intelligible what is going on in Poland. For non-communist Poland resists Sovietism, as it resisted an earlier alien domination, and the background forces and ideas of this resistance are given illuminating analysis in this book.

With a creative combination of history, political economy and sociology,

Dr. Gross discusses the whole panorama of Polish Life without impairing his focus on the Polish worker. This is natural, for the author sees the Polish worker, his economic and political movements and ideas, as a result of Polish history and in turn a maker of that history anew. The conclusion logically follows that "the alliance of the three great groups of peasants, workers and intellectuals and middle class . . . is a fundamental condition for the creation of a democratic political system, which could solve all the economic and political problems of Poland; moreover, it could stabilize social conditions, which is tremendously important in this part of Europe, for no society can possibly survive too frequent economic and social upheavals."

Before he draws his conclusion Dr. Gross subjects to searching analysis the historical background of Poland, the origin and structure of the Polish working class in all its complexity (including the peculiarities of the rural proletariat, which is usually neglected), the economic and political origins created by the workers to carry on their struggles, and the place of revolutionary socialist ideas in those struggles.

Particularly important and suggestive is Dr. Gross' analysis of Polish socialism: its unifying force among the workers, its tie-in with national aspirations and insurrection, all of which socialism supported from the 1830's on, trying to convert the national-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, and the later tie-in with labor unionism and cooperatives. This part of the analysis ends with the alliance of workers, middle class and intellectuals in the heroic Warsaw uprising against the Nazi invaders and the conclusion: "With the occupation of Poland a new chapter in the war began. The Poles took the old path of insurrection, resuming their old tradition of heroic and uncompromising struggle." It makes one understand more fully why Poland is a key factor in the struggle for liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet despotism.

There is nothing formalistic in Dr. Gross' approach and analysis, for he agrees with Goethe: "Theory, my friends, is gray, But green is the golden tree of life." Hence this book throws light not only on the situation in Poland, and Eastern Europe, but on a number of basic questions with which our generation is grappling.

To me, one of the most basic questions is the part the intelligentsia plays in social movements. The intellectuals themselves have given this little if any analysis, and (largely if not wholly unconsciously) indulged in a lot of rationalization. Here, again, Dr. Gross is not formalistic: he does not work with generalizations but with concrete analysis. He makes a distinction between "intellectuals" in the Anglo-American sense and the intelligentsia of continental Europe, especially Poland; and then subjects it to a rigorous economic, political and ideological analysis. Although the Polish intelligentsia, which as a whole controlled the bureaucratic state apparatus (which in turn controlled a not inconsiderable part of Polish economic life), in general "followed Pilsudski or the nationalist camp, while only a minority joined the socialist, peasants' and workers' camps,"

yet large numbers of the intelligentsia, especially among public school teachers, were progressive. Because of the belated development of capitalism and democracy in Poland, the intelligentsia became a "ruling group" through control of state and bureaucracy. All this is so seminal and suggestive that Dr. Gross should prepare a larger study of the role of the intelligentsia in European social movements and change.

Antioch College LEWIS COREY

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE U.S.S.R., *Documents and Materials relating to the Eve of the Second World War.* 2 vols., Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1948. Pp. 314, 243.

The above work was brought out by the Soviet government after the publication of our State Department's *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941* (Washington, D. C., 1948). The first volume contains secret documents from the Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were captured by the Soviet Army after entering Berlin, and a few significant documents copied from the Archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and from published accounts. The first document, dealing with the record of a conversation between Hitler and Lord Halifax at Obersalzberg, is dated November 19, 1937. The last one in the first volume consists of a letter from the Polish Ambassador in London, Raczyński, to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, and is dated December 19, 1938.

The second volume is chiefly devoted to the papers of Herbert von Dirksen, the German Ambassador to London from May, 1938, to August, 1939. They were found by the Red Army on Dirksen's estate at Gröditzberg. These papers deal with the period between May 5, 1938, and August 25, 1939. In addition, there are two appendices to the second volume. The first consists of four letters from Dirksen's private and unofficial correspondence; the second, of two letters from the German Ambassador in Paris, Welczek, to the German Foreign Office. Both volumes have a complete register of all documents contained in them and a useful index of all names referred to in the documents.

The State Department's publication, which begins where the Soviet publication stops, gives a picture of the suspicion, cynicism, self-interest, and betrayal which motivated Russian foreign policy in the period leading to the signing of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact in August, 1939, and to the subsequent breakdown of Russo-German relations. The Soviet publication presents an unfavorable account of the diplomacy of the Western Powers in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of World War No. II. Most of the documents included in it are intended to bring to the attention of the reader the most unfavorable aspects of the appeasement policies of the Western democracies.

Emphasis is placed on the repeated efforts of Halifax and Chamberlain to come to a friendly understanding with Germany and on their almost abject apologies to various German officials for the anti-Nazi tone of the British press. England's prompt acquiescence in the *Anschluss* with Austria and her readiness

to force the Czechoslovak Government to accept all German demands during the Sudeten crisis, as well as France's reluctance to aid Czechoslovakia without Britain's assistance, are especially stressed in the documents for the year 1938. Even Winston Churchill is not spared, for a memorandum of his conversation with Foerster is included to show that Churchill intimated to the head of the Danzig National Socialists that "it would be quite possible, as part of a general European agreement to pledge Britain and France to come to Germany's assistance with all their forces should she be the victim of an unprovoked attack on the part of Russia through Czechoslovakia, or in any other way" (I, 137).

The British distrust of Russia is also stressed. Even after Munich, Chamberlain continued to ignore the Soviets and avoided opposing German designs in the East, in spite of the fact that he was much criticized for his actions by his own officials (I, 301). As late as July and August, 1939, he approved of a far-reaching Anglo-German plan to open up new world markets (II, 67-8, 118), but the inflamed state of British public opinion made it necessary for these negotiations to be made in secret (II, 74-5, 109, 120). It is clearly implied that it was not the British Prime Minister but British public opinion that was responsible for the firm attitude of the British Government during the Polish crisis in August, 1939, and even then the British Foreign Office seemed to be so favorable to peace that Ambassador Dirksen advised his government that Britain would go to Poland's defense only if Poland's independence were clearly threatened (II, 140).

Undoubtedly the Soviet Government has laid its fingers on a very sore spot in recent British diplomacy. Certainly at times Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy was one of almost abject surrender to the most blatant of National Socialist demands. Nevertheless, the highly selected documents published in the above volumes give only one side of the picture: the side that is the most advantageous to the Russian Government to have revealed to world opinion at the present moment. The scholar will still have to wait until all the significant documents on pre-war diplomacy are published before he can make any definitive evaluation of the diplomacy of the Western democracies in the period immediately preceding World War II.

University of Colorado R. JOHN RATH

Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg, Commentaries by Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenck. Translated from the German by Eric Posselt. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., Chicago-New York, 1949. Pp. 328. $4.00.

Alfred Rosenberg was born in Reval, January 12, 1893. He perished in Nuremberg on October 16, 1946, after being hanged by the neck until dead as a convicted war criminal. His political career began with his friendship for Dietrich Eckart in Munich in December, 1918, and his membership in the new NSDAP in 1919. He was, successively, chief editor of the *Voelkischer Beobachter* (1921 ff.); author among innumerable other works, of *The Myth*

of the Twentieth Century (130); member of the Reichstag; Nazi emissary to London (1931); head of the *Aussenpolitisches Amt* (APA) *der NSDAP;* dictator of *Weltanschauung* (1934); and, in the end — 1941 ff. — Reich Minister for the East.

In his Nuremberg cell he wrote sundry bits of disjointed memoirs, intended to aid his defense and to justify his career and the fantastic obsessions which he never abandoned. The U.S. Office of Alien Property, in granting permission to publish, "neither warrants nor disclaims the authenticity of the work." It appears to be entirely authentic. Its fragments have been ably assembled, well organized, and embellished with interlarded comments in small type—for the most part accurate, informative, and suggestive—by two competent Swiss journalists. There is no index. But there is a Foreword, a Chronology, a *Dramatis Personae,* and a List of Abbreviations.

This is a fascinating picture of the sick and twisted personality, shy, aesthetic, sentimental, and jealous, who became the most ferocious Anti-Semitic, Anti-Slavic, and Anti-Communist ideologist of the Third Reich. It is also, at many points, a contribution to the history of the Nazi hierarchy. Rosenberg has little to say about the work of the APA, and less about his role in the conquered *Ostland* where the mass murder of millions of helpless victims is attributed to Erich Koch and to Hitler's mistaken reliance on Himmler, Bormann, and other rivals of Rosenberg for the *Fuehrer's* favor. But there is much here on the political interplay of Gregor Strasser, Robert Ley, Bormann, Goebbels, Goering, Himmler, and Hitler himself, most of whom are depicted as having "betrayed," 'misused,' or "demoralized" National Socialism through ignorance or greed or ambition or bad judgment.

None of these men was insane in a juridical sense. All, and Rosenberg more than most, were neurotics or psychotics in the psychiatric sense, for their frustrations and aggressions led them to modes of adjustment to experience in which reality and morality ceased to motivate conduct. Their case histories are baffling only because millions shared their delusions, their sadistic drives and their will to annihilation. Psychopathology is scarcely equipped as yet to deal meaningfully with the mass mania of entire communities whose members, moved to group hallucinations and incredible bestialities by the economic, social, and spiritual breakdown of a whole culture, go mad collectively instead of individually. The disease is nonetheless madness.

Its symptoms, written across the world in letters of blood and fire, are here discernible in their more subtle nuances amid the seemingly sane lines of Rosenberg's pedestrian and self-righteous prose. To the very end, he is still engaged in saving the Nordic Soul from the Jewish- Masonic-Communist-Catholic World Conspiracy. In his final Political Testament, he sets forth his ideas on a new German Constitution, on the Red Menace, on the "Iron Curtain" (originally Goebbels' phrase), on the need of rearming Germany, "which alone could furnish a fanatical army," against Bolshevism.

None of this is new. Neither, in 1949-50, is it old or irrelevant to many current attitudes, policies, and hopes. This madness is persistent and contagious. Some of the De-Nazifiers have become Nazified. Editors Lang and Schenck observe sagely in their closing comments that Rosenberg "does not make his ideological exit from the stage of the world," but expresses "the terrible conviction, shared by all neo-Fascists, that the Second World War and the defeat of the Axis Powers was in vain and merely a wrong turn taken by history."

Williams College FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

ANDERS, W., *An Army in Exile.* Foreword by F. M. Viscount Alexander of Tunis, K. B. and Introduction by the Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, M. P. New York: Harpers, 1949. Pp. 312. $5.00.

Among the many memoirs published since the end of the war, Anders' "An Army in Exile" will always occupy a unique place, which will be due as well to the historical value of his story as to the highly dramatic human element which is inseparable from facts and events described in his memoirs. As Harold Macmillan said in his remarkable introduction to the book: "No one can read General Anders' account of the Polish Army in exile without emotion."

General Anders was one of the most outstanding and brilliant officers of the army of independent Poland. He distinguished himself during the Soviet-Polish war of 1918-1920 as a gallant and skillful commander of a cavalry regiment. During the peace period of 1920-1939, he won distinction as one of the ablest and best educated higher commanders, as well as an independent and courageous ciitzen who did not hesitate to oppose actively the *coup d'état* of Marshal Piłsudski in 1926, of which he did not approve. One of the characteristic features which endeared him to all Polish cavalry officers and men, was his youthfulness and skilled horsemanship, which enabled General Anders to compete successfully with his young officers in hunting, as well as in the famous Warsaw international steeple-chase races. It was probably this extraordinary physical fitness which made it possible for him to endure the regime of Soviet prisons, to survive his unattended wounds, and to regain his forces and indomitable energy as soon as he recovered freedom. Anders' military past prepared him well for the role of a national leader which he had to play during and after the last war.

Anders' book is the story of a man and an Army, who went through the heroic but hopeless struggle against the joint German-Russian aggression of September, 1939, who subsequently were plunged into the abyss of Soviet labor and death camps, were miraculously freed (at least partially) in 1941 and again welded by their great leader into a splendid fighting organism inspired with a glowing spirit of patriotism, gallantry and sacrifice; who then traversed Russia, Asia, Africa and took a glorious part in the Allied campaign of Italy, to capture the impregnable monastery of Monte Cassino,, as well as Ancona, Bologna and

many other less known strongholds; and who finally, after a complete Allied victory in Europe, to which they and the whole Polish nation contributed so much, learned from their own Allies and companions in arms, that independent Poland was destroyed and surrendered to the Soviet, and that, if they wanted to remain free men, they must be resigned to live in exile.

Anders begins with a short account of the Polish campaign of 1939, in which he brilliantly commanded a group equivalent to an Army Corps. He makes the important statement, that had Russia not attacked Poland on September 17, 1939, Poland would have resisted much longer and some 200-300 thousand soldiers could have been led out of the country, to reinforce the western front in France. This statement refutes the persistent Soviet propaganda which tried to belittle assistance given by Russia to Hitler in 1939-1941. Wounded eight times, Anders was captured by the Russians while trying to break through to Hungary with some of his troops. Wounded and sick, he was denied medical care and put into a common jail, and from that time until his unexpected liberation in 1941, he remained in prison. His description of Soviet prisons, of endless scientifically conducted interrogations by NKVD, during which he sometimes was given tea and cigarettes and sometimes hit in the face and maltreated in various ways; his account of conversations which he had with numerous Russian and Jewish political prisoners, victims of unending Communist purge, are of the greatest interest to all who want to penetrate behind this sinister curtain which conceals the real life in Soviet Russia from the outside world.

After the conclusion of the Russo-Polish agreement in July 1941, Anders was freed and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in Russia. It was an army of emaciated skeletons in rags just released from Soviet prisons and concentration camps, and covered with ulcers from malnutrition, but its spirit was magnificent. Only several hundred Polish officers were released by the Soviet, and Anders from the beginning started the search for some 15,000 missing officers, the cream of the Polish Army, who were known to have been in the Soviet prisoner of war camps of Starobielsk, Kozielsk and Ostashtov in 1939-40. When asked about them, Stalin was evasive, Molotov arrogant, and other Soviet high officers most silent. As the time passed more and more evidence was gathered by Anders which raised the terrible suspicion that the officers had been murdered by the Soviets. Only in 1943, when the Germans discovered several thousand bodies of Polish officers shot and buried in the Katyn forest near Smolensk, was the mystery of their disappearance solved, and Anders obviously does not doubt that they were killed by the Russians in 1940, one year before the Russo-German war, and he has substantiated this opinion with convincing evidence.

When the Soviet government became convinced that the Polish Army could not be won over to communism, it stopped the release of imprisoned Poles and forbad their enlistment. In spite of Anders' appeals to Stalin and the latter's promises, the Soviet authorities made endless difficulties; many soldiers froze to

death in their tents, many were kidnapped by NKVD, promised arms and equipment were not forthcoming. The Soviet government made an attempt to send piecemeal unarmed and untrained Polish divisions to the front for certain extermination, and when Anders opposed this scheme, Stalin ordered food rations for 70,000 Polish soldiers to be reduced to 26,000, which meant death from starvation for the Polish army and the thousands of Polish civilians with whom soldiers shared their food. Finally, under the pressure of the British government, Stalin agreed to the evacuation of Anders' army to Iran in summer 1942. Out of 1.5 million Poles deported to Russia, only 115,000 could leave with Anders, and even that Anders ascribed to the critical situation in which Russia was in 1942, and to her dependence on American and British help.

Once out of Russia, Anders' army received armament and equipment and began training under the leadership of its commander. In the beginning of 1944 it was transported to Italy and started the Italian campaign which brought it fame and recognition by all Allied commanders. Chapters supplemented with excellent maps describing the irresistible drive of the Polish Second Corps across the mountains, rivers and fortresses of the Italian peninsula, are among the best of the book.

With great force and simplicity Anders tells us how the gallant struggle of the Polish Army for the common Allied cause was in complete contradiction to the contemporary Allied policy toward Poland. The glorious capture of Monte Cassino by the Poles took place six months after the conference of Teheran, at which Roosevelt and Churchill agreed in principle to the partition of Poland. When the Poles were engaged in the operation of breaking through the Gothic line, in August 1944, they learned that the Soviets treacherously provoked the Warsaw uprising and then let the Germans suppress it and destroy the city. After the official publication of the Yalta agreement of February 1945, which announced the partition of Poland and the doom of her independence, Anders felt that he had no right to demand new sacrifices from his men and asked the British Command to withdraw the Polish Corps from the line. However, when he was told that there were no other units to replace the Poles, he remained and used all his authority to calm his soldiers. After that, on April 21, 1945, the Poles took Bologna.

During the war Anders conferred many times with Stalin, Molotov, Churchill and many other prominent Allied leaders, as well as with all outstanding Polish leaders from Poland and in exile. In his book he gives detailed accounts of these conversations, many of which are published for the first time and throw a new light on the events of the war; it is striking how many promises were given during the critical hours of the war and how few of them were kept later. Very interesting are Anders' observations on the personality and behavior of Stalin, Molotov and many other high officials of the Soviet government with

whom he not only had official relations, but could speak informally in perfect Russian.

On the basis of his personal experience in dealing with the Soviet rulers and of his intimate knowledge of their mentality and their aims, Anders is deeply pessimistic as regards any possibility of peaceful cooperation between Soviet Russia and the western world.

Washington, D. C. WLODIMIERZ ONACEWICZ

BECHER, JOHANNES R., *Vom Willen zum Frieden. Zwei Reden.* 1947. Pp. 112.
NIEKISCH, ERNST, *Deutsche Daseinsverfehlung.* 1948. Pp. 93.
NIEKISCH, ERNST. *Zum Problem der Freiheit.* 1948. Pp. 38.
DEITERS, HEINRICH, *Der reale Humanismus.* 1948. Pp. 32.
VONTIN, WALTHER, *Heinrich Heine. Lebensbild des Dichters und Kämpfers.* 1948. Pp. 185.
LUCKE, THEODOR, *Denis Diderot. Skizze eines enzyklopädischen Lebens.* 1949. Pp. 123. Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag.

The grouping together of a number of books for the purpose of a review because they bear the imprint of one publishing house may appear as an expedient of dubious merit. In this case, however, we are concerned with the Aufbau-Verlag in Berlin, the largest and most important publishing house in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany. Thus Aufbau-Verlag resembles a *gosizdat* whose activities are governed by a clearly defined publication policy. It does not require much political acumen to establish the nature of this policy but it may be of interest to show how this policy is being implemented.

The publications of the Aufbau-Verlag, or at least those under review, are intended for the general reading public. Political, philosophic, and literary topics are treated in a manner that will insure popular understanding. The application of Marxian concepts achieves unity of outlook and method.

The author of *Vom Willen zum Frieden* is Johannes R. Becher. He belonged to the literary *avant-garde* of the Expressionistic movement in Germany. Soon after World War I he joined the Communist party and has remained unwaveringly true to this decision. After Hitler's advent to power he went into exile in the Soviet Union. In 1945 he returned to Germany to become president of the *Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands.* I believe that Becher still holds this key position in the cultural life of the Soviet Zone. Thus his remarks on the central and pressing problems of peace may safely be considered as official pronouncements made on the occasions of the first *Bundeskonferenz des Kulturbundes* (1947) and of the first *Deutscher Schriftstellerkongress* (1947). Becher insists that Germany must not only accept her defeat but also understand its causes. Thus she will be able to avoid repetition of the errors and sins of the past, only thus will there be *"Gewinn in der Niederlage"*. Only after Germany has understood the forces that drove her into defeat, will

she be able to realize and marshall the forces that make for peace. Becher is alarmed at the widespread reluctance to accept the heritage of the recent past and the responsibility which it imposes upon the individual. There must be a change of mind, no more *Flucht und Verdrängung,* else Germany will not be able to contribute to universal peace. If there is no peace, there will be war, and another war will be Germany's utter undoing (*Es geht um Deutschland*). Germany must understand not only herself but other nations as well. An understanding of the Soviet Union is particularly necessary and useful because there is a nation which created a new society in defeat. Without the acceptance of the philosophy of *realistischer Humanismus,* the emergence of the *anständiger Mensch* and the regeneration of Germany are impossible. Becher's speeches are also interesting for what they do not say or mention merely in passing: the Soviet occupation, the Eastern frontier, the *Flüchtlinge* from the East and Southeast, the prisoners of war in Soviet captivity. He accepts unflinchingly the conditions imposed by his political masters. Evidently this kind of acceptance would greatly contribute toward the pacification of Germany. It appears doubtful, however, if Becher's solution has met with general approval.

Becher is the poet discharging his political duties. Niekisch, however, is a *Politiker* by inclination and profession who, in addition, is a historian and philosopher of considerable knowledge and perspicacity. In his early career he was an active and prominent member of the *Unabhängigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands* and took part in the establishment of the short-lived Bavarian *Räterepublik.* Later he became the editor of the *nationalbolschewistische* magazine *"Der Widerstand"* which was allowed to appear for some time after the 30th of January, 1933. This was amazing indeed because Niekisch had published in 1930 his devastatingly critical and, as it turned out to be, truly prophetic pamphlet *Hitler, Ein deutsches Verhängnis* (I do not hesitate to call this pamphlet one of the outstanding publicistic events in recent German history). *Der Widerstand* was eventually ruled out of existence, and, in due course, the *Volksgerichtshof* caught up with Niekisch. He was indicted for conspiratorial activities, tried, and condemned (most clemently!) to life imprisonment. He escaped (most incomprehensibly!) the thorough liquidation which, after the abortive putsch of January 30, 1944, Himmler and his cohorts carried out among the actual and any potential opposition. What Becher suggests, Niekisch had already accomplished in *Deutsche Daseinsverfehlung* (its first edition appeared in 1946). This treatise is an inquiry into the causes of Germany's historic failure. It makes no original contributions but has the great merit of showing lucidly and convincingly how the German *Bürgertum,* again and again since Luther, failed to perform its appointed historic role. National unity was thus imposed from above, and the development of democratic institutions was tolerated to a point where it would not seriously endanger the privileges of the autocrat and his few beneficiaries. Thus the German *Bürgertum* conditioned itself to the toleration, indeed the active

support, of a *Machtpolitik* which, finally, Hitler pursued in such disastrous fashion. Niekisch's investigation is indeed honest and convincing.

Zum Problem der Freiheit deals with that aspect of freedom which, in this country, has been so animately discussed since the publication of Hayek's *Road to Serfdom*: Can individual freedom be preserved in a society which subjects its economy to planning? Niekisch's argument follows familiar lines. The exercise of individual economic freedom leads to exploitation and maldistribution of wealth among the few, and to want and poverty among the many. Thus not only the democratic principle of equality but also that of liberty is violated because where want prevails, there can be no true freedom. Planned economy, i.e., democratic control of production and distribution, is the only means through which equality and freedom are attainable.

In *Der reale Humanismus* Deiters discusses the humanist foundations of Marxian socialism. (It will be remembered that Karl Marx, in his *Frühschriften,* sometimes calls his philosophy *"realer Humanismus"*) Every social philosophy is built upon a conception of man. Thus the socialist believes in the worth and dignity of the individual, the power and efficacy of his ratio, his duty fully to realize his potentialities, and his responsibilities toward others living within and without his own particular society.

The pamphlets discussed thus far represent adequate attempts at popularizing a number of political, historic, and philosophic ideas from the socialist's point of view. The most knowledgeable and, therefore, most successful attempts are those undertaken by Niekisch. These pamphlets are very readable indeed, largely because the authors have refrained from using the cumbersome and often forbidding Marxian terminology.

The essays on Heine and Diderot are written as endeavors to regain and to bring to life the cultural heritage. Heine's merits as a poet, literary critic, journalist, and social thinker have been, for over a century now, a matter of contention. Vontin, at long last, presents a sane and sensitive account of Heine's career. The presentation is adequate as far as it goes. Unfortunately, it does not go far enough because Heine's accomplishments as a poet have received but niggardly treatment. It is gratifying to note that Vontin has taken good advantage of the findings of recent Heine research. However, the reader interested in Marxian literary criticism will do well to supplement his reading of Vontin's book with Georg Lugacs' essay on Heine (*Internationale Literatur,* 7. Jahrgang, Heft 9, 10).

Lücke's *Diderot* likewise represents an attempt at intelligent and readable popularization. In contrast to Vontin, he has not made use of the results of recent scholarship. His main sources do not date beyond 1928, the year of publication of Le Gras' *Diderot et l'encyclopédie.* It is strange, however, that Lücke should not have availed himself of the authoritative Marxian treatment of his topic. J. K. Luppols book appeared in 1924 and a French translation of it (*Diderot. Ses idées philosophiques*) in 1936.

University of Colorado GERHARD LOOSE

DELAPORTE, JEAN (et al.), *Permanence de l'Autriche.* (Nations et Civilisations du Temps Présent). Paris: Éditions du Temps Présent, 1948. Pp. 404, 16 Plates.

As the first volume in a new series, this book undertakes a popular survey of Austria's life and main problems in almost every field. In this task, France's equally perenniai interest in pleading her case combines to produce, not surprisingly, one more nostalgic little encyclopedia written *ad usum delphini.*

M. Delaporte, editor and main contributor, opens with a long, comprehensive introduction entitled "Discovery of Austria." The discovery is not only belated but incomplete. There are rather important and evident things that escaped him: German nationalism (still influential enough to cause a grotesque scramble for its vote); the structural impact of Anschluss, war and occupation; the irretrievable loss of most of the country's top talent through emigration, concentration camps and war; the world power struggle in the shadow of which Austria is uneasily trying independence once more. M. Delaporte writes well; he is well (though not always reliably) informed; he thoroughly understands Austrias' way of life and loves it. But he is hopelessly, almost intolerably, naive; as when he writes: "Une Autriche qui deviendrait l'enfant chéri (sic) de l'Europe peut vivre, à condition de le vouloir elle-même" (p. 135). Does political permanence really require no more than being the good boy of a "Europe" that, as a political entity, no longer exists?

The second part of the book consists of eight contributions by Austrian authors, two of which deserve mention. Ernst Molden, now chief editor of the Vienna *Presse,* offers a sketchy but suggestive discussion of Austria's present social and political structure. His remarks on the decline of the middle class, on the decay of political instinct and on the rapidly developing political inferiority complex are acute. But his picture of the party structure is generally unbalanced, often superficial, and occasionally misleading; as when he compares the present Communist party with the pre-Hitler *Grossdeutsche* as being the small but decisive "third party." Many of his pre-1938 notions are patently obsolete, such as the insistence on the Catholic character of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, or the reference to France's cultural influence in Romania, or the belief in a "spiritual community of the Slavs." The section on the city of Vienna is good.

Joseph C. Wirth, Director General, Office of the Federal President, contributes the other article mentioned. His subject is Austrias' post-war economy. What makes the article significant is the fact that it deals with the foreign trade and payments situation to the exclusion of almost any other topic, and that the viewpoint taken is that of balancing imports by exports, though the author does not fail to pay the usual tribute to freedom of trade. As a careful statement of Austria's official attitude to these questions (as of 1947) the article is well worth reading.

The remaining articles deal with Austria's history (Rudolf Charmatz), social policy (A. Weinberger), youth and youth organizations (A. Sellner), and the arts. Rudolf Holzer's survey of literature and the theater is as complete and as stimulating as Homer's catalogue of ships; Professor Joseph Marx writes nicely on music; and Elisabeth Gasselseder gives a competent, useful survey of Austrian art to about 1800, with a well-selected but poorly printed set of photos.

The French translations of the Austrian contributions read well enough, except that of Dr. Wirth's article, the "federal prose" of which proved intractable.

To serious students of Austria the book is of little use. But it is a highly commendable, sympathetic and informative guidebook for the tourist who wants to know all about Austria—as long as it does not disturb his notion of her permanence.

University of Georgia GREGOR SEBBA

WEINBERGER, LEO, *Tatsachen, Begegnungen und Gespräche. Ein Buch um Oesterreich.* Vienna: Oesterr. Verlag, 1949.

The author of the above volume is Vice-Mayor of Vienna, a leading deputy of the People's Party in the Austrian Parliament, and chairman of the Workers' Union of the People's Party. He did not take an active part in politics before 1945. In his memoirs he gives a record of his personal experiences in a very unpretentious and appealing manner. His main concern is naturally that of accurately giving what he believes to be a fair and honest analysis of the views which he holds. The author is a gifted journalist, but he is certainly no poet or man with scholarly ambitions. He is a labor leader who is at the same time both an idealist and a realist and who is devoted to his patriotic and social ideals.

In his book the author deals mainly with the following three periods of Austrian history: 1) "The Little Fatherland" (pp. 27-63), in which he gives a general survey of the era between 1918 and 1938; 2) "The Resistance Period" (pp. 66-235), from 1938 to 1945; and "The New Start" (pp. 241-280), covering the period since 1945.

The section of the book which deals with the author's childhood gives the reader a glimpse into the era of Francis Joseph. The author asserts that the breaking-up of the Austro-Hungarian-Bohemian entity was "a tremendous blunder" (p. 24). Others have also expressed the same opinion. For instance, Anton Wildgans the great Austrian poet, had the same idea when he wrote his great "Speech on Austria" for a Swedish audience. So did Herman Bahr and Hugo von Hoffmansthal. As a matter of fact, poets have long felt much more free than the historians to tell the truth about Austria. Why? In contrast to the poet, the historian lives chiefly on a salary paid by the state and frequently aspires to earn his living in Leipzig or Berlin, whereas the poet has remained banished in Vienna or Salzburg.

In the part dealing with the controversial and troubled transitional era

before 1938, Weinberger gives his personal impressions of the leading men and events of the period. Like countless other patriots without actual political responsibility, he willingly shared in the trials and tribulations of his beloved country. Without defending or prosecuting, without blaming or condemning, he gives a true picture of the times as seen by both the fighters on the barricades and the numerical majority who fought against them. As a convinced opponent of stubborn radicalism of both "leftist" and "rightist" varieties, he fully realizes that nothing is more enduring or unfortunate in its consequences than the bitter resentments ensuing from hard fought battles on the barricades. Weinberger lived through the era. It is most worthwhile to read what he tells with so much forbearance and prudence.

In the second part of the book we learn about the dreadful experiences of the author during the infamous period of Gestapo rule, as well as about the sporadic attempts of a few isolated individuals to set up a genuine resistance movement in Austria. We read once more about concentration camps and prison life. But all this offers hardly more than a few additional and corroborating touches to an abomination with which the world has long been familiar. The third section of the volume—on the Second Austrian Republic—also concerns itself with facts that are quite well known, and the author adds no significant new information here.

The most interesting part of the book, which is certainly worth careful reading by anyone interested in recent political history and its psychological premises, is the section containing the reports of the repeated meetings held by leading personalities in the German resistance movement like Dr. Karl Goerdeler, the former Mayor of Leipzig; Jakob Kaiser, the leader of the Christian workers; and William Leuschner, a former leader of the Social Democrats. The conversations of these men, as described by the author, give new insight into the final aims of these truly European patriots. Weinberger is right when he characterizes these men as the leaders of the greatest of all existing resistance movements in Europe. Since they began their work as early as 1938, their activities were the earliest of this kind and also the most intricate and risky. The fact that their movement came to such a tragic end on July 20, 1944, does not change this evaluation.

What is particularly interesting is the clear manner in which the author explains to his German friends and political kinsmen in the resistance group the Austrian view of their future independent political life. In most respects all the members of the group spoke exactly the same language and eventually they agreed on what they had in common as well as on how history and tradition had conditioned them to take different ways without losing sight of each other. The age-old problem of how best to realize a Central European mind in different but complimentary political bodies is a real problem which only the shortsighted can ignore and then only temporarily. A simple, nationalist solution is inadequate, for it is only a repetition of the former German blunder. It is particularly inter-

esting to follow this sober line of reasoning which was shared by all participants in the meetings of the leaders of the German resistance movement. All of them knew exactly what was at stake both for them and for their countries. All of the German leaders of the group except Jacob Kaiser fell victim to Hitler's ruthless political machine. Not only the Germans but all Europeans should feel greatly indebted to the group.

Certainly the importance and meaning of the 20th of July and the plots leading up to it have not yet been fully realized. It was not just an affair of professional militarists or of a single caste or party. To the unbiased observer it contains the only bright spot in the gloomiest period of Central European history. Everybody interested in Central European problems will certainly enjoy reading Weinberger's account of this affair.

Many students will welcome the author's honest and objective report on facts of recent history that have so often been distorted and misinterpreted as well as his basically sound, dispassionate, and humane way of thinking and his obvious efforts to fight the ideas based on a feeling of revenge and barren resentment.

Weinberger's volume and other similar books should be supplemented by a map of Central Europe which shows the changes in political geography after the two world wars. A glance at such a map should contribute more than anything else to an understanding of the many problems involved.

St. Louis University KURT SCHUSCHNIGG

MEINECKE, FRIEDRICH. *The German Catastrophe. Reflections and Recollections.* Translated by Sidney B. Fay. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949. Pp. 121. $3:00.

Professor Sidney Fay and the Harvard University Press have thought it useful to bring out in English an American edition of Professor Meinecke's *Die Deutsche Katastrophe,* first published in Wiesbaden in 1946. The argument for the publication will be evident enough, and it is sincerely to be hoped that a wide public of sensitive readers be gained for this little book which for all its grim analysis is so serious, so frank, so wholly moving. Few readers need an introduction to Professor Meinecke, the doyen of German historians, honored by Harvard University in 1936 at its Tercentenary, and now, though an octogenarian, Rector of the Free University of Western Berlin. A volume of his memoirs, 1901-1919, just published by Koehler, Stuttgart, can help to attest to his life-long concern with and understanding of the German spiritual and political problems.

Professor Meinecke's own purpose in sending forth the essay under review —for the book is in the nature of a long essay—is 1) to begin responsible thought on the German tragedy, and 2) to set down what he knows at first hand of the "essence of the atmosphere of the period in which our fate was fulfilled, and of which one must be aware in order fully to understand this fate. (p. xii).

In beginning his essay Professor Meinecke's scalpel dissects out "The Two Waves of the Age." "This danger (Socialism), threatening from the side of the masses, surged up as a mighty wave which from the middle of the nineteenth century swept over the traditional culture of the world. A mastery over it, however, was soon secured, partly through preventive repressive, or reforming domestic measures, partly and much more by the fact that a second mighty wave had already risen up out of the expanding life of the masses and the nations. . . . This second wave was none other than the nationalist movement of the nineteenth century, which originally was also a liberal movement aiming at the individual's rights to freedom" (p. 3). Both waves were historical and humanly explicable, he continues, and the control and mingling of them easily felt to be a valid political goal. Indeed Meineckes own memoirs show him to have been conscious early in the century of the need for this mingling and to have followed Freidrich Naumann's teaching eagerly to learn what it offered in this respect.[1] It becomes Professor Meinecke's concern to trace, under the peculiarly German conditions obtaining for socialism and nationalism and for the cultural medium in which they existed, the interaction of the two waves and the desired synthesis of them. This effort forms the bulk of the essay, and it is here that the historian vies with the artist and the man for the reader's regard. Meinecke shows himself to be one with the spirit of Goethe, von Humboldt, Fontane, and the best of the classical liberals who, as he shows, but for conditions might have weighted the delicate balance of German fate on the happier side.

Where the man is so compelling it is difficult not to agree with his history. Yet this history, too, under the circumstances is an extraordinary performance. One may examine his approach to Bismarck for an example of his thought. As the "modern man of power in Germany" developed it was "the high aim of German culture to preserve from this pressure and from its coarsening and deteriorating effect the sacred heritage of the Goethe period—an almost miraculous gift bestowed upon the German people—and at the same time to support strongly what seemed vital and fruitful in the demands of the new masses" (p. 9). The classical liberals set about with imagination the making of the synthesis and succeeded at first brilliantly. But their work was "fatally crippled" by a "militarily narrow-minded monarch and by an equally narrow-minded and at the same time egotistical caste of nobles and officers" (*ibid.*) which brought a strong color of *Borussismus* into national life and imposed a heavy "mortgage" on Bismarck's work. The specifically Prussian and militarist characteristics of which we have

1 "From the middle of the nineties, as I have detailed before, I had split spiritually from the Conservative pary. But I retained in my thinking many Conservative elements as I now followed with growing sympathy the reform efforts of Friedrich Naumann and his national-socialist group. It was and still remained my basic thought to secure the workers for the national state, first of all because of the need for a true community of interest and then because of the need for them in carrying out the imperial expansion of Germany which seemed necessary," in *Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin 1901-1919. Erinnerungen von Friedrich Meinecke.*

already spoken were stamped upon him" (p. 55). But even in Bismarck's own contribution, pursues Meinecke, there was that which lay on the border between good and evil and which later slowly expanded on the evil side. Specifically German, he fears, was "the frankness and nakedness" of the German power state and likewise German the "tendency to elevate something primarily practical into a universal world theory" (p. 14). That the gentler tradition was still alive, however, he finds in the spontaneous and heartening burst of humanitarianism at the outbreak of the first World War, when the rifts among the German people seemed bridged over. But only for the moment: Even by 1915 they were opened again over the problem of war aims, and "the men of power" gained the upperhand so that they "led to regions in which Hitler later pitched his camp" (p. 28). Thus Bismarck did not in his day accomplish the "mass Machiavellism" of his people, but he is not blameless, and the descent to Avernus was easier after him.

Professor Meinecke does not see events as leading inevitably to the Third Reich. On the contrary, there were decent forces within the Weimar Republic which might have saved the State. Many factors led to January 30, 1933, and an appointment which could have been avoided. Among these factors was "the chance trait in Hindenberg's personality" which made him too weak to exercise the political judgment required of him in the crucial test. That majority of Germans who chose him was mistaken in the man but for whom Brüning might well have won through. Even in National Socialism Professor Meinecke feels bound to see some positive elements for good. Was not Hitler's plan, too, for a synthesis of nationalism and socialism? Were not several of his appeals geared to the objective needs of the time, as a new training for youth certainly was? Hitler perverted the good in his program because he was the fanatic he was: "There was too much ego in Hitler's nature for him to be regarded as a man of superior rank in history. The boundless vanity, the bad taste of his self-glorification . . . all these were heavy mortgages whch lay on his resolves" (p. 76). In the *coup* of July 20, 1944 there was a strong element of good in the form of the best of the military tradition, a fact for which Meinecke vouches from personal contact with General Beck and several of those about him.

Thus although Hitler left the German state only "a complete heap of ruins," Professor Meinecke does not despair. True understanding of the past can reactivate the bright tradition and banish the dark forces. He hopes that other searching studies like this of his will help to open the way back to Goethe, and not only back but forward to integration into the Western Way. If there are limitations in Professor Meinecke's method of historical analysis and in his choice of a road to new life for the German people—and there certainly are such limitations —these cannot make a responsible historian like Meinecke of less importance than he is; this essay is a monument to his scholarly and human integrity.

University of Nebraska PAULINE R. ANDERSON

BOLTON, FRANCES P., Chairman, *Communism, Its Plans and Tactics.* Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. Pp. viii, 108. $2.00.

ROTHSTEIN, ANDREW, *Man and Plan in Soviet Economy.* London: Frederick Muller, 1948. Pp. viii, 300. 10s. 6d.

The first of these two books was published originally as a United States Government Report entitled *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism.* In its initial form it was Report of Subcommittee 5 (National and International Movements) of the U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Infantry Journal Press has now reprinted it between book covers to assure it a wider distribution and closer attention than it had as a Congressional report.

After a brief introductory part on the general nature of the "specter . . . haunting Europe," Part II details the theory and practice of communism, Part III deals with the tactics of world communism, and Part IV states the various possibilities of counter-measures open to us. Two main points are made in the book concisely and intelligently.

In its domestic policy (and this by now includes the Kremlin's behavior in its captive satellite states) the Soviet government stands for "the deprivation of the producing class of the fruits of production, for "monopolies in every major industry," for "the slave labor of millions," for trade-unions as tools of the state "to prevent labor from seeking justice," and for "reactionary rejection of freedom" in every conceivable way.

In its foreign policy the Soviet government seeks world domination. Its occasional cooperation with the West is but a tactical retreat, in no wise changing the overall strategy of hatred and aggression. Retreat one step in order to advance two—such is the essence of the Soviet aggression. The authors of the report graphically cite this comparison used by both Lenin and Stalin: If you climb a dangerous mountain, the path straight up may be too difficult. So you better make the ascent in zigzag, or even turn back for a while in order to test another direction, another path, which may prove to be easier to climb.

The strong feature of the report is that its authors quote only a few of the enemies of the Kremlin and far more of the pillars of communism: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Molotov. The Lenin-Stalin brand of communism thus stands convicted of its aggressive and reactionary substance though the testimony of its own prophets and leaders. One would wish, however, for a more precise reference method than the one employed in the report. "Stalin on Leninism, lecture at Sverdlof University, 1924," reads a typical reference. But where the text of the lecture was published, and when and by whom, and from what page the quotation is taken—these questions are left unanswered.

A more exact reference system is used by Andrew Rothstein in his *Man and Plan in Soviet Economy.* But this is practically the only positive element in the book. Mr. Rothstein is Lecturer in Soviet Institutions at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, to which post he came after many years as head of the Tass office in London. As he wrote for the

Tass—the official Soviet news agency—so he writes in this book (and so presumably he lectures at the School): we have here extremely pollyannish panegyrics to the saintliness, gentleness, peace-loving qualities, and supreme wisdom of the Soviet government. Official Soviet sources of the most optimistic kind are almost exclusively the basis of this volume. The author dismisses critics of the Soviet regime in his few opening pages of contemptuous comment. Later on he sideswipes at Churchill, and by the book's end cites one more anti-Soviet source—*Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* by Dallin and Nicolaevsky—but only in a footnote and only to heap abuse on "the wilder mare's nests."

The aim is to show that workers and peasants themselves create the Five-Year Plan and run their state and its economic enterprises. The result is that the book reads like a glossy advertisement for a vacation resort. The pseudo-scholarly verbiage and footnotes, laden with statistics, form a rather unrealistic and sometimes self-contradictory background for this tone.

That it is largely pseudo may be seen from such random glances as say at pages 84 to 89, where Mr. Rothstein discourses on the Soviet turnover tax without once mentioning the sad fact that it is actually a very high sales tax and, as such, hitting at the poorer strata of the population most painfully and unfairly. That the tax is high may be perceived from the table at the top of page 85, revealing that in 1947 the tax brought the Kremlin 62.3 per cent of its budget revenue, and that for 1948 the plan envisaged 65.4 per cent. On page 38 the author unwittingly speaks of "the human factor . . . of personal material interest" causing a Soviet manager to help extract this turnover tax—allegedly "in fulfillment of the community's economic plans." This personal interest is a truer factor, of course than Rothstein meant to show. In reality it clashes with, and does not at all fulfill, the community's interest. For there is no true socialism, and certainly no true communism, in the rule of the new managerial élite which the Soviet Union is today.

Colgate University ALBERT PARRY

CIANO, GALEAZZO, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe.* Milan: Mondadori, 1948. Pp. 722. L. 1100.

Mussolini's late son-in-law and foreign minister acquired a widespread reputation for flightiness, but the sheer quantity of papers which he accumulated would tend to show that, whatever else he may have been, he was also an industrious man. From this mass of material was extracted first his *Diaries,* of which somewhat variant Italian, American, and English editions have appeared. The *Diaries,* while interesting in themselves, were disappointing from the standpoint of the documentary evidence contained in them.

The present volume, of which a British version has also been issued, is of an entirely different nature; it is wholly a documentary collection, adequately described in the subtitle as "the minutes drawn up by Ciano of 184 conferences of Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Chamberlain, Sumner Welles, Rüstü, Aras, Stojad-

inovic, Göring, Zog, François-Poncet, etc." with, in addition, 40 hitherto unpublished other diplomatic documents. The documentation stretches from 1936 to 1942, covering virtually the entire period of Ciano's tenure of the foreign ministry; it is arranged chronologically under subheadings describing the chief issue under consideration and with useful introductory summaries in each case which serve to situate that issue in its background and to fill in the gaps in the documentation. This represents only a fraction, though how large a fraction we cannot tell, of the Ciano papers, and one can only regret that the book itself supplies no information on the origin of these papers, the basis of the selection or of the editing. They are ostensibly extracts from the material which had been presumably sent out of Italy before the collapse of the regime, and it is to be hoped that, following the precedent of the German documentation, our own State Department, which had possession of these papers for a time, will see its way to issuing the complete story.[1]

For if we have rightly given major emphasis to the role of Germany in the precipitation, and even more in the military conduct of the second World War, the fact remains that the role of Italy, especially on the diplomatic level, was of crucial importance. Traditionally, the most valuable asset of Italian diplomacy has been the balance of power which was exploited on the whole with both skill and moderation. The temporary destruction of this balance after the first World War was one of the deep-seated reasons for Italy's dissatisfaction with the settlements that issued from that conflict. Whether Fascist or not, Italy was fated to play a secondary role and to resent and oppose the dominant French influence so long as the structure of Europe resting on French power persisted. The success of the Nazis in Germany in 1933, especially for ideologically like-minded Fascist Italy, offered the possibility of reestablishing some sort of equilibrium. Mussolini's Four-Power Pact of that same year was an attempt to enhance Italy's position by restoring German influence within controllable limits. The attempt failed, but the general preoccupation, especially France's, with a renascent Germany, presented a golden opportunity to embark with relative safety on the Ethiopian adventure, the consequences of which Nazi Germany was not slow to exploit.

It is at this point that Italian policy, with Germany still weak, takes on capital importance, and the book opens with "the liquidation of the Ethiopian undertaking." There are not startling revelations in the sequel, the general known story is in the main confirmed, but useful light is thrown upon it from the Italian angle. France, increasingly torn by internal stress, abdicates her leadership to an unprepared Britain whose use of it causes her to bear a heavy share of the negative responsibility for the coming catastrophe. There is no little irony in the fact, well illustrated in these papers, that Britain had no real quarrel with Italy and not a little sympathy for German aspirations. Italy, too, was

[1]This documentation, also available in England, was presumably used by Elizabeth Wiskemann in the writing of her recent book, *The Rome-Berlin Axis* (Oxford, 1949).

anxious to come to terms with Britain and efforts to that end went on for a long time. The full significance of Fascism appears at this point and the fundamental irreconcilability of radically antagonistic modes of thinking. The British inability to grasp the true nature of Fascist mentality was only matched by the Fascist inability to understand the workings of a Britain controlled in the last analysis by a public opinion that was fundamentally pacific—not to say pacifistic—but highly responsive to moral issues (as witness its reaction to the Hoare-Laval episode and the German occupation of Prague). To be sure, Britain, especially in the person of Neville Chamberlain, unwittingly did her best to mislead Mussolini. Few documents make more interesting reading than Grandi's detailed report of February 18 (incidentally misdated February 13), 1938 of the meeting between himself, Eden and Chamberlain, called by the latter while Eden was unable to obtain a meeting with Grandi and during the course of which the British Prime Minister almost openly sided with the Italian ambassador against his own foreign minister. Grandi himself was bewildered.

But Fascist Italy committed a less pardonable and in the end more fatal, error than misunderstanding democratic Britain. Nazi Germany was after all a kindred regime about which there was little excuse for harboring illusions. It was plausible enough for any Italian government to seek a counterweight for irksome French power; merely to replace that power by the Nazi was sheer folly. The tale of Italo-German relations, especially after the *Anschluss*, is a compound of the sordid and the pathetic, with an admixture of irony and poetic justice. The reiterated German assurance that an ever shrinking Mediterranean basin was an exclusive Italian concern can only be described as humorous. The Italian military record after the country entered the war merely accentuated German high-handedness, until defeated France loomed as large in German calculations as the Italian ally. Clearly the record of these Axis relations is highly incomplete; very little light is shed, for instance, on the question of the South Tyrol, or on the losing fight to preserve some sort of Austrian independence.

There are many other, sometimes incidentally, revealing sidelights. Italy's Central European and Balkan satellites seem to have entertained few illusions on the score of Nazi Germany. Their appeals to Italy had to be met repeatedly with veiled avowals of impotence. The period of collaboration with Yugoslavia under the Stojadinovic regime, shortly followed by designs, eventually implemented, to partition the country, is a good measure of the standards of Fascist diplomatic ethics. The taking over of Albania, ascribed here to a fit of petulance on Mussolini's part, and the later attack on Greece, can hardly be described as other than samples of irresponsible levity. Franco, who commanded personally scant respect from his Axis partners, showed not a little skill in evading their insistent pressure that he enter the war. Italy's decision to go to war antedated the German attack in the West; finally set for June 5, it was put off a few days at Germany's request.

Altogether, this is a valuable record. As stated earlier, it is very incomplete

and we must wait for fuller disclosures before we can assess the share of what may be described as "reasonable" mistakes as against that of sheer incompetence in leading Italy toward ultimate disaster. Of the share of Fascist Italy in leading Europe toward catastrophe this book is merely further confirmation.

Barnard College RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIE
Columbia University

SZABO, ISTVAN, *Tanulmányok a magyar parasztság történetéből* (Studies from the History of the Hungarian Peasantry). Budapest: Teleki Institute: 1948. Pp. 420.

Approximately two thirds of the world's population is engaged in agriculture. This includes a wide variety of occupational grades from the semi-primitive man plowing between the Tigris and the Euphrates, to the highly mechanized, combine-equipped farmer in Canada. The characteristic peasant culture however, which is a common denominator in the agricultural masses liivng between the Baltic and the Balkans, is unique. This block of approximately 6 million peasants with their ancient world outlook, customs and emotional traditions are preserved from the end of the Middle Ages. Their characteristic nature is by no means the outcome of their occupation. Peasantry can not be defined as a class. It includes a system of different classes—indeed a complete society with its proletariat and aristocracy.

In Hungary, where the bulk of the population belongs to or takes its origin from that category, a vigorous movement started in the thirties exploring the life of the peasantry and showing to the public the grave social conditions it lives in. The invaluable work of Bartok and Kodály of collecting the musical motives of the peasants in the Danube Valley gave the initiative to these groups of enthusiastic young writers, sociologists and religious workers. The methods of sociology were often neglected, emotions were widely used and the presentation was often one-sided, although idealistic. They fulfilled however the most important task of drawing public attention to the dynamics of social strain in the agricultural masses. They stood up bravely for their ideas in various court-trials and undeniably succeeded in arousing public opinion. The next step needed was the scientific collection of all the facts of the peasant problem and a systematic study of their history from the beginning. By that time, however, the tide of war entered the Danube Valley and washed away the possibilities of academic study of the problem.

This book, written by a professor of Debrecen University, a well known authority on peasant history, fills an important gap. It gives a systematic study of the evolution of Hungarian peasantry from the end of the Middle Ages to 1848. The author makes an extensive use of almost every reputable work published on the subject in Hungarian and, as a media of primary research, of the municipal, state and family archives. He constantly relies on German and French

publications to give the comparison with contemporary conditions abroad. The influence of Sombart can be observed all through the book.

The author makes a serious endeavor to avoid arbitrariness or emotionalism. His sympathy for the cause of the peasantry is well balanced by his adherence to the academic approach. This is particularly demonstrated in his treatise on the various peasant rebellions. While the stormy political conditions which preserved the peasantry for centuries are carefully presented he devotes ample attenion to the constant flux within the peasantry itself and the internal migrations. A remarkable study is made of the vertical structure of the peasantry as well as the horizontal. The difference in the historic development between the serfs and the inquilinus —the landless agricultural laborers—is stressed all through the book and the author goes into the details of their comparative legal, social and economic situation. The relation of the two groups with each other and with the landowners is shown in its constant change as a direct result of the great historic struggles between the Moslems, the Hapsburgs, and the Hungarian nobility in between. In his comparisons with other countries, the author shows that the personal relationship between serfs and landowners, which in Eastern Germany and Lithuania changed serfdom into slavery by giving the landowners a right to sell or exchange serfs as such without any land, was absent in Hungary. On the other hand the development of city-communities did not have such an important impact upon peasantry in the Danube Valley as in several other countries.

The most important merit, and the same time the greatest shortcoming of the book is that it tries to present the historical development of millions of people with complex and varied problems—through several centuries—in one volume. The extensive usage of footnotes (in several pages the footnote is longer than the text) and the unusually detailed index suggest that the book would serve best as a handbook for the more interested reader who would go through the sources himself for the details, which are constantly reviewed in the footnotes.

The book brings the subject up to 1848, is fair in evaluating the reforms, and explains clearly how the warfare following the bloodless revolution made it impossible for the parliament to enlarge upon the initial reforms and handle the numerous details which had to be solved in the liquidations of the centuries old relationship between serfs and landowners.

Stanford, California IVAN G. NAGY

FLECHTHEIM, OSSIP K., *Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in der Weimarer Republik. Offenbach* a/M, 1948. (Available in the United States from the author, Waterville, Maine, $5.00).

Dr. Ossip K. Flechtheim's history of the German Communist party presents a critical study remarkably free from the bias and special pleading which so frequently finds its way into works dealing with recent and controversial subjects. In his preface the author states his value position—a wise move in a work of this nature—which is socialistic, democratic, and humanistic (p. xvi).

The absence of the scholarly studies on the German Communist Party is remarkable, considering the significance of this party. There are of course several works which touch upon this subject at length, without however making it central, such as Evelyn Anderson's *Hammer or Anvil* (London, 1945) or Franz Borkenau's *The Communist International* (London, 1938).

Beside the work under consideration notice can be given to Ruth Fischer's *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, 1948). Despite an honest attempt on the author's part to produce a scholarly study, Miss Fischer's active participation in the events she describes colors her work considerably. Her position as one of the leaders of the German Communist movement has given her an insight into characters and events, but at the same time this constitutes a serious liability.

Tracing the roots of the German Communist Party to the Social Democratic Party of the Empire and apparently utilizing the theoretical analysis of Robert Michels' *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der Modernen Demokratie* (Leipzig, 1911), Dr. Flechtheim discusses the transformation of the Social Democratic Party from a strict class party to a popular one. The author's thesis is that a revolutionary party will become reformist or even conservative if some of its demands are actualized within the framework of the existing social system, if the realization of the revolutionary aims requires considerable time and if institutional developments lead the revolutionary movement to acquire a vested interest in the status quo.

Although, or perhaps because, the Communist Party was an offspring of the Social Democratic Party, a strong mutual antagonism existed between the two labor parties. The Socialist party during the Empire was never decided as to whether it was in opposition to the feudal-militaristic state of Wilhelm II or to capitalist hourgeois society. Faced with the choice between democracy and socialism, the SDP would invariable choose democracy, while the communists wished the realization of socialistic goals at all costs. Through an analysis of the social composition of the Socialist Party the author refutes Lenin's claim that the party represented a labor aristocracy. Except for the fact that the Communist Party always contained a large number of unemployed, no economic pattern as to why certain workers joined the one or the other of the two parties is discernible. There was, further, a frequent shift from one to the other of these parties depending on the political and economic situation—the communist party's vote increasing during a revolutionary situation and the socialist party profiting from a period of relative stabilization.

While the development and continued existence of the German Communist Party may not be explained solely in psychological terms, Dr. Flechtheim has noted certain tendencies of interest within the KPD.

> In der Regel wird nur der zum Kommunisten, der ueber ein erhebliches Mass von Unzufriedenheit und Groll, Temperament und Aktivitaet verfuegt. Tatengrang und Ungeduld trueben aber kritisches Denken fast immer ebenso stark wie zu raschem Handeln ansporen (p. 216).

It must be noted that this statement could equally well be applied to the Nazi party, indicating the similar psychological basis of both extremist parties. These characteristics rarely led to an objective evaluation of the situation. The fanaticism of the Communists made them regard all opponents as stupid, evil, or both. A refusal to accept communism was regarded as *ipso facto* proof of reactionary or fascistic tendencies; most hated were those who left the Communist Party since they expressed doubts which were felt in some measure by the devoted members.

Dr. Flechtheim makes use of Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* (New York and Toronto, 1941) in which the latter constructs a typology of "true revolutionaries" and "rebels". The latter type, with its ambivalent attitude towards authority, is considered representative of the KPD. Thus the party was radically opposed to the existing bourgeois state, but was blindly subservient to its own leaders and to the Soviet Union. Dr. Flechtheim does not attempt to relate every aspect of the party's course to foreign and internal policy consideration of the Soviet Union, as is done to a large extent in Miss Fischer's book, but neither is this important aspect neglected.

The author assesses considerable blame to the Communist Party for the advent of National Socialism; not only was there a collaboration of the Communist Party with the extreme military Right during the early twenties, but even in the thirties the party recognized "no difference in principle" between a bourgeois democracy and a fascist dictatorship (p. 165). It is further noted that the Communist Party contributed little to the overthrow of the Third Reich.

Dr. Flechtheim concludes by stating that the German Communist Party was largely a failure. Its lack of success was not due to the use of mistaken tactics at various periods in its development, but was the logical consequence resulting from the structure and dynamic of the party.

GEORGE M. KNER

Soviet Views on the Post-War World Economy. Translated by Leo Gruliow. Published as one of the "Current Soviet Thought Series" by the Public Affairs Press in cooperation with the Russian Translation Program of the American Council of Learned Societies. Washington, D. C., 1948. Pp. 128. Mimeographed.

This work is a translation of the stenographic transcript of a discussion of Eugene Varga's *Changes in the Economy of Capitalism Resulting from the Second World War* which took place in Moscow in May, 1947. The discussion is of especial significance because Varga is one of the few economists in the U.S.S.R. who combine competent technical training with a long record of loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union. Varga was for two decades an economic expert of the Comintern and during World War II was personal economic advisor to Stalin. His recent book was the product of his assignment by the All-Union Communist Party to make an objective study of the effect of the war on capitalistic economies and the course of their post-war development for

the guidance of the Party in formulating foreign policy. The conclusions of Varga in his resulting work appear on casual examination to constitute a one-sided evaluation and a bitter indictment of the capitalist economies. Yet the May, 1947 discussion and subsequent events make it clear that the intellectual positions assumed by Varga are considered sensational deviations amounting practically to defense of the potentialities of the capitalist system. The World Institute of Economics in Moscow, of which Varga was Director, was absorbed in the Institute of Economics headed by K. V. Ostrovitjanov and the journal *World Economy and World Politics,* of which Varga was editor, was replaced by *Problems of Economics,* edited by Ostrovitjanov with Varga as his assistant.

The discussion of May, 1947 was under the chairmanship of Ostrovitjanov who opened the meeting by referring to the appearance of Varga's book as an "important and significant event on our theoretical front," valuable because of its "timeliness" and the manner in which it "stimulates thought." Nonetheless, he observed that "the book contains not a few debatable and incorrect propositions" and in the ensuing "creative and comradely" criticism he expected beyond doubt to aid "Comrade Varga in . . . correcting the shortcomings of his book." At a later point Ostrovitjanov commented that the sessions must not be considered a "trial" but a "scientific discussion."

Although the twenty participants were not in complete and detailed agreement on the nature of the "perversions" in Varga's work, and one or two of them even went so far as to champion Varga vigorously, two principal "errors" were generally condemned, as the concluding summary by Ostrovitjanov noted. First, Varga failed to employ the "Stalinist characterization of the general crisis of capitalism as his initial methodological position." He therefore falsely prognosticated that there was no likelihood of a basic economic crisis in Western capitalism in the first ten post-war years. With no looming economic crisis, the death struggle between capitalism and communism was abated; in fact, "the struggle of the two systems was halted during the war." This position, corrects Ostrovitjanov, belies the Stalinist doctrine that the "fundamental . . . proposition in an analysis of capitalism," war and post-war, is "the struggle of the systems.'

Secondly, Varga erred in his attempt to "abstract himself from politics in analyzing economic phenomena." Because of this "error" he was led to an improper analysis of the "role of the state in the war economy of capitalist countries" and a "patent underestimation of the countries of the new democracy [the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe] in the post-war economic and political development of capitalism."

The discussants held that the capitalist state did not and cannot play a "decisive role" in wartime, as Varga asserted, for to do so would contradict the "existence of planlessness and anarchy in the war economy of the capitalist countries." If capitalism can engage in genuine planning, then it can overcome its "general crisis" and that, of course, is an impossibility according to the theory

of Marxism-Leninism. Similarly Varga is judged to be perilously close to "reformism" in his opinion that the state, at certain times, can "force individual monopolies to subordinate their interests" to the national interest, and in his statement of disagreement with the thesis that "the financial oligarchy determines, even in peacetime, . . . the *entire* policy of the state."

Varga also came under fire for his anticipation of the important role of American credits in the post-war reconstruction of Europe; for his conclusion that the war had substantially mitigated the dependence of colonial-imperial areas on England, for example, by changing several of them from a debtor to a creditor status; for his observation that the standard of living of workers in certain capitalist countries had improved during the war; for his introduction of a biological (hence non-economic) factor, namely, population growth, as an important determinant in the post-war development of capitalism; and many other points. Varga, permitted to give the closing remarks in the discussion following Ostrovitjanov's summary of the critique, refused to recant.

The Varga discussion should be studied by all who wish evidence of the role of the intellectual in the Soviet system. (Curiously enough, the economists have been given more freedom to deviate from the Party line than the philosophers, musicians, artists, biologists, and other intellectuals.) The discussion should likewise be studied by those who wish to know whether there is a solid base of good intention and wide understanding supporting the current "peace offensive" of the Soviet Union. Perhaps some light is thrown on this question by the insistence in the discussion on the "Stalinist characterization of the general crisis of capitalism" as the "fundamental proposition" in any analysis of the post-war "struggle of the systems."

University of Colorado CARL MCGUIRE

CLISSOLD, STEPHEN: *Whirlwind, Tito's Rise to Power.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. Pp. 245.

It requires a lot of knowledge to understand the riddle of Balkan politics. For its solution, it would not be sufficient to have a good command of the perplexed history of Balkan nations, or to analyze documentary reports and statistics which, as a rule, serve historians, chroniclers, and reporters to write their stories and reach conclusions. The Balkans have always been an area of passions, governed by mixed feelings of vengeance and gentleness, leading to unpredictable developments. One has to go there, travel and talk to local people to detect the atmosphere, to grasp the greatness and misery of these Balkan nations which have made their countries the most difficult part of the world.

If this is true of the Balkans as a whole, it is doubly true of Yugoslavia and more than that of the war-time Yugoslavia, plunged into a multilateral civil war.

The tragic story of fighting in the Yugoslav mountains and valleys during

World War II will probably not be fully told as long as the present regime of Marshal Tito stays in power and contrives to make important parts of authentic material inaccessible to students of history.

The book of Stephen Clissold, however, following upon the contributions made by R. H. Markham (*Tito's Imperial Communism*) and by David Martin (*Ally Betrayed*), will undoubtedly bring us another considerable step forward in searching for the truth about the Yugoslav struggle for liberation, veiled by unscrupulously biased testimony, as it was given by the Yugoslav communist writers, V. Dedijer, R. Čolaković, and V. Nazor. For Clissold is one of the few foreigners whose experience and knowledge has entitled him to bring to light complexities of the last civil war in Yugoslavia. He saw the country in the agony of disintegration on the eve of war; he had the opportunity to follow its development when it was plunged into a fratricidal struggle; he saw Tito at work as guerilla leader in the deep forests of Yugoslavia and later as Prime Minister in the luxurious palace of former Yugoslav Kings. He was able to read a number of documents in Serbian and penetrate beneath the surface of a seemingly all-national struggle into the core of communist war strategy. His narrative, made up from quotations, stories, authentically reported discussions, brings the reader into the midst of Yugoslav problems. He gives a picture of the chaos which was the result of an old national, religious, and social feud, potentialized in the tragic dimensions of a civil war, in which simple people no longer knew where they belonged. Only their political leaders, officers and partisans knew how to follow their aims: Tito and his partisans to fight the external enemy and internal opposition; Mihailović and his officers to save the Serbian nation from extermination and to fight communism; local traitors to help the invader, the Croat Ustaše, to persecute Serbs; and above all these tragic contradictions were the real enemies: the German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops of occupation. To make this plight more confusing, the Allies had their own plans and their missions, sent by parachutes to Yugoslava, were at first understood to be messengers of sympathy to Mihailović and then seen as spokesmen of Allied support to Tito.

Clissold publishes some decisions of the Comintern and the Yugoslav Communist Party Executive Committee, hitherto unknown, confirming the notion of the Partisan fighting as a struggle for the victory of communism in Yugoslavia. He also brings to light an interview between Churchill and Tito, revealing the awareness of the British Prime Minister of Tito's communist aims. It remains to be explained why, in spite of this, he threw all the weight of his authority to support this irreconcilable foe.

Clissold's *Whirlwind* deserves to be read carefully, especially in this critical period of psychological warfare when Tito's bold stand against the Kremlin, tends to blind many uncritical people and makes them forget the real issues at stake.

University of Denver JOSEPH KORBEL

ITALY; MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA; STATO MAGGIORE DELL'ESERCITO; UFFICIO STORICO: *Il primo passo verso l'unità d'Italia 1848 1849.* Rome: Tipografia Regionale Roma, 1948. Pp. 264.

A great many carefully edited documents and many painstakingly prepared monographs have issued in times past from the Historical Office of the Italian General Staff. The basic documentary collections for 1848-1849 are the three-volume work, *Relazioni e rapporti finali sulla campagna del 1848 nell'Alta Italia* (Rome, 1910) and the single volume with the similar title for 1849 issued in 1911. In 1928 the Historical Office published a remarkably comprehensive, factual, and objective study, *La campagna del 1849 nell'Alta Italia.* The present book does not represent a new and exhaustive work of critical scholarship; there is no documentation: it is a series of six essays commemorating the years which Luigi Sturzo rightfully terms the basic period in the traditions of modern Italy.

Army General Francesco Grazioli, author of several works on military history, narrates operations of 1848; Army General Carlo Geloso, who in 1943 commanded the Italian armies in Greece, describes those of 1849; Army General Mario Caracciolo, author of several works on history and tactics, a veteran of the Libyan War and of both World Wars, who barely escaped being shot by the Germans after the collapse in September, 1943, discusses the military contribution of the Italian states other than Piedmont; Corps General Corselli, a productive military writer, provides a general view of the revolutions in Italy; Division General Cesare Cesari, author of several studies on Garibaldi, describes the volunteers. These authors have technical competence as well as writing experience. Professor Alberto Ghisalberti of the University of Rome, who in 1931 published *Gli albori del Risorgimento italiano,* has written a good essay on the contributions of the arts and letters. There are a few mis-statements of fact. Lord Palmerston was Foreign Secretary, not 'President of the Ministers' as he is designated (p. 220). Military statistics are notoriously difficult and the statistics as given in various parts of the book (pp. 18, 32, 44 n.l, 182) are not altogether consistent.

Achievement of the independence of Italy was basically a military problem and, despite the valid criticisms which can be made of Charles Albert and his army, the fundamental fact is, as stated by Caracciolo: "the war essentially was conducted by the Piedmontese army with the limited aid of a few regular forces and of brave but discordant and divided volunteers" (p. 139). Appreciation of this fact, however, does not justify romancing about the House of Savoy: and there is a great deal of it in this work, particularly in those sections done by Generals Grazioli and Geloso. In the bygone age before World War I, which in a way these old men represent, it was a curious paradox that the army of the French Republic was full of monarchists and the Royal Italian Army had many officers of republican sympathies. Under the aegis of the Italian Republic this work continues the glorification of the House of Savoy. Thus it is stated

that Charles Albert did not hesitate at the outbreak of the war (p. 14). If he did not hesitate from March 19 to 23, the word has no meaning. The assertion (p. 19) comparing the quality of the Piedmontese army of 1848 to that of Prussia, "considered at that time the best in Europe," is doubly in error. The Piedmontese army was not on a par with that of Prussia: the Prussian army of 1848 (not that after 1868) was not, and was not regarded as, the best in Europe. The Italian documentary materials mentioned at the outset, and the contemporary work by Ferdinando Pinelli (*Storia militare del Piemonte*, vol III) scarcely warrant the fulsome praise bestowed on the military reforms of Charles Albert (p. 20). The interpretation of Charles Albert's decision to retreat to Milan, with emphasis on his chivalry and generosity (p. 50), will not stand critical examination. The description of Gioberti's resignation (p. 55) makes no mention of the ugly part played by the King which provoked indignant comment from Cavour. The mutiny which followed Novara is very lightly passed over (p. 95). The brief words regarding the abdication of Charles Albert and the armistice negotiated by Victor Emmanuel II are matters of faith, of national tradition and legend, not fact. Professor Ghisalberti (civilian) is on sounder ground when he remarks (p. 124) that the myth of Charles Albert was already born in response to Italian national hope and feeling, before the revolutions of 1848. For close narration of fact regarding the dynasty during the *Risorgimento*, the writing of Luigi Chiala (1834-1904), who also was a man of considerable military experience, are much to be preferred to those of these generals of a bygone age which appear under the Republic.

Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. HOWARD MCGAW SMYTH

J'ai choisi la Potence—les confidences du Général Vlassov, félon soviétique. Paris: Editions Univers. Pp. 251.

This anonymous little book in its flimsy paper-covered French edition and its sensational title 'I Chose the Gallows' (an apparent paraphrase of Kravchenko's 'I Chose Freedom') does not inspire much confidence. If, however, the reader overcomes his mistrust and begins reading it, he is not likely to put it aside until he has read right through. The book purports to be the inside story of the former Soviet General A. Vlassov, leader of the 'Russian Army of Liberation' which fought with the Germans against the Red Army. The Vlassov movement is one of the grimmest and most obscure stories of World War II.

A conventional appraisal of this book is difficult as it does little more than state facts and these are impossible of verification at this time. It is organized as a diary of Vlassov, dated from September 10, 1942 to September 1943, but according to a note of the publisher it was not written by Vlassov himself but by one of his intimate collaborators now living in South America. The publisher further states that except for replacing by 'I's' the phrase 'Vlassov told me that', the manuscript was in no way 'doctored'.

According to the first entry General Vlassov was summoned by Hitler on September 10, 1942 to the German HQ and asked to form ten volunteer divisions out of his Russian fellow captives. Vlassov obliged with some reservations. However he does not appear from this book to be a simple traitor and puppet but rather as a sincere Russian patriot and a man intent on playing a bold and independent rôle. It was an extremely dangerous game and he lost it. He was, as is known, handed over by our Army to the Soviets who announced latter that they had hanged him.

Beside the reports on conversations with Hitler, there are many others on discussions Vlassov had with Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, Keitel, von Schulenburg, von Beck, Pétain, Laval and other Axis notables. Some of them throw weird side-lights on Hitler's entourage frantically seeking a way out of defeat after Stalingrad by hatching all manners of schemes. in most of which some sort of role was reserved for Vlassov. Thus von Schulenburg supposedly sounded him out on participating in the plot against Hitler, attempted later on July 20, 1944.

The information concerning Vlassov so far published has unfortunately been too scanty to check the revelations of this book. The article of Mr. Wallace Carroll 'It Takes a Russian to Beat a Russian' (*Life* Magazine, December 19, 1949) which discusses the Vlassov movement presumably on the basis of material from German archives, confirms some of the facts of this book but contradicts many others. The full story of Vlassov may never be known, certainly not before the documents of the German archives are thoroughly examined and confirmed with documents from Soviet police archives, when and if these latter may come to light.

Florida State University VICTOR S. MAMATEY

TOSTI, AMEDEF, *Mannerheim e il Dramma della Finlandia.* Bologna: Capelli. 1949. Pp. 171. L. 500.

This short biography of Finland's Marshall Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, written for an Italian audience by Amedeo Tosti, begins with a panoramic review of Finnish history to 1914. The seven following chapters trace the colorful career of the distinguished military leader from his birth in 1867 to the end of the recent Russo-Finnish war.

How have Finnish scholars received this product of an Italian military historian, whose previous works on the Austro-Italian War of 1915-18, the first and the second world wars, have brought him honors from the Italian Academy?

There is, of course, a strong feeling of appreciation. A Finnish reviewer remarked: "We should be grateful that a scholar and writer of Amedeo Tosti's stature has wished to make known in such sympathetic terms recent developments in Finland to the Italian reading public"

Yet conscientious scholars have not hesitated to point out serious deficiencies in Tosti's biographical sketch. Perhaps the most serious stems out of

the Italian's inability to handle the Finnish language. As an unfortunate consequence, such authoritative studies as Kai Donner, *Sotamarsalkka, vapaaherra Mannerheim* (1934), Juhani Passivirta, *Suomen itsenäisyyskysymys 1917* (1947-49), Y. A. Järvinen, *Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa* (1948), E. Kuussaari & V. Niitemaa, *Suomen sota vv. 1941-1945* (1948) were not used. Indeed, the result would have been catastrophic had not J. O. Hannula's excellent study of the Finnish War for Independence (Civil War) been available to Tosti in a French translation. Much of the book, thus, is based on scattered periodical and newspaper materials, which have yielded a shallow, uneven, and at times, erroneous interpretation of Finnish events. The final chapters of the work read more like a journalistic account written with an eye for dramatic effect rather than history.

Reviewers have also chided Tosti for not having asked a competent Finnish scholar to go over the manuscript before publication. Failure to do so has resulted in grievous errors in the spelling of Finnish place- and proper names. For example, *Kalastajasaarento* shows up as *Kabastuiassarrennu* (!) and *Uusimaa* is hidden under *Ayland*. Finnish editing would also have made the accompanying maps, four in number, more accurate and useful.

The biography, finally, has affronted the Finns' notion of modesty. The lavish praise which Tosti heaps upon the marshall (who is introduced to the Italians in the following magnificent manner: "Occorreva un Capo. E come alla Francia della rivoluzione il destino diede un Napoleone, all'-Italia del Resorgimento un Garibaldi, alla rinata Prussia un Moltke, così la Finlandia, nell'ora del cimento supremo per la sua indipendenza e la sua gloria, trovó il suo vindice ed il suo eroe in uno dei suoi figli migliori: Carlo Gustavo Mannerheim!"), his faithful soldiers, and the people of Fnland, goes beyond the limits of credulity. "Surely the book would have been more successful," wrote an honest critic, "and Tosti would have done greater service to Finland and to Mannerheim if he had been more discriminating in the use of adjectives."

In a word, most Finns view the book as having some publicity value, but being deficient in historical scholarship. This reviewer shares their opinion.

Heidelberg College JOHN ILMARI KOLEHMAINEN

MEHNERT, KLAUS and SCHULTE, HEINRICH, edd., *Deutschland-Jahrbuch 1949*. Essen: West Verlag, 1949. Pp. viii, 504. DM 36.

The publication of a German yearbook may properly be regarded as a landmark in the postwar period. The standards of this production may not be up to the prewar days since the statistical material shows a good many gaps, but the impressive aspect is not the defects but rather that as elaborate and useful a compendium could be produced at this particular time. While the binding is not substantial, the printing and quality of paper, the charts and single map, and the general organization and format suggest the high degree of skill displayed by the Germans in the reference work field of an earlier period. The

editors concentrate on factual material rather than on interpretation, as is appropriate in such a publication, and devote at least reasonably proportionate space to all of the zones.

After a foreword pointing out that this yearbook covers the period from May, 1945 down to the autumn of 1948, the editors present two brief chapters which deal with the land and resources and a chronology of important events in Germany from the surrender to the Allies on May 7, 1945 to the assembling of the Parliamentary Council at Bonn on September 1, 1948. The main body of the yearbook is divided into five parts devoted respectively to government, law, and politics, industry, the social order, religion, education, and science, and art and culture. At the end there are two appendices. The first furnishes the names of the members of the Bonn Parliamentary Council, together with their political party affiliations and their places of residence, the same information relating to the Bizonal Economic Council, Council of States, and administrative agencies, and similar data having to do with the zonal and *Länder* governments and Berlin. The second lists 700 of the current leaders in public affairs, industry, and the cultural field. Finally, there is a map which shows zonal and state boundaries.

Part I of the yearbook is subdivided into nine reasonably detailed chapters covering exactly one hundred pages. The several chapters deal with military government organization in general insofar as it affects the Germans, the *Länder,* with a discussion of their constitutions, governments, administrative agencies, police, and civil service, the zones, including Bizonia and the problem of a united Germany, local government, public finance, the tax system, law and justice, including a useful table relating to the Nuremberg trials, and foreign missions, consulates, and international organizations in Germany. With the coverage limited to September, 1948, many significant recent developments which would be of great interest to readers are not dealt with, but despite that fact the greater part of what is included remains valuable.

Part III dealing with the Social Order is subdivided into ten chapters which covering some 120 pages is the most elaborate of all the sections. Here one finds chapters on the New Order, including land reform programs, economic organization, food, agriculture, forestry, mining, electricity, manufacturing, handcraft, transportation, sea shipping, the post office, banking and exchanges, foreign and interzonal trade, and insurance. Not everything which one might desire is here and the statistical material in general does not extend beyond 1947, but almost everything of significance receives at least some attention and the tables and charts are both numerous and helpful.

Part III dealing with the Social Order is subdivided into ten chapters which cover some 70 pages. Topics covered include labor and labor laws, displaced persons, refugees, expellees, and prisoners of war, women, trade unions, trade associations, housing, public health, social insurance, and relief programs. Here again the statistical material is now somewhat out-of-date, but it is conveniently assembled and still valuable in the absence of more complete information. The

fourth section, entitled "Religion, Education, and Science," contains eight chapters and covers about 75 pages. Among its chapters are to be found those dealing with the religious activities, youth, primary and secondary schools, higher education, science, and libraries. Useful lists of universities, technical schools, scientific institutes, and libraries are included. The final section, entitled "Art and Culture," consists of ten chapters covering approximately 75 pages. Here one finds more or less detailed reports in such fields as literature, newspapers and periodicals, book publishing, art, museums, historical monuments, music, the theatre, films, and radio.

Ohio State University HAROLD ZINK

Ukrainian Resistance: The Story of the Ukrainian National Liberation Movement in Modern Times. New York. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America with introduction by Clarence A. Manning, 1949. Pp. vii, 143.

This book is best described by Dr. Manning in his admirable short introduction. "For the first time it gives in English a connected study of the course of events in Ukraine during the occupation of that area by the Soviet Union and the forces of Nazi Germany since 1939, and it traces the rise and history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army which fought bravely and desperately against both totalitarian imperialisms."

The work does not bear the name of an individual author but is presented as the joint offering of the members of the Congress Committee. This Committee is composed of representatives of the outstanding American Ukrainian organizations "devoted to America's national security and peace effort and to the national liberation of Ukraine." From a large number of documents and sources, chiefly in the Ukrainian language, available to them, the authors have compiled a narrative which is familiar enough to close students of Ukrainian affairs but is largely an unknown story, or at best a series of detached fragments, to the American public.

At one time such a book might be dismissed as just another bit of nationalist propaganda. It cannot now be so summarily disposed of. In order to get a clearer idea of what is happening in East Europe we need every possible evidence and nothing can be dismissed without careful examination. Like a man in a jungle we hear from time to time the noise of a scuffle, a scream, a fall, and then there is silence. Ordinarily the man would get out of the jungle as quickly as possible without pausing to investigate. But we cannot do that now. We are living next to a jungle where the swamps and tanglewood are slowly spreading. We must know the ways of the jungle if we are to survive.

This book gives evidence of the desperate attempt of Ukrainian nationalism to maintain itself under the hammer blows of Soviet oppression and the deadly thrust of Nazi conquest. The road which the Ukrainian nationalists followed had its topographical twists and turns but its general direction was always toward the goal of freedom and security.

The fact that the Ukraine is now a member of the United Nations within the orbit of the Soviet Union is regarded by some as marking a definitive ending to its historic struggle for self-government. Such observers even regard the Ukraine as being completely in the camp hostile to free nations. This book will shake the belief of those who have arrived at this conclusion. It will indicate that the Ukrainian people who have borne more than their share of the horribly cruel blows of fate have not only a tremendous capacity for suffering, but that they have retained an amazing resiliency of spirit which deserves wider recognition and sympathy among freedom-loving folk.

Since Ukrainian nationalism along familiar western lines is still a factor which must be reckoned with in the future its manifestations during the years of the war ought to be closely studied and appraised.

University of Saskatchewan GEORGE W. SIMPSON

LANGSAM, WALTER CONSUELO, *Francis the Good, the Education of an Emperor, 1768-1792.* New York: Macmillan, 1949. Pp. 205. $3.50.

In the conventional image Francis, first emperor of Austria and last wearer of the Holy Roman crown, is pictured as the sponsor of a stifling, draconian censorship, an exemplar of bureaucratic totalitarianism, the inveterate and unwearying adversary of progress, who reversed the hands on the clock which forward-looking predecessors, his uncle, Joseph II, and his father, Leopold II, had set moving toward high noon. Wherefore, Francis merits the title, not of "the Good," but of "the Wicked."

Langsam begs to differ with this interpretation which he regards as a demonstrable caricature. His hero, Langsam argues, "inherited a confused, outworn, and reactionary system—reactionary despite anything that Joseph and Leopold in theory might have intended. And it remained for Francis to bring progress and advance into every phase of Austrian life save those related, in one way or another, to politics. . . . In all else he encouraged experimentation and change and improvement" (p. 141). Precious little in this volume upholds that thesis. This is, however, only the first installment of a projected full-length biography running to the death of Francis in 1835. A verdict on whether Langsam has overstrained his argument must await the completion of his labors.

The "Education of an Emperor" carries the career of the Prince to 1792, when, at the age of twenty-four, he assumed the Hapsburg crowns. We are given a succinct survey of the European political scene at that time, with fuller coverage on the heterogeneous Austrian realm. The performance of Francis as regent and as husband and father are described, together with an analysis of his ideas on the nature of good government. The real heart of the book is the schooling and experiences of the Prince in his formative years. Students of pedagogy, in particular, and of aristocratic manners and tastes in the eighteenth century will find much of interest in this section.

The upbringing of the Prince was taken in hand by his father and his

uncle, both of whom qualify as "enlightened despots." They prepared elaborate memoranda on the education of Francis for the guidance of his tutors. Joseph II, "the revolutionary emperor," dreamed indeed of making the Prince a replica of himself imbued with "the spirit of the principles of state introduced by me." The educational programs of the imperial brothers, of which the book contains generous excerpts, are as revealing on the mentality of their authors as on the character of Francis training.

Almost all the teachers were men of the old school, devoutly religious, and conscientious in the execution of their assignment. They discovered that their charge was a problem child, as indeed all children are, arrogant, ambitious, short on initiative, long on indolence. Count Francis Colleredo, the principal master, lamented that Francis "likes to dawdle over trivialities and unimportant things"—a tendency which, up to a point, lingered with him. Though only modestly successful in learning from books, the pupil acquired a lasting interest in social and economic affairs and, blessed with a capacious memory, he displayed unusual facility with languages. Religious instruction repelled him, but Langsam leaves us in ignorance on the theological opinions of the Prince. His military schooling was conventionally attended to and in his baptism of fire he acquitted himself with credit. Relaxations and hobbies he had aplenty.

A British observer, impressed with the end-result of Francis' training, urged that the same methods should be adopted as a standard pattern for the well-born. Not so, however, Joseph II, who was thoroughly disappointed with the youth upon his arrival in Vienna in 1784, and desired to start the whole process of education over again. Father Leopold had misgivings, too, but eventually he praised the Prince for "firmness, integrity and discretion."

Langsam equates Gallicanism with rationalism, whereas nationalism would be much closer to the mark. And it is more than doubtful whether the world-wide prestige of the Vienna medical faculty survived World War I, as the author asserts. But these are picayune points in a work of originality, composed by a scholar in full command of the relevant literature, who has contrived admirably to recapture the *milieu* wherein Francis I grew to maturity.

The University of Rochester ARTHUR J. MAY

BRANDT, KARL, *Germany, Key to Peace in Europe.* Claremont, California: Claremont College, 1949. Pp. ix, 109. $2.00.

This book consists of three lectures delivered in 1949 for the Associated Colleges of Claremont and California. The group of business and professional men who sponsored them were presumably entitled to a penetrating and factual analysis of the past, present, and future relationship of Germany to the peace of Europe and of the world. They did not receive it. A better title for the work would be: *Germany, Key to Power in Europe, or How to Win the Germans Quickly to Our Side in the Cold War.* Such a consideration may be proper for diplomats and officials, but it has little to do with the long-range problem of

integrating Germany into a peaceful Europe. The reader who comes to Professor Brandt's book hoping for new light—or even refiltered old light—on the roots, origins, and prospects of German aggressiveness of the twentieth century, and suggestions for curing it will be meagerly rewarded. Evidently the author believes that the most serious problems concerning Germany are how to restore its economic productivity rapidly and effectively and how to give it independence with maximum speed. The impression conveyed by this book is that the Nazi régime was "no more than a phase in German history and one might say, a manifestation of but one sort of conduct and the predilection of a specific type of Germans" (pp. 6-7). Granted; but how can we be sure the "phase" is ended? How can we guard against its recurrence? What aspects of German historical tradition, social organization, culture, and folkways permitted the "specific type" to gain control of the nation and to lead it, obedient to the last, into a career of the most insane and vicious destruction the world has ever experienced? Not only does Mr. Brandt not answer these questions: he does not even raise them. One searches his lectures in vain for a mention of the fact that the three traditional incubators of German nationalism, militarism, expansionism, and authoritarianism are Junkerdom, the cartelized industrialists, and the universities. Despite the record of German racial fanaticism in recent years, Professor Brandt calls the manifestations of resurgent nationalism since the war "not objectionable, because they are only a symbol of the psychological process of self-preservation by people who have gone through the most degrading phase of their national history and have been made to understand that all nations consider them collectively as outcasts" (p. 92). The slate, indeed, Mr. Brandt, implies, is clean; Germany and Europe are quits. The Germans are "a people whom the Lord has punished as severely as any nation on earth was ever punished" (p. 61). Poles, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Yugoslavs, and European Jews might dissent sharply from this dictum.

Professor Brandt regrets much that has happened in the past decade. He deplores the excesses of the occupation troops in Germany; who does not? He has harsh words for the Morgenthau Plan; they may well be justified, but the Morgenthau Plan has long been a dead duck. He believes the Allied policy of insisting upon unconditional surrender instead of a negotiated peace was unwise; he may be right. He thinks the Allies made a mistake in not treating with the anti-Hitler conspirators; again, he may be right, though he does not prove convincingly that this group could really have seized power. But when he dignifies this handful of highly-placed, mostly conservative individuals by the name of "Resistance" and implies thereby a kinship with the heroic, uncompromising, persevering activities of the Resistance movement in the occupied countries, with their intensely democratic drive and their broad social basis of support, he is overlooking a fundamental difference between the Germany of our times and the rest of Europe. This difference is embodied in the fact that there simply *was no German* Resistance movement comparable to that in other countries.

Germans," he says, "have revived a free press, are making use of their freedom of speech and assembly, vote with good judgment and are reforming their educational system. . . . Hungry and destitute German people did not vote

Professor Brandt evidently thinks the difference no longer exists. "The communist, but instead laid the foundation for a genuine democracy and elected leaders of well-known and well-tested democratic convictions" (p. 70). From this rosy picture well-informed and competent Western observers — including some of our occupation officials—dissent with growing anxiety. Professor Brandt's view of politics and of democracy, however, is a rather remarkable one. He characterizes the Liberal Democratic Party as one "on the extreme left"! The Liberal Democrats are the party of Theodor Heuss, who since the war has reissued a volume of biographical sketches—originally published separately under the Hitler régime—in which he bestows high praise upon Alfred Krupp, among others. If Heuss is an extreme Leftist, then Papen, Schacht, and Neurath were sound, middle-of-the-road democrats and Hitler a right-of-center moderate, and there is no need to feel uneasiness for the future of democracy in Germany.

Professor Brandt's economic program calls for a continued expansion of West German economy and a free flow of German trade to the rest of the world. His political program envisages the integration of Western Germany into Western Europe at once (even two or three years from now, he declares, may be too late) by the conclusion of a peace treaty between the West German republic and the Western powers and the granting of economic sovereignty to the republic, together with the right to have diplomatic and consular representatives in foreign countries and to enjoy full membership in the OEEC. The Ruhr Authority, he thinks, should be revised, to extend its authority over French and Belgian coal and steel resources, so that the Germans need no longer feel discriminated against. The Germans should "eventually" furnish contingents for a Western European army. Germans should participate in an international "exchange of thought and experience on the question of labor-management in both countries . .. [Germany and Italy] have learned a great deal from the past 25 years, and the relations between the two seem to me—perhaps not generally—but in a great many cases, to be on a more advanced level than in other Western countries." (p. 102) Some of Professor Brandt's readers will doubtless be of the opinion that no democratic country has anything good to learn from German business management, which is still largely in the hands of the same men who favored the destruction of the European trade unions and the exploitation of slave labor.

All the doubts we may entertain about Germans as supporters of democracy are resolved for Dr. Brandt by one fact: the Western Germans voted against communism. There was one period, not long ago, when leaders of some Western democracies welcomed German leaders as allies against communism wihout inquiring too closely into their views and purposes. The period was the 1930's, the policy was called "appeasement", and the result appeared in 1939.

Indiana University C. Leonard Lundin

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